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ABSTRACT 
‘Corporate Venturing (CV)’, which is broadly defined as an innovation practice by creating and 
nurturing internal CV teams or investing in external start-ups (Burgelman, 1983b; Dushnitsky 
and Lenox, 2005), has been adopted by large incumbent firms wishing to ensure their survival 
and business s growth in the future. Despite its promised benefits, CV activities are often 
terminated in the early stages. Nevertheless, some firms start their CV programs again, and 
these recurring patterns of CV activities contribute towards ‘CV cyclicality’. However, we have 
limited understandings of the phenomenon of CV cyclicality at the level of the firm. This thesis, 
therefore, aims to develop a better understanding of the cyclical nature of CV (i.e. CV cyclicality) 
in a way that helps managers manage CV activities—engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007). 
To explore CV cyclicality at the firm level, this thesis adopted an in-depth case study approach. 
A large Korean ICT firm (pseudonym: Company Alpha), which is the exemplar of a large firm in 
Korea that repeated CV activities over time, was examined (from early 2013 to 2017) to find out 
how CV activities were developed, terminated, and then re-started during the period between 
1990 and 2015. This approach enabled to find the importance of the term ‘direction’ for the CV 
practitioners at Company Alpha and in the Korean context. Hence, this thesis also aims to 
usefully conceptualize ‘direction’ itself to understand and explain Company Alpha’s corporate 
venturing activities and how they repeat over time. 
This thesis suggests that the direction of corporate venturing (CV) can be usefully conceptualized 
as an internal consistency between the firm’s structure (with actors residing in the structure) 
and its strategy. Drawing on research orchestration theory (Sirmon et al., 2007; 2011), a 
conceptual framework (the direction of CV) was developed by combining both the main 
managerial actors who conduct CV activities (the starting point) and the primary strategic 
objective that the CV program pursues and is designed to achieve (the end point). 
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The thesis demonstrates that this new framing of direction helps us to better understand and 
explain Company Alpha’s repeating CV cycles. From the examination of the twenty-six years 
history of CV (from 1990 to 2015) at the Korean ICT firm through the lens of the direction of CV, 
this thesis makes its main argument about the CV cyclicality at Company Alpha: rather than being 
terminated separately, a series of CV programs evolved over time for the purpose of combining 
resources in a new way; results of deliberate and experimental efforts then formed an 
evolutionary cycle of CV. The thesis also argues that what was terminated during the firm’s 
repeated CV activities was, instead, a distinct evolutionary cycle of CV, which later re-initiated 
with the next CV cycle. 
This thesis makes substantial contributions to knowledge. Firstly, this thesis makes contributions 
to the CV literature by providing a detailed and empirical evidence-based explanation of CV 
cyclicality at a large Korean high-tech firm (repeated evolutionary CV cycles aimed at new 
resource combination), which goes beyond a relatively simple dichotomy between termination 
and evolution. Secondly, the thesis also contributes to the strategy and innovation management 
literature by suggesting a new framing of direction from an internal firm perspective. This helps 
us to understand organizational and strategic change in a new way that organizations can 
generate changes proactively by reconfiguring their internal elements, even without stimuli 
external to the firm. Thirdly, for practitioners, the findings from the thesis contribute by 
providing an empirical insight that can help managers manage their CV activities. Almost no 
organizational memory about their previous CV efforts remained within the firm, however, this 
thesis casts an empirical light by unfolding how a repeating pattern (the evolution of CV) 
occurred within the first (1997–2002) and the second CV cycle (2011–2015) of the firm. The case 
firm and other companies may benefit from having knowledge of a corporate history of CV cycles 
including failures.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Background 
Incumbent firms in rapidly changing environments have to continually innovate in order to 
survive and grow (Schumpeter 1942/1975). This innovation involves both incremental 
innovation for undertaking current business better, and also activities to stimulate radical 
innovation for creating different future business opportunities. Markides (1997) divides this 
into a ‘better game’ and a ‘different game’. From a Schumpeterian perspective, ‘better’ and 
‘different’ are associated with “the doing of things that are already being done in a new way” 
and “the doing of new things” (Schumpeter, 1947: 151). 
Innovation at the level of the firm can be defined as the process of commercialization by which 
ideas are searched, selected, and then implemented into new products and services to capture 
their benefits (Tidd and Bessant, 2013). Innovation is not therefore invention, which is often a 
one-off event (Freeman and Soete, 1997). Instead, innovation is a process that benefits from 
being managed strategically. 1  The strategic importance of innovation to firms is widely 
accepted, but this acceptance raises fundamental questions about how large, incumbent firms 
can continually innovate in their products, services, technologies, and businesses. How do they 
and how should they continually undertake innovation in order to survive and grow? 
                                                            
1 Not surprisingly, there is a wide variety of definitions of innovation. For example, emphasizing the 
processual feature of innovation, Van de Ven (1986: 591) defined innovation as “the development and 
implementation of new ideas by people who over time engage in transactions with others within an 
institutional context.” 
Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, 
a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem. —Popper (1963) Conjectures and Refutations 
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This issue has been a central topic in both the innovation and the strategy literature where 
emphasis is placed on “the sustained management of innovation and change” (Tushman and 
Nadler, 1986: 74) as a source of ‘sustainable competitive advantage (SCA)’ (e.g. Barney, 1986; 
Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). In a similar way, the innovation management literature stresses 
the crucial role of continued and on-going innovation and the management of ‘sustained 
corporate innovation’ (e.g. Rothwell, 1992; Utterback, 1994; Dodgson et al., 2008; Tidd and 
Bessant, 2013). This is closely related to the question of “how firms achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage” (Herrmann, 2005: 111), which has been one of the fundamental 
questions in the strategic management literature from the outset. 
Here, the strategic use of innovation to achieve sustainable competitive advantage is crucial 
(Keupp et al., 2011).2 As will be discussed in this thesis, large established firms often undertake 
innovation activities, or practices, in a strategic way to both search for new business and 
technological opportunities and build capabilities that enable firms to create and capture the 
value of the opportunities they have identified. This allows firms to achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage for their survival and growth. Although a lot of exploration about how 
large, incumbent firms manage their strategic innovation practice has been carried out in the 
past (e.g. Kanter, 1989; Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1990; Christensen and Raynor, 2003), it 
remains under-explored, despite its importance. The motivation for this study is therefore to 
develop a better understanding of the process of large firms’ strategic innovation practice. 
Especially, this thesis will focus on an innovation practice called corporate venturing (CV), 
which will be set out in the following section. 
                                                            
2 The strategic use of innovation should be distinguished from Markides’ (1997) ‘strategic innovation’. 
According to Markides (1997: 11), ‘strategic innovation’ means “the strategy of breaking the rules”, 
which allows a firm “to successfully attack the established industry leaders or to successfully enter a 
new market where established players exist … [without] the benefit of a new technological innovation”. 
Approaches to strategic innovation include redefinition of customers (who); products and services 
offered to customers (what); and ways to offer products or services cost efficiently (how) (Ibid.: 12). 
 [3] 
 
1.2  Research topic and problems 
1.2.1 Corporate Venturing (CV) 
Corporate Venturing (CV) is an innovation practice strategically conducted by large established 
firms. In their classical book on CV, Block and MacMillan (1993) highlighted that a firm’s 
managerial activities are corporate venturing when it: 
1) involves an activity new to the organization; 2) is initiated or conducted internally; 3) 
involves significantly higher risk of failure or large losses than the organization’s base 
business; 4) will be managed separately at some time during its life; and 5) is 
undertaken for the purpose of increasing sales profit, productivity or quality. (Block and 
MacMillan, 1993: 14) 
As we shall see in Chapter 2, the way firms conduct CV has evolved since the 1960s, and in this 
thesis, CV refers to the venturing activities of large established firms (Von Hippel, 1973), which 
includes (1) creating venture teams inside the firm; (2) nurturing those teams; and (3) making 
them into new business units (internal CV) (e.g. Burgelman, 1980; Block and MacMillan, 1993; 
Tidd and Taurins, 1999; Van Burg et al., 2012; Burgelman and Sayles, 1986). The term also 
includes (4) investing equity (and other kinds of support) in external start-ups outside the firm 
(external CV). This firm-based venture capital activity is also known as Corporate Venture 
Capital (CVC) (e.g. Hardymon et al., 1983; Sykes, 1990; Keil, 2000; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). 
CV has been highlighted as a potential option for realizing firms’ growth strategies, which can 
be indicated by new business development and growth in sales, market shares, and profits 
(Biggadike, 1979; Kuratko et al., 2009). Firms often make a strategic decision to undertake CV 
as a “source of growth and renewal” (Block and MacMillan, 1993: 71) as part of a firm’s ‘growth 
strategy’. As an important part of firms’ innovation strategies (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005), 
CV can have other benefits, such as stimulating intrapreneurship within the existing 
organization (Pinchot, 1985; Parker, 2011) and spreading a creative organizational culture 
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across the firm (Dushnitsky, 2006). 
1.2.2 The cyclical nature of CV activities: CV cyclicality 
Despite evidence of its benefits, practitioners face challenges in managing corporate venturing 
given its risks and uncertainty, which are inherent to innovation (Makarevich, 2017). Empirical 
evidence suggests that CV activities are often terminated in their early stages. Considering that 
the longevity of CV (and CVC) programs is “influenced by the early venture failure/success” 
(Sykes, 1986: 281), the average longevity of CVC programs in the 1990s, for example, was only 
2.5 years (Dushnitsky, 2011: 45).3 This short lifespan can be problematic if the CV activities 
were terminated before achieving their desired outcomes. A number of potential causes of 
CV’s termination have been proposed in the literature: such as unclear missions (Burgers et al., 
2009); insufficient commitments (Birkinshaw and Hill, 2005); inadequate processes (Enkel and 
Goel, 2012); and disappointed decision-makers (Block and MacMillan, 1993). Whereas, 
theoretical and practical frameworks which help understand the dynamics of CV (including 
termination) are still quite limited. 
An interesting empirical phenomenon is that, some firms start their CV programs again with 
different—either strategic or financial—objectives and with new types of organizational 
structures (Burgelman and Valikangas, 2005). These recurring (or repeating) patterns of CV 
activities, which start, terminate, and restart, may collectively contribute towards cyclicality in 
corporate venturing (e.g. Fast, 1978; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Burgelman and Valikangas, 
2005; Birkinshaw and Hill, 2005; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006). With regard to the cyclical 
nature of CV activities, Gompers and Lerner (1998) initially highlighted that there are three 
‘waves’ in the history of CV funds starting from the mid-1960s, and these findings have been 
                                                            
3 Dushnitsky (2011: 45) pointed out that, in the 2000s, the average lifespan of CVC programs was 
extended to “3.8 years and more than 40 per cent have been working four years or longer.” 
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elaborated and extended by other scholars (e.g. Birkinshaw and Hill, 2005; Dushnitsky and 
Lenox, 2006; Dushnitsky, 2011). According to Gompers and Lerner (1998): 
The first corporate venture funds began in the mid-1960s, about two decades after the 
first formal venture capital funds. The corporate efforts were spurred by the successes 
of the first organized venture capital funds … Excited by this success, large companies 
began establishing divisions that emulated venture capitalists. During the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, more than 25% of the Fortune 500 firms attempted corporate venture 
programs. (Gompers and Lerner, 1998: 6-7) 
However, the collapse of the market for initial public offerings (IPOs) in 1973 as well as 
recession at this time brought an end to the first wave of corporate venturing activities 
(Birkinshaw and Hill, 2005; Dushnitsky, 2011). And, as Birkinshaw and Hill (2005) noted, this 
was followed by the second wave:  
A second wave of [corporate venturing] activity began in the early 1980s, fueled by 
substantial growth in the computer and electronics sectors. When recession hit in the 
late 1980s, once again, corporate venturing efforts sputtered and halted. (Birkinshaw 
and Hill, 2005: 248) 
Dushnitsky (2006; 2011) explained the third wave of corporate venturing activity in the 1990s: 
The third wave, which took place in during the 1990s, reflected a surge in venture 
capital investing. It was a period characterised by technological advancement and an 
explosion in Internet-related new ventures. The number of CVC programmes soared to 
more than 400; and, by the year 2000, established corporations had become important 
players in the venture capital industry, managing more than $16 billion (approximately 
15 per cent of all venture capital investment that year). (Dushnitsky, 2011: 49) 
Today, we are observing “Corporate venturing is on the rise” (Battistini et al., 2013: 31), which 
is indicated by more than $7.5 billion funding by CVC programs in 2015 to the software, 
biotechnology, and energy sectors: the highest level since 2000.4 This indicates that CV is going 
                                                            
4  Lavine (2016) ‘Corporate venturing rises to highest rate since 2000’, [online], Global Corporate 
Venturing, 21 January, Available from: http://www.globalcorporateventuring.com/article.php/12894/ 
corporate-venturing-rises-to-highest-rate-since-2000 [Accessed 25 January 2017] 
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through its fourth historical wave. After thirty years’ studying internal CV (ICV), Burgelman 
highlighted that ICV activities are characterized by a “seemingly endless cycle” (Burgelman and 
Valikangas, 2005: 26), and termed this as ‘ICV cyclicality’. When taking internal and external 
CV together, the term can then be defined as CV cyclicality. Henry Chesbrough briefly explained 
what might be a general pattern behind this cyclicality: 
The general pattern is a cycle that starts with enthusiasm, continues into 
implementation, then encounters significant difficulties, and ends with eventual 
termination of the initiative. Yet, within a few years, another generation of businesses 
undertakes the effort anew, and the cycle occurs again. (Chesbrough, 2000: 31) 
However, as Burgelman and Valikangas (2005: 33) pointed out, “there has been little 
systematic discussion of what generates the start, duration and ending of the ICV [,or CV] 
cycle.” 5  This recurrent phenomenon calls for a further investigation in order to better 
understand the cyclical nature of CV activities, i.e. CV cyclicality. 
In understanding the phenomenon of CV cyclicality at the firm level (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 
1998; Chesbrough, 2000; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Burgelman and Valikangas, 2005; Lerner, 
2013), it is mainly explained in the CV literature in two ways: termination versus evolution. 
Supporters of CV’s termination suggest that CV activities are designed to be short-lived during 
the “periods of severe technological discontinuity” (Gompers and Lerner, 1998: 4), hence they 
are soon terminated. From this viewpoint, a firm’s ‘CV cycles’ could be the result of termination 
of CV activities (or programs) repeated over time. Whereas from an evolutionary perspective, 
CV cycles can be a result of deliberate and experimental effort. For example, Fast (1977) argued 
that, although CV activities have a short-term life span, CV units that successfully evolve 
through changing the objectives and types of their CV activities (e.g. CV programs) can survive. 
                                                            
5 In this thesis, the ‘waves’ of CV both at the global and national level are distinguished from the ‘cycles’ 
of CV at the level of the firm, which is the focal point of this thesis. 
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This issue about CV cyclicality is important because a firm’s CV cycles could be the result of 
undesirable terminations (i.e. repeated mistakes). Given the uncertainty in CV, which is 
inherent in innovation activities, it is not surprising that CV activities sometimes fail. However, 
if a firm were to cease those activities completely, and then restart them from scratch—with 
new members and a new set of rules—several years later, it might find itself repeating another 
unsuccessful CV cycle. 
Therefore, assuming that there is a cyclical nature to CV activities, a better understanding of 
CV cyclicality would help managers make sense of their CV history, and also manage CV 
activities in a more strategic way. This can be supported by a framework that help understand 
and explain CV cyclicality at the level of the firm. 
1.3  Research context and research questions 
1.3.1 Three waves of CV in Korea and Company Alpha (the exemplar of CV cyclicality) 
As noted in the previous section, there is a cyclical nature of CV (i.e. CV cyclicality) at a global 
level (largely based on the US and European data), which can be divided into three waves: the 
first wave since the mid-1960s; the second in the early 1980s; and the third during the 1990s 
(e. g. Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006). CV researchers suggest that a 
new wave of CV began since the early 2000s (e.g. Battistini et al., 2013; Dushnitsky, 2011). Also, 
in South Korea (hereafter ‘Korea’), there is a local phenomenon of CV cyclicality, which can be 
divided into three different waves: The analysis of CV studies on Korean firms—which are few 
in number (e.g. Lee, 2009; Kim et al., 2012)—and the newspaper articles since the 1980s 
suggests that the first Korean CV wave began in the mid-1980s; the second in the mid-1990s; 
and the third wave has started in Korea since the early 2010s. 
The objective of this research is to develop a better understanding of the cyclical nature of CV 
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(i.e. CV cyclicality) at the level of the firm. The thesis also aims to understand a pattern of CV 
cyclicality in a way that helps managers manage their CV activities. The first research question 
of the thesis is then articulated as follows: 
How are corporate venturing activities developed, terminated, and then re-started at the level 
of the firm? 
The articulation of the research question addresses a key issue highlighted by research 
methodologists: “What is the case a case of?” (e.g. Becker, 1992; Ragin, 1992). The case in this 
thesis is a case of the process of the repeat of a range of CV activities in the large firm. 
To explore CV cyclicality at the level of the firm, this thesis adopts a case study approach (e.g. 
Ragin, 1997; Morgan, 2012; Yin, 2013). As we shall see in Section 4.2 (research design section), 
a case firm (Company Alpha) is chosen as it is the exemplar of a large firm in Korea that repeats 
CV activities over time. Company Alpha was founded in 1990 as an Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) subsidiary of a multinational business group (the Alpha 
Group) headquartered in Korea.6 This firm is unique in the history of the development of CV in 
Korea, because it has been at the center of all three CV waves in Korea—both indirectly and 
directly. In the first Korean CV wave (in the mid-1980s), a subsidiary of the Alpha Group 
(Company Delta) became a pioneer of CV in Korea.7 But in both the second (in the mid-1990s) 
and third (in the early 2010s) waves, Company Alpha itself operated a range of CV programs. 
For example, Venture-α, which was originally a CV team with an internet-based business model, 
was successfully spun-off in the late 1990s from Company Alpha; this is still regarded as one of 
the most successful CV cases in Korean CV history. 
                                                            
6 As will be discussed in the research design part (Chapter 4), the real name of this case study firm is 
disguised for the anonymity of the research. 
7 The Korea Economic Daily (1986) ‘Company Delta launches corporate venturing, reducing the risks in 
new business development’ 
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1.3.2 The importance of ‘direction’ in managers’ framing of CV management 
Observation of, and interaction with, a number of CV managers across different levels within 
Company Alpha throughout the period 2012 to 2014 highlighted the importance of the term 
direction. Thinking in Korean CV practitioners’ first language system helped engage with their 
thought processes. In the Korean language, ‘방향 (bang-hyang)’ is the same as the Chinese 
word ‘方向 (fangxiàng)’, where both words mean ‘direction’. The term ‘방향 (bang-hyang)’ is 
typically used in firms’ strategy meetings and business documents, which include when CV 
managers designed and operated a range of CV programs. Earlier in this period, those actors 
were very enthusiastic about their growing number of CV programs and new business ideas 
flowing through to the programs. Starting from 2012, however, there were noticeable changes 
in these actors as they were more and more disappointed by actual business outcomes. Their 
words frequently used in the latter part of this period were converged into a theme: the 
importance of the direction of CV activities. For example, in the spring of 2013, a manager at 
Company Alpha’s CV unit said: 
After all, this is about the problem of directionality. … We don’t have a clear direction 
of corporate venturing. (I-M, personal interview, 2013). 
However, it was also revealed that there was often considerable ambiguity about how the 
concept ‘direction’ itself is interpreted by different actors within the organization. At Company 
Alpha, the term ‘direction’ was often used in a vague and inconsistent way.8 
                                                            
8 Garud and Van de Ven (1992) suggested that ‘uncertainty’ and ‘ambiguity’ are two important aspects 
of CV activities. As these authors pointed out, “[p]ersistence with a course of action is likely to occur 
especially when there is ambiguity about the right direction to pursue. While uncertainty implies 
imperfect knowledge about the causal relationship between means and ends, ambiguity implies 
imperfect knowledge of which ends are worth pursuing” (Garud and Van de Ven, 1992: 95; emphasis 
added). In this thesis, however, the ambiguity in CV means the different interpretation of the meaning 
of ‘direction’ by different actors (i.e. a vague and inconsistent usage of the term). 
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1.3.3 The importance of ‘direction’ in the Korean context 
It is not surprising ‘direction’ is important to the people at Company Alpha. Today, in the 
Korean context, the importance of direction is also highly emphasized. Korea is one of the few 
countries that have succeeded in ‘catching up’ and is moving on to ‘forging ahead’ 
(Steinmueller, 2017). The Korean Government’s 2017 report “The Direction of the new 
Government’s Economic Policy” highlights the fact that the direction of the catching-up 
strategy is no longer valid, as the frontiers to imitate, or to catch up with, are disappearing.9 
The report then concludes by urging that the country needs to pursue an “innovation-led 
growth” to explore future growth.10, 11 Assuming that there is a global frontier and a country is 
located at some point behind this frontier, the concept of direction may be obvious because 
‘catching up’ is “a process with an end”—i.e. to catch up with the frontiers (Steinmueller, 2017: 
72). However, in the current Korean national context, not only in the case of Company Alpha, 
policy makers and advisors also face challenges in setting the direction of innovation. 
Indeed, direction is a core feature of strategy and innovation. In the strategy literature, for 
example, strategy is often regarded as “about the direction of organizations, and most often, 
business firms” (Rumelt et al., 1994: 9; emphasis added), where strategy is assumed as a plan 
with some kind of direction (Mintzberg, 1987; Mintzberg et al., 2009). Also in the management 
of strategic innovation, it is crucial to have a “clear sense of direction” (Tidd and Bessant, 2014: 
21). However, within the firm, there was a degree of widespread ambiguity about what 
                                                            
9 Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2017), ‘The Direction of the new Government’s Economic Policy’ 
10 Ibid. 
11 This shift from imitation to innovation in the Korean context was already discussed in the late Lin-su 
Kim’s book, From imitation to innovation (Kim, 1997), where he discussed the development of 
technological capabilities in the Korean industries since the early 1960s. However, this thesis suggests 
that to understand the direction of, and set the direction of, innovation both in the firm and at a national 
level have become more crucial for the country. 
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‘direction’ really means, let alone how it can be managed.12 
As set out in Section 1.3.1, this thesis aims to develop a better understanding of the cyclical 
nature of CV (i.e. CV cyclicality) in a way that helps managers manage CV activities—engaged 
scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007). The thesis therefore attempts to usefully conceptualize 
‘direction’ itself in a way that would help managers make sense of the phenomenon of CV 
cyclicality, which we address in the first research question. Hence, the second research 
question can be articulated as follows: 
How can different understandings of direction help managers and academics understand and 
explain Company Alpha’s corporate venturing activities and how they repeat over time? 
As we shall see in Chapter 3, the thesis reviews how ‘direction’ is used in the organizational 
change and the strategic management literature; and in Chapter 7, apply the idea of the 
direction of CV to help understand the process of the repeat of CV activities at Company Alpha. 
1.4  Thesis arguments and potential contributions 
As highlighted in Section 1.2.2, there are contested viewpoints in the CV literature about the 
cyclicality of CV between termination (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1998) and evolution (Fast, 
1977). However, as Burgelman and Valikangas (2005) point out, little systematic discussion has 
been taken place about CV cyclicality. 
                                                            
12 Regarding the ambiguities involved in understanding of ‘direction’, an example of a ‘world map’ could 
be used to enlighten us. There is no doubt from this that the US is a ‘western country’, however, on the 
world maps generally used in Korea (e.g. in textbooks), the US is on the right side of the map as those 
maps are centered on Korea. From the viewpoint of maybe a few Korean people, the US could be an 
‘eastern country’. This suggests an example of potential inconsistency, or an ambiguity, in the concept 
of direction. We may have assumed what direction is and how it is determined; however, we may not 
have adequately questioned about the definition and measurement of direction. Some linguists, social 
scientists, and engineers conducted an interdisciplinary work (Van de Zee and Slack, 2003) to explore 
the meaning of direction in a linguistic and spacial sense. However, this thesis aims to address this 
concept in the context of strategy and innovation. 
 [12] 
 
From an examination of the twenty-six years history of CV (from 1990 to 2015) at a Korean ICT 
firm, which is the exemplar of the firm that repeated CV activities over time, this thesis makes 
its main argument about the CV cyclicality at Company Alpha: rather than being terminated 
separately, a series of CV programs evolved over time for the purpose of combining resources 
in a new way; results of deliberate and experimental efforts then formed an evolutionary cycle 
of CV. The thesis also argues that what was terminated during the firm’s repeated CV activities 
was, instead, a distinct evolutionary cycle of CV, which later re-initiated with the next CV cycle. 
Therefore, this thesis contributes towards the CV literature by providing this detailed and 
empirical evidence-based explanation of CV cyclicality at a large Korean high-tech firm. These 
ideas go beyond a relatively simple dichotomy between termination and evolution. The thesis 
then helps us understand the CV cycles of the firm in a new way: repeated evolutionary CV 
cycles aimed at new resource combination. 
Importantly, the idea of direction allows us to better understand and explain Company Alpha’s 
repeating CV cycles. As we shall see in chapter 3, traditional strategy literature discussed 
‘direction’ in strategic settings mainly focusing on the content of the firm’s strategy. However, 
this thesis additionally focuses on managerial actors who play a key role in the organization’s 
proactive change and the process of strategy implementation. 
This thesis suggests that the direction of corporate venturing (CV) can be usefully 
conceptualized as an internal consistency between the firm’s structure (with actors residing in 
the structure) and its strategy. A conceptual framework (the direction of CV) is developed by 
combining a focus on both the main managerial actors who conduct CV activities (the starting 
point), and on the primary strategic objective that the CV program pursues and is designed to 
achieve (the end point). 
Seen through the lens of the direction of CV, it allows us to see a pattern of change from 
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Company Alpha’s twenty-six-year history of CV activities. One is changes in the starting point 
of direction (i.e. locus of innovation): main managerial actors (and the structural units they 
reside in) of CV activities swung between the technology and the marketing sides within the 
firm. The other is changes in the ending point of direction (i.e. strategic objective): a series of 
CV programs were developed, terminated, and then re-started with changes in the primary 
strategic objective of the CV programs between exploration of new business opportunities and 
exploitation of identified opportunities. 
The thesis contributes to the strategy and innovation management literature by providing a 
new framing of direction from an internal firm perspective, which considers both managerial 
actors and the program-level strategy. It draws on the underexplored, prospective research 
agenda of research orchestration (RO) theory: the depth (multiple levels of structures and 
actors) and breadth (multiple levels of strategies) of RO (Sirmon et al., 2011). This new idea of 
direction emphasizes organizational proactive change led by managerial actors, which is 
particularly crucial in innovation settings. The newly developed framework (the direction of CV) 
helps us understand and explain the process of the repeat of CV activities, specifically from the 
perspective of new resource combination. 
1.5  Thesis structure 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the CV literature, where CV’s 
definitions, different modes, objectives, and managerial challenges are discussed. This chapter 
then highlights gaps in the literature, especially the under-explored aspects of CV’s repeating 
cycles and the less well understood composition of CV’s actors (and the structures these actors 
reside in) in large established firms. 
Chapter 3 reviews the concept of direction in the organizational change and the strategy 
literature. Applying three lenses on strategic change, this chapter then scrutinizes two main 
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types of direction in the strategy literature, and finds the need for a new framing of direction 
in the context of corporate venturing, which emphasizes the role of the actors conducting CV 
activities and the primary goals pursed by CV programs. The chapter finishes by developing an 
analytical framework (the direction of CV), by discussing its underlying a theoretical framework, 
resource orchestration theory. 
Chapter 4 starts by brief reflection on research design in general. The chapter then explains 
the overall research design of this thesis, which is designed to use the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter 3 as an investigative tool. Next, the chapter summarizes the data 
collection process and the methods for data analysis. 
In Chapter 5 and 6, the case study firm is empirically examined in a chronological manner. After 
compiling the timeline of Company Alpha and identifying key events during the period from 
1990 to 2015, Chapter 5 analyzes the firm’s CV programs during the period 1997 to 2002, which 
is found to be the firm’s first CV cycle. Similarly, Chapter 6 analyzes the second CV cycle from 
2011 to 2015. 
Using the analytical framework, Chapter 7 analyzes how the direction of CV at Company Alpha 
has changed both in the first and second CV cycles. This generates a more robust conceptual 
framework that is both theoretically and empirically supported. 
In Chapter 8, three main factors that affected the changes in the re-conceptualized direction 
are discussed. Based on a repeating pattern occurring within the two cycles, this chapter 
finishes with the discussion of the evolution of CV at Company Alpha represented by changes 
in the direction of CV. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2  
REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE VENTURING LITERATURE 
2.1  Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 1, large established firms often conduct innovation activities in a strategic 
way to search for new business and technological opportunities and to build capabilities to 
seize the opportunities they have identified (see Section 1.1). These innovation activities, 
which are mostly risky and entrepreneurial, are strategic to the firm because incumbent firms 
deliberately pursue innovation to ensure their business continuity (i.e. survival) and to achieve 
their business growth strategy. These innovation activities include managerial practices such 
as new product development (e.g. Cooper and Edgett, 2009) and open innovation (e.g. 
Chesbrough, 2003). Here, the primary focus of this thesis in on corporate venturing as an 
innovation practice. This research topic has been specifically chosen because CV practitioners 
face significant challenges in managing CV activities, showing the recurrent patterns of the CV 
activities at the level of the firm (see Section 1.2.2). 
To address the research questions articulated in Section 1.3, this thesis examines the case 
firm’s multiple levels of strategy, structure, and actors, and also technological changes by 
investigating its range of corporate venturing (CV) programs in its twenty-six years history of 
CV (from 1990 to 2015). It is then crucial to establish a knowledge base associated with CV and 
to prepare an investigative tool through which the process of the repeat of CV activities can be 
examined. The aims of this chapter are twofold: (1) to set a solid foundation of knowledge of 
CV and (2) to find gaps in the CV literature in which to situate research findings. In particular, 
the latter will be specifically addressed by revisiting seminal works in this domain including 
those of Robert Burgelman (e.g. Burgelman, 1980; Burgelman, 1983a; Burgelman, 1983b). 
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2.2  What is Corporate Venturing? 
Corporate Venturing (CV) is an innovation activity, or practice, of the incumbent firm seeking 
to generate its new business (Von Hippel, 1973; Von Hippel, 1977). CV has been adopted by 
large established firms wishing to ensure their survival and growth. As an innovation practice, 
CV includes (1) creating venture teams within the firm; (2) nurturing those teams; and (3) 
making them into new business units (e.g. Burgelman, 1980; Burgelman, 1983b). CV activities 
sometimes include (4) investing equity (and other support) in external start-ups. The former 
group of activities is known as internal CV (ICV); whereas, the latter is known as external CV 
(ECV), or corporate venture capital (CVC), which highlights the role of incumbents as corporate 
investors (e.g. Hardymon et al., 1983; Sykes, 1990; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). 
There has been a long-lasting sense of the imperative associated with CV activities. However, 
the wide scope of such activities requires a clearer understanding of CV. Often, different 
terminologies were used in describing similar CV practices, generating inconsistencies in 
definitions (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). As Narayanan et al. (2009: 68) pointed out, the 
domain of CV literature “has been fragmented, spotty in its coverage of important issues of 
interest, and non-cumulative”. In order to establish a solid foundation of knowledge for 
advancing the thesis, the remainder of this section reviews how the term ‘corporate venturing’ 
and other related terms have been used and developed. 
2.2.1 An old imperative but a newish term 
From the perspective of innovation studies, the idea of CV is not completely new. For example, 
Joseph Schumpeter (1934/1982) emphasized charismatic individuals’ entrepreneurial efforts 
through which new firms and businesses could be generated. In his later work Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter, 1942/1975), however, he highlighted incumbent firms’ 
collective entrepreneurial activities. Here, CV is the very example of the latter Schumpeterian 
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idea (i.e. Schumpeter Mark II). By activating innovation processes within the organization, large 
established firms undertaking CV activities can become collective entrepreneurial actors, or 
innovators, who are the main agents of creative destruction at the organization level. 
As highlighted by Adams (1969: 255), an incumbent’s endeavor to do “new businesses based 
on new technologies” are not new phenomena; however, in the 1960s, ‘new business 
ventures’, the term describing these phenomena, became “an increasingly popular expression 
among businessmen, investors, and managers of research and development” (Ibid.). The usage 
of the word ‘venture’ can also be found in Alfred Chandler’s pioneering study on the business 
histories of large US firms between 1890 and 1960. In Strategy and Structure (Chandler, 1962), 
Chandler examined diversification efforts carried out by American Smelting and Refining, 
which was one of the big four companies in the US copper industry. By establishing a separate 
autonomous organizational unit, this firm attempted to enter a new-to-the-firm market 
(nonferrous metal processing), and Chandler interpreted this effort as their venture activity: 
[The firm] entered the processing of a variety of nonferrous metals from scrap. Because 
both the purchasing and marketing of these materials were quite different from its 
primary operations, the company came to form a separate autonomous unit… However, 
this venture has not proved very successful, in part because its activities differ from the 
rest of the larger organization. (Chandler, 1962: 329; emphasis added) 
In the 1960s, against the backdrop of the need for diversification, ‘venture management’ came 
to be regarded as a new managerial practice available to large firms which want to leverage 
entrepreneurial resources within the organization. For example, Hanan (1969) emphasized 
that ‘venture management’ is “an interesting new approach” (Hanan, 1969: 43), which is “an 
entrepreneurial concept that enjoys remarkable freedom from typical corporate restraints in 
seeking out growth opportunities and in preparing to capitalize on them” (Hanan, 1969: 44). 
Since the late 1960s, modern studies about CV emerged from business practitioners’ 
observations of large firms mainly in the context of the US, such as Du Pont (Peterson, 1967) 
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and 3M (Adams, 1969). Leveraging insiders’ viewpoint and data accessibility, they reported a 
special type of innovation practice adopted by large established firms. For example, in a HBR 
article “New venture management in a large company”, Peterson (1967), Director of R&D at 
Du Pont, explored the way in which the large firm leveraged advantages of entrepreneurial 
small ventures by setting up a new venture group within the firm. Similarly, Adams (1969), 
General Manager of New Business Ventures Division at 3M, reported their innovation practice 
in an article entitled “An approach to new business ventures”. 
2.2.2 Emergence of seminal studies on Corporate Venturing 
Since the 1970s, an academic foundation in the domain of CV was established mainly by several 
doctoral researchers. Notable among those researchers who substantially contributed to this 
area are Von Hippel (1973) at Carnegie-Mellon University; Fast (1977) at Harvard University; 
and Burgelman (1980) at Columbia University. 
Eric von Hippel, who is later known as the iconic scholar of ‘user innovation’ (Von Hippel, 1988), 
conducted his doctoral research on determining factors for successful corporate venturing. In 
a PhD thesis entitled An Exploratory Study of ‘Corporate Venturing’—A New Product Innovation 
Strategy Used by Some Major Corporations (Von Hippel, 1973), a distinction was made 
between firms’ innovation activity (corporate venturing) and its actor (corporate venture) in 
the context of CV. The study defined ‘corporate venturing’ as “an activity which seeks to 
generate new businesses for the large corporation through the establishment of ‘internal 
corporate ventures’” (Von Hippel, 1973: 1)13; whereas, an ‘internal corporate venture’ was 
defined as “an individual or group given (or having taken on) all aspects on the task of 
developing a new product concept, bring it to market, and carrying it through at least its initial 
                                                            
13 Later, Von Hippel (1977: 163) expanded the definition of CV to include both internal and external CV: 
“an activity which seeks to generate new businesses for the corporation in which it resides through the 
establishment of external or internal corporate ventures”. 
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phases of marketplace activity” (Ibid.). 
One of the key insights from Von Hippel’s seminal work on CV (Von Hippel, 1973; 1977) is a 
clarification of key concepts in the CV context: corporate venturing (CV) is an innovation 
practice which involves the formation of (internal or external) corporate ventures, while 
corporate ventures are either an individual or group level actors in the corporate venturing 
activity of large established firms. From the 1970s and onward, the term ‘corporate venturing 
(CV)’ became more popular in an academic sense, rather than ‘venture management’ and ‘new 
business venture approaches’. Table 2.1 summarizes definitions of CV from selective literature.  
Table 2.1: Definitions of Corporate Venturing (CV) 
Author(s) Definition of Corporate Venturing (CV) 
von Hippel  
(1973: 1) 
CV is “an activity which seeks to generate new businesses for the large corporation 
through the establishment of ‘internal corporate ventures’” 
Biggadyke  
(1976) 
“An internal corporate venture was defined as any start-up that: (1) originated 
internally; (2) was new to the company on at least two of the three dimensions of 
products, markets, or technologies; and (3) required significant investments of 
company resources to accomplish a result beyond the year in which the expenditure 
was made” (as cited in Day, 1994: 156). 
von Hippel  
(1977: 163) 
“Corporate venturing is an activity which seeks to generate new businesses for the 
corporation in which it resides through the establishment of external or internal 
corporate ventures” 
Burgelman  
(1980: 8) 
“ICV aims at developing a new product/market base around which a new business 
organization can be built, and which can be integrated into the overall corporate 
context after reaching maturity.” 
Guth and 
Ginsberg 
(1990: 5) 
Corporate venturing is “the birth of new businesses within existing organizations”. 
McGrath et al. 
(1994: 352) 
CV is “entrepreneurial activity within an established organization, meaning attempts 
to create products, enter markets, or introduce process innovations that are new to 
the firm.” 
Block and 
MacMillan  
(1993: 14) 
CV is “the activity of the company when it: 1) involves an activity new to the 
organisation, 2) is initiated or conducted internally, 3) involves significantly higher 
risk of failure or large losses than the organisation’s base business, 4) will be 
managed separately at some time during its life and 5) is undertaken for the purpose 
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of increasing sales profit, productivity or quality.” 
Sharma and 
Chrisman 
(1999: 19) 
“Corporate venturing refers to corporate entrepreneurial efforts that lead to the 
creation of new business organizations within the corporate organization. They may 
follow from or lead to innovations that exploit new markets, or new product 
offerings, or both.” 
De Bettignies 
and Chemla 
(2008: 505) 
CV is “the financing and development of new business ventures by large established 
companies, either inside (intrapreneurship) or outside (corporate venture capital) 
the corporate structure.” 
Narayanan et al. 
(2009: 59) 
“CV is the set of organizational systems, processes and practices that focus on 
creating businesses in existing or new fields, markets or industries—using internal 
and external means.” 
Leten and Dyck 
(2012: 243) 
“Corporate venturing is a practice whereby a company sets up a separate 
organizational unit, the corporate venturing unit (CVU), to invest in new 
technological and business opportunities arising within or outside the boundaries of 
the firm, for long-term strategic and/or short term financial purposes.” 
Source: Elaborated by the author. Emphases are added in italics. 
Von Hippel’s work provides us with another insight as to the difference between CV and new 
product development (NPD). Von Hippel (1977: 173) argues that corporate venturing can be 
viewed as a variation of new product development. NPD in large organization settings needs 
to address the problem of “effective integration of specialists” (Ibid.: 164), and CV is a special 
“organizational means” (Ibid.) to integrate people having special skills in need (e.g. R&D, 
marketing, and manufacturing) by forming “small ad hoc groups of specialists” (Ibid.). 
Especially, he emphasizes that the key variation from NPD to CV comes from “the vesting of 
responsibility for the complete new product development process, from concept through 
initial marketplace activity, in one venture manager [who is the CEO of a corporate venture]” 
(Ibid.: 173; emphasis in the original). 
Next, among those seminal studies on CV, Norman Fast’s work focused more on the 
organizational structural side. In his PhD thesis, The Evolution of Corporate New Venture 
Divisions (Fast, 1977), Fast investigated special separate organizational units in charge of 
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corporate venturing within large firms. This unit is often called a ‘New Venture Division (NVD)’, 
which Fast (1977: 1) defined as “an organizational unit whose primary functions are (1) the 
investigation of potential new business opportunities, (2) the development of business plans 
for new ventures, and (3) the management of the early commercialization of these ventures”. 
Using surveys and interview data from 18 companies and 3 follow-up case studies, he argued 
that the main forces affecting changes in the process of NVD are the strategic posture of the 
parent firm and the political posture of the NVD. Fast concluded that the NVD’s long term 
mission to develop new business and its short-term life span would inevitably generate a 
dilemma, claiming that such a dilemma would be solved by “understanding and managing the 
evolution of an NVD” (Fast, 1977: 3). 
Adding to Von Hippel’s (1973; 1977) earlier insight into CV—which includes discussions about 
the innovation activity (corporate venturing), group level actors (corporate ventures), and key 
individual actors (venture manager, venture sponsor)—Fast (1977) contributed to the body of 
CV literature by drawing researchers’ attention to the NVD, which is another group level actor 
with strong influence over CV activities. The attention to the NVD is followed by a line of 
research on the ‘corporate venturing unit (CVU)’ (e.g. Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Finally, Robert Burgelman, who is now regarded as a strategy scholar in the Learning School 
(Mintzberg et al., 2009), made significant contributions in establishing CV studies as a 
prominent research domain. In the CV literature, for example, the most cited article is 
Burgelman’s paper in 1983 on the process of ‘internal CV (ICV)’ (Burgelman, 1983b). It is mainly 
based on his doctoral research in the 1970s, A Study of the Process of Internal Corporate 
Venturing (Burgelman, 1980), where he observed six ICV projects of a large US chemical firm.14 
                                                            
14 ‘Internal CV (ICV)’ is one mode of corporate venturing, and the modes of CV will be reviewed in Section 
2.3. 
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From a processual perspective, Burgelman argued that the main aim of ICV is “developing a 
new product/market base around which a new business organization can be built” (Burgelman, 
1980: 8). While Von Hippel (1973; 1977) perceived that CV is a variation of new product 
development (NPD), where a range of responsibilities throughout the complete NPD process 
are vested in a single CV manager (i.e. the CEO of a corporate venture), Burgelman (1980: 8) 
highlighted that the main difference between CV and NPD is a degree of novelty in innovation. 
From Burgelman’s viewpoint, ICV is a strategic means to achieve ‘unrelated diversification’ or 
‘radical innovation’, which falls outside of the parent firm’s existing business area. 
Building on his original work, Burgelman published a vast quantity of subsequent publications 
on the complex and “multilayered picture of the strategic management process” (Burgelman, 
1983b: 242) underlying the CV practice (e.g. Burgelman, 1983a; Burgelman, 1984b; Burgelman, 
1983c; Burgelman, 1984a; Burgelman and Sayles, 1986; Burgelman, 1988; Burgelman and 
Valikangas, 2005). Although Burgelman had observed a single case study firm, his study 
advanced previous research on CV due to the in-depth qualitative analysis of a large incumbent 
firm from a processual perspective and his approach to the analysis of different hierarchical 
layers to examine “how a total organization works” (Burgelman and Sayles, 1986: 6). 
In addition to the inductively developed process model of ICV (Burgelman, 1983b; Burgelman, 
1984a), Burgelman pursued a ‘theoretical generalization’ (Yin, 2013) of the formulation of 
corporate-level strategy influenced by autonomous strategic behaviors (Burgelman, 1983a; 
Burgelman, 1988). Indeed, his efforts have contributed to the establishment of the CV and 
corporate entrepreneurship literature as a prominent domain in strategy and innovation 
studies. Considering the impact of Burgelman’s work on the CV literature, it becomes clear that 
positioning outcomes of this study relative to his work is crucial. Hence, Burgelman’s key 
literature and his findings will be critically reviewed in Section 2.3.2. 
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2.3  Modes of Corporate Venturing 
In the 1970s, CV was undertaken by large firms as a promising managerial practice.15, 16 CV 
researchers, however, faced academic challenges in articulating a clear definition of and ideas 
about the target research phenomenon because of the “heterogeneity of CV” (Narayanan et 
al., 2009), which captures the characteristics of CV programs that “vary significantly in their 
duration, objectives and organization” (Narayanan et al., 2009: 69). Rather than a singular 
concept, CV is more of organizations’ innovation practice that “takes many different forms” 
(Campbell et al., 2003: 37). Specific forms of CV were stimulated by different external or 
internal stimuli, and this called for researchers to explore different modes of CV. 17  
2.3.1 Typology and taxonomy of CV  
As to the diverse form of CV activities, Roberts and Frohman (1972) set out to explain it by 
using the ‘spectrum of venture strategies’, which were composed of (1) internal 
entrepreneurial activities, (2) joint ventures, (3) spin-off, and (4) venture capital investments. 
The spectrum of venture strategies was later refined by Roberts (1980). Depending on the level 
of involvement and commitment by parent firms, he divided the spectrum with ‘internal 
ventures’ (i.e. internal CV) at the one end and ‘venture capital investment’ (i.e. external CV, or 
CVC) at the other end (Roberts, 1980: 135). In between these two were ‘venture merging and 
                                                            
15 Based on studies in the early 1970s, Fast (1977: 1) estimated that “30 of the 100 largest U.S. industrial 
companies and as many as 25% of the Fortune 500 adopted” a new type of organizational structure to 
facilitate new business development during the period 1965 to 1975. 
16 Druker (1968/2011) predicted the 1970s will be the ‘age of entrepreneurship’ in the large corporation: 
“we are entering again an era in which emphasis will be on entrepreneurship. However, it will not be 
the entrepreneurship of a century ago, that is, the ability of a single man to organize a business he 
himself could run, control, [and] embrace. It will rather be the ability to create and direct an organization 
for the new. We need men who can build a new structure of entrepreneurship on the managerial 
foundations” (Drucker, 1968/2011: 43). 
17  In early studies, Hanan (1969), for example, articulated three types of new venture approaches 
depending on the level of ventures’ freedom: (1) ‘intracorporate ventures’ (new business units within 
the parent firm), (2) ‘intercorporate ventures’ (joint business units by multiple firms), and (3) 
‘supracorporate ventures’ (external business units with a maximum degree of freedom). 
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melding’, ‘new-style joint ventures’, ‘venture spin-off’, and ‘venture nurturing’ 
Maintaining the location of corporate ventures either external or internal to the firm (Roberts 
and Frohman, 1972; Von Hippel, 1977; Roberts, 1980), Sharma and Chrisman (1999) made a 
distinction between ‘internal CV’ and ‘external CV’. Internal CV is “corporate venturing 
activities that result in the creation of organizational entities that reside within an existing 
organizational domain” (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999: 20; emphasis added); whereas, external 
CV is those activities carried out through “the creation of semi-autonomous or autonomous 
organizational entities that reside outside the … boundaries of the exiting organization” 
(Sharma and Chrisman, 1999: 19-20; emphasis added). 
From a theoretical viewpoint, there is little consensus on CV typologies (Narayanan et al., 2009). 
For an example, Miles and Covin (2002), from the review of extant CV literature, developed a 
CV typology with two dimensions: (1) the focus (or source) of entrepreneurship, which is either 
internal employees or external start-ups and (2) the presence of investment intermediation, 
which is direct or indirect investment. Combining these two dimensions, CV types are divided 
into four generic forms (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Typology of CV 
 
Presence of Investment Intermediation 
Direct investment in the venture 
through the corporation’s operating 
or strategic budgets 
Indirect investment in the 
venture using financial 
intermediaries 
Focus of 
Entrepreneurship 
Internal to the 
corporation Direct-Internal Venturing Indirect-Internal Venturing 
External to the 
corporation Direct-External Venturing Indirect-External Venturing 
Source: Miles and Covin (2002:24) 
From an empirical viewpoint, Keil (2000) classified the modes of external CV based on in-depth 
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case studies of seven high-tech firms in the ICT sector (see Figure 2.1). As Maula (2001: 21) 
pointed out, such classification is important in developing an “understanding of the domain of 
corporate venturing”. Considering its empirical origin, the suggested classification is a CV 
taxonomy. 
 
Figure 2.1 Classification of CV (CV taxonomy) 
Source: Adapted from Keil (2000: 109). 
Having reviewed the spectrum of CV and its typology and taxonomy, the criticism raised by 
Narayanan et al. (2009) still holds true: “little research effort has been devoted to refining and 
integrating proposed typologies” (Narayanan et al., 2009: 59). But perhaps more importantly, 
CV research needs to be advanced through efforts to understand its dynamics, such as the 
changing modes of CV within the spectrum. This calls for the need of program-level research 
in CV, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.1. 
2.3.2 Internal CV and revisiting Burgelman’s classic studies on ICV 
In the ‘spectrum of venture strategies’ (Roberts, 1980), one far right end of the spectrum is 
internal CV (see Section 2.3.1). Highlighting the maximum level of involvement and 
commitment made by the parent firm, Roberts (1980: 136) explained that a company adopting 
internal CV “sets up a separate entity within itself—an entirely separate division or group—for 
the purpose of entering different markets or developing radically different products.” 
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However, we need to make it clear about the internal and external distinction. As suggested 
by Sharma and Chrisman (1999), the focus of this distinction could be on the location of 
organizational entities newly established for CV activities, which are either within or outside 
an existing organization (see Section 2.3.1). This is in line with Von Hippel’s (1973; 1977) 
approach, which distinguishes between internal and external CV depending on whether 
‘corporate ventures’—i.e. CV teams seeking to generate new business—are established 
external or internal to the firm (see Section 2.2.2). On the other hand, the distinction between 
internal and external CV may highlight the origin of entrepreneurial resources necessary for 
the firm to initiate a new business (Ginsberg and Hay, 1994). In a ‘types of corporate 
entrepreneurship’ framework, for example, Botkin and Matthews (1992) set one dimension of 
the framework to the ‘origin’ of entrepreneurial resources, which is also either internal (e.g. 
employees) or external to the firm (e.g. external start-ups and other individuals). 
In this thesis, the term internal CV (ICV) is used to emphasize the inside-out trajectory of CV 
activities. As MacMillan et al.’s (2008: 1) put it, “Internal venturing programs “go inside” the 
firm and create entrepreneurial ventures from within the corporation.” In other words, new 
business ideas are nurtured within the firm’s boundaries through ICV (Von Hippel, 1977; 
Burgelman, 1983b), where sources of those ideas can be either internal or external to the firm. 
The ideas are then developed into new products or services through the ICV process 
(Burgelman, 1983b); and there are possibilities that CV teams built around the ideas could be 
spun off as external independent ventures or established as business units within the firm. 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, Burgelman’s study on ICV made a significant contribution to the 
CV literature. Although nearly forty years have passed since his study (e.g. Burgelman, 1983a; 
Burgelman, 1983b; Burgelman, 1983c), which has now become a classic on this topic, revisiting 
his seminal work will be important in finding gaps in the CV literature and articulating the 
study’s positioning relative to the literature. 
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Burgelman’s ICV research is largely based on a field study of the internal corporate venturing 
activities in a large diversified US chemical company (pseudonym: GAMMA) in the 1970s 
(Burgelman, 1980).18 Those activities were mainly driven by a specialized organizational unit 
within the firm, which pertains to the “New Venture Division (NVD)” (Fast, 1977). 
In Burgelman’s study, the large firm undertaking ICV is interpreted as a combination of an 
innovating system and an operating system (Burgelman, 1980). The former is an organizational 
unit “geared toward business development in unrelated areas” (Burgelman, 1980: 7); whereas, 
the latter is a set of operating (business) divisions. Drawing on Bower’s (1970) resource 
allocation process model, he articulated the ICV process in ‘managing innovating systems’, 
which is the very title of his PhD thesis. By examining the ICV process through which new 
products and markets are developed, Burgelman (1980; 1983c) argues that new business units 
emerged from an innovating system are converged into operating systems throughout the ICV 
process. Burgelman (1980) concludes that managerial problems could arise at the interface 
between the innovating system and the operating system within the firm. 
One of the major contributions of Burgelman’s empirical analysis is the formulation of a ‘stage 
model of ICV’ (Burgelman, 1983b). It should be noted that what this model describes is the 
sequence of developmental stages at the level of the project itself. The model was constructed 
by a comparative analysis of six ICV projects in GAMMA, and it is composed of four stages of 
ICV project: a conceptual, a pre-venture, an entrepreneurial, and an organizational stage (Ibid.). 
Table 2.3 shows the list of six ICV projects, where the stage reached by each project is indicated. 
  
                                                            
18 Burgelman (1980: 46) examined the Corporate Development Group (CDG) of a chemical firm in the 
US, which was formed in 1971. 
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Table 2.3: Burgelman’s (1983b) stage model of ICV 
 
Source: Burgelman (1983b:228)  
The stage model of ICV (see Table 2.3) provides a framework through which the chronological 
development of ICV projects can be systematically analyzed. In the case of GAMMA, for 
example, the shift from a conceptual stage to a pre-venture stage captures the development 
of an ICV project where “an idea for a new business opportunity evolves into a concrete new 
product [and service] around which a pre-venture team of R&D and business people is formed” 
(Ibid.: 231). These two stages often “take place in the context of the corporate R&D 
department” (Ibid.). Next, the ICV project reached an entrepreneurial stage “was transferred 
with venture status to the business development department. … [It] acquired its own 
organization, general manager, and operating budget, thus becoming an embryonic new 
business organization in the department” (Ibid.: 233). Finally, the project reached an 
organizational stage received “the decision to integrate this new unit into the operating 
system of the corporation as a freestanding new division or as a major new department of an 
existing division” (Ibid.: 233). Although specific processes of, and organizational structures for 
ICV may be different in different organizations, Burgelman’s stage model provides us with a 
useful guidance to analyze the development of ICV projects (or, CV teams). 
Another major contribution generated from Burgelman’s empirical analysis is a ‘process model 
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of ICV’ (Burgelman, 1983b). He asked the research question about how “a diversified major 
firm transforms its R&D activities at the frontier of corporate technology into new businesses 
through internal corporate venturing (ICV)” (Burgelman, 1983b: 223). The research was then 
framed as a process study of ICV, resulting in the generation of an “inductively derived process 
model for ICV at GAMMA” (Ibid.: 229) (see Figure 2.2). 
The process model of ICV was developed by connecting a project level analysis of six ICV 
projects and a corporate level analysis of the parent firm, GAMMA. Burgelman examined the 
historic development of ICV projects during a fifteen-month period, and interviewed actors at 
different hierarchical layers across the firm (sixty-one people in total), including project 
members, directors of departments, and corporate management. The connection between 
different levels of analysis—i.e. between the project level and the corporation level analyses—
was enabled by adopting a process-model approach proposed by Bower (1970), which was 
originally applied to a resource allocation process in the context of capital investment in a large 
manufacturing company. 
 
Figure 2.2 Burgelman’s (1983b) process model of ICV 
Source: Burgelman (1983b: 230). 
Its explanatory power and managerial insights, which the process model provides, need to be 
carefully reviewed, because there is a danger of misinterpretation of the model due to the 
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complexity and an overlap with the stage model of ICV; perhaps the latter is not explained 
clearly enough in Burgelman’s (1983b) paper. On the one hand, the core processes—which 
include the definition and the impetus processes—focus on the development of an ICV project 
per se (Ibid.: 229). In the process model (see Figure 2.2), the definition process encompasses 
the development of an ICV project from a conceptual stage to a pre-venture stage (Ibid.: 231); 
whereas, the impetus process encompasses the development of an ICV project from an 
entrepreneurial stage to an organizational stage (Ibid.: 233). One the other hand, in the 
overlaying processes—which include the strategic context and the structural context 
processes—the focus is on the development of a corporate-level context under which the 
selection of ICV projects and the updates of corporate strategy take place (Ibid.: 228). 
In terms of managerial insights, the process model of ICV helps clarify the sequence of key 
activities conducted by different levels of actors (e.g. group leader/venture manager; NVD 
management; and corporate management) while ICV projects are developed along the four 
stages of ICV (from a conceptual stage to an organizational stage; see Table 2.3). For example, 
in the definition process of ICV (see Figure 2.2), R&D and business people conduct ‘technical 
and need linking’ led by a group leader (or, a venture manager); the NVD management conduct 
‘coaching stewardship’; and the corporate management performs ‘monitoring’ activity. 
Next, Burgelman’s process model informs us about key activities in the ICV process and the 
actors of those activities. Firstly, product championing is the activity which aims to turn a new 
idea into a new viable product (or service) and to create market interest in it (Ibid.: 232). By 
demonstrating the potential value of a new product (or service), the product champion enables 
an ICV project, which is organized around the new product, to progress from a pre-venture 
stage to an entrepreneurial stage. The ICV project then becomes “an embryonic new business 
organization” (Ibid.: 233) with an official venture status. In the ICV process, as highlighted by 
Burgelman (Ibid.: 234), the product champion usually becomes the venture manager of an ICV 
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project at an entrepreneurial stage. 
Secondly, Burgelman reveals another key activity called organizational championing, which is 
to link the development of an ICV project with the corporate-level strategic context. 
Organizational championing aims to “make corporate management see the strategic 
importance of a particular new business field for corporate development” (Ibid.: 238); hence 
the activity requires “the rare capacity to evaluate the merit of the proposals and activities of 
different product champions in strategic rather than in technical terms” (Ibid.). Burgelman 
observed that this activity was often performed by the business development manager who 
played the role as the “venture manager’s manager” (Ibid.: 241). 
Finally, Burgelman highlights the role of structuring conducted by the corporate management 
in the ICV process. Large innovative firms are, according to Burgelman (1984b: 156), “likely to 
possess a reservoir of entrepreneurial potential at operational levels that will express itself in 
autonomous strategic initiatives.” Burgelman (1983b: 229) argues that “ICV is primarily a 
bottom-up process”, because it is mainly driven by ‘autonomous strategic behavior’ 
(Burgelman, 1983a) of individuals at the operational level of the large innovative firm. 
Considering the bottom-up characteristic of ICV, the process model explains that corporate 
management (i.e. top-level managers) can exert control over the ICV process “through the 
manipulation of structural context” (Ibid.: 242). According to Burgelman, ‘structural context’ 
“refers to the various organizational and administrative mechanisms put in place by corporate 
management to implement the current corporate strategy” (Ibid.: 229). The structural context 
creates an internal selection environment in which “the autonomous strategic initiatives 
emerging from below [i.e. from operational levels] competed for survival.” (Ibid.: 240). Here, 
structural context is determined by corporate management through structuring activity, which 
Burgelman provides examples of: 
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The creation of the NVD as a separate organizational unit, the definition of positions 
and responsibilities in the department of the NVD, the establishment of criteria for 
measuring and evaluating venture and venture-manager performance, and the 
assignment of either entrepreneurially or administratively inclined managers to key 
positions in the NVD all seemed intended to affect the course of ICV activity. (Burgelman, 
1983b: 239–240) 
In section 2.5, Burgelman’s work reviewed in this subsection will be linked to some gaps in the 
CV literature, which will guide how this thesis can be embedded in the CV literature. 
2.3.3 External CV and Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) 
The other end of the ‘spectrum of venture strategies’ is ‘venture capital’ (Roberts, 1980). 
Highlighting the feature of equity investment made by incumbent firms, this activity is called 
‘corporate venture capital (CVC)’ (e.g. Keil, 2000; Maula, 2001; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). 
CVC is a way in which incumbent firms tap themselves into external entrepreneurial ventures, 
and Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005: 615) define CVC as “equity investment by incumbent firms in 
independent entrepreneurial ventures, i.e., relatively new, not-publicly-traded companies that 
are seeking capital to continue operation”. The term CVC highlights the feature of venture 
investment, which allows the incumbents to make linkages with external ventures. Here, 
venture funds are sponsored by incumbent firms performing as corporate investors (Gompers 
and Lerner, 1998). 
In Keil’s (2000) CV taxonomy (see Figure 2.1), CVC was classified as a main mode of external 
CV along with ‘venture alliance’ and so-called ‘transformational arrangements’, which includes 
‘spin-offs’ and ‘acquisitions’. However, in many cases, ‘alliances’ between ventures and 
investing firms can be viewed as a subset of CVC investments (Van de Vrande and 
Vanhaverbeke, 2013). In addition, rather than a mode of external CV, ‘spin-offs’ could be an 
example of an outcome of internal CV. Finally, ‘acquisitions’ are usually conducted for multiple 
reasons, which may be difficult to justify as only a case of external CV (Narayanan et al., 2009). 
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Therefore, although there is a viewpoint which sees CVC as one mode of external CV along 
with alliance (or joint ventures) and acquisitions (e.g. Keil, 2000; Schildt et al., 2005; Titus et 
al., 2017), this thesis uses the term ‘external CV’ and ‘corporate venture capital (CVC)’ 
interchangeably. Here, the term external CV highlights the outside-in trajectory of CVC 
activities, which is in line with MacMillan et al.’s (2008: 1) description: “External venturing 
programs “go outside” the firm and tab external sources of innovation.” By external CV, in 
other words, incumbents invest in external start-ups, which may include an alliance with them, 
with the aim of incorporating their resources (e.g. technology, human resources) into the firm. 
Firms undertake CVC mainly in two modes (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). First, they invest 
indirectly in external start-ups by providing funds for independent venture capital (VC) 
organizations.19 Next, some companies choose to invest directly through the establishment of 
their own fund management units, which are similar to traditional VCs’ organizational 
structures. Drawing on Miles and Covin’s (2002) CV typology with a minor modification, these 
two modes of CVC pertain to direct-external CV and indirect-external CV (see Table 2.2). 
The study of CVC goes back as early as Rind (1981) in strategy literature. According to Rind 
(1981: 169), CVC is firms’ venture investment through “direct venture capital investment 
and/or investment as one of many limited partners in a conventional venture capital 
partnership”. Examining a list of firms actively undertaking CVC, he identified that about 20 
firms in the US were performing CVC programs, and he expected that more companies will 
adapt the direct venture capital model in the future for financial and strategic gains. 
Since then, a number of studies were carried out focusing on the managerial implications and 
success factors for CVC (Hardymon et al., 1983; Sykes, 1986; Bleicher and Paul, 1987; Sykes, 
                                                            
19  Venture capital (VC) is defined as “equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held 
companies, where the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically active as a director, advisor, 
or even manager of the firm” (Gompers and Lerner, 1998: 6). 
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1990). Whereas, a financially rigorous study on CVC was that of Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
who investigated the difference between CVC and traditional VC firms. By comparing 
investment performance between CVC and VC, they suggested that CVC is as successful as 
independent VC, “particularly when there is a strategic overlap between the corporate parent 
and the portfolio firm” (Gompers and Lerner, 1998: 3). And they claimed that a parent firm’s 
strong strategic focus on the portfolio firms is critical. 
After the beginning of the new millennium, researchers identified a new wave of CV. 
Chesbrough (2000) highlighted that CVC was the main mode of CV in this new wave. Recently, 
CB Insight, a consultancy firm based in New York, reported that the number of new CVC peaked 
in 2015 with about seventy new CVC units globally.20 This echoes earlier insights by Rind (1981). 
2.4  Why do firms engage in Corporate Venturing? 
Researchers have investigated what drives firms to undertake corporate venturing activities. 
Most previous research agrees that objectives for CV can be grouped into financial and 
strategic objectives (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Maula, 2001; Campbell et al., 2003; 
Narayanan et al., 2009). CV can be regarded as an organizational response prompted by 
external stimuli, such as looming crisis in industries (e.g. an economic slowdown in a firm’s 
main business areas) which requires a new approach for mitigating risks. It can also be viewed 
as incumbent firms’ proactive action taken outside of any direct stimulus to overcome internal 
constraints which cannot be met by only relying on existing structures and business efforts. In 
both cases, the objectives pursued by CV activities need to be clearly articulated. It is because, 
as Campbell et al. (2003: 36) suggested, the ambiguity over a CV’s objectives can generate the 
                                                            
20  CB Insights (2015) ‘Number of New Corporate VCs Set for New High In 2015’, Available from: 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/new-corporate-venture-capital-firms/ [Accessed 20 September 
2016] 
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danger of mixed messages, which may well result in the failure of CV. 
2.4.1 Financial objectives 
Financial objectives for CV are relatively simple in both modes of CV (internal and external CV): 
to achieve financial gains by ensuring return on investment (e.g. Siegel et al., 1988; Lerner, 
2013). In the early stages of CV history, internal CV in particular was adopted by established 
companies to develop radically new business using new technologies (Burgelman and Sayles, 
1986). This was a means of business diversification, which ultimately prioritized the financial 
objective over other objectives. In the case of external CV, or CVC, as it was based on the model 
of independent VC firms, it would be natural that firms at first pursued financial gains from 
their venture investments. 
Ralph Biggadike, in The Risky Business of Diversification (Biggadike, 1979), examined the 
strategy for internal CV with the emphasis on its role as a means of business diversification.21 
His work influenced researchers to unravel the effect of CV’s aggressive entry timing, and 
triggered a new strand of CV research focusing on CV’s financial objectives. Maintaining the 
definition in the Profit Impact of Market Strategies (PIMS) database, Biggadike defined the 
corporate venture as “a business marketing a product or service that the parent company has 
not previously marketed and that requires the parent company to obtain new equipment or 
new people or new knowledge” (Biggadike, 1979: 104). He estimated that “new ventures need, 
on the average, eight years before they reach profitability” (Ibid.: 106). He also suggested that 
this eight-year period “would be reduced if higher relative share were achieved in the early 
years” (Ibid.: 110), emphasizing the need for large-scale entry made by CV activities and the 
importance of building market share (one of the financial objectives): 
                                                            
21 This article was developed originally from the author’s PhD thesis at Harvard University published in 
1976: Entry, Strategy and Performance. 
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[A] venture’s objective for its early years should be to build share, regardless of short-
run financial performance. ... perhaps the biggest risk is entering too small. ... [T]o enter 
on a large scale is the best strategy. (Biggadike, 1979: 108) 
Consequently, a line of CV research was carried out using the PIMS database, such as success 
factors for financial performance (Miller and Camp, 1985); the effect of aggressive entry 
(MacMillan and Day, 1987); entry order (Miller et al., 1989); the impact of strategy and 
environment (Tsai et al., 1991); and the relatedness between CV teams and the parent firm 
(Sorrentino and Williams, 1995). However, the PIMS database provided the data for corporate 
ventures that survived until the first four years of their operation—termed “start-up”—and 
this possessed some limitations in capturing various aspects of CV activities (McGrath et al., 
1992a). For example, CV activities conducted for strategic objectives with a time frame of less 
than four years had to be ignored. This constitutes a challenge to the study of CV’s financial 
objectives, which urges researchers to critically address the use of public financial databases. 
2.4.2 Strategic objectives 
Today, rather than relatively narrow financial objectives, it is widely accepted that CV has a 
much broader range of strategic objectives as a ‘strategic vehicle’ of the firm (e.g. Covin and 
Miles, 2007; Anokhin et al., 2016). CV is also an important part of firms’ innovation strategies 
(Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005), and there are numerous ways by which this innovation practice 
can contribute to firms’ strategic benefits (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Covin and Miles, 2007).  
As to the strategic objectives of internal CV, Tidd and Taurins (1999) argued that motives for 
internal CV can be grouped into two types: learning and leveraging. Based on the examination 
of fifteen firms in the UK, Tidd and Taurins (1999: 123) identified that some firms conducted 
internal CV “to leverage existing competencies” such as to utilize slack resources or to expand 
current businesses, whereas other firms utilized internal CV “to learn new competencies” such 
as to build new capabilities. Considering motives are—implicit or explicit—reasons for 
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activities, these two types of motives can be regarded as firms’ objectives for internal CV, and 
the result shows that the identified motives are largely strategic objectives. 
In the case of external CV, or CVC, the range of its strategic objectives is much more diverse. 
Researchers have suggested that incumbent firms undertake CVC: (1) to access to a window 
on new technologies (Benson and Ziedonis, 2009; Sahaym et al., 2010; Van de Vrande and 
Vanhaverbeke, 2013); (2) to bring in new ideas from external sources (MacMillan et al., 2008); 
(3) to identify acquisition opportunities (Benson and Ziedonis, 2010); (4) to be involved in VC 
syndication networks (Keil et al., 2010) and monitor market trends spontaneously (i.e. 
intelligence-gathering) (Lerner, 2013); (5) to recruit and retain talented employees (De 
Bettignies and Chemla, 2008); and (6) to nurture entrepreneurial corporate culture 
(Dushnitsky, 2006). Maula (2001) classified strategic objectives of external CV into learning, 
option building, and leveraging. Overlaying the classification of internal CV (Tidd and Taurins, 
1999) with those of external CV (Maula, 2001), a remaining dimension of classification, option 
building, highlights distinctive strategic features of CVC. These include an identification of 
acquisition opportunities through CVC activities and a consideration of early stage equity 
investments to external ventures through CVC funds. 
In the history of CV research, a new stream of research emerged in the early 1990s which 
criticizes previous CV studies for their financially oriented approach, paying less attention to 
non-financial objectives (e.g. McGrath et al., 1992a; McGrath, 1995; Keil et al., 2009). Instead, 
this new stream of CV study urges to pay closer attention to strategic objectives pursued by 
CV activities. For example, McGrath, Venkataraman, and MacMillan (1992a) point out that 
incumbents’ CV activities have typically been measured for success or failure mainly by using 
financial criteria (e.g. return on investment or market shares). However, they argue that many 
firms conduct CV as a mechanism for generating new resource combinations, which may well 
be specific to each firm (McGrath et al., 1992a; McGrath et al., 1994). 
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From this alternative viewpoint, definitions of success for CV can be different, and some 
perceived CV failures can even be framed as “desirable disappointments” (McGrath et al., 
1992b). Claiming disappointments during CV operations are inevitable, McGrath (1995) 
suggests that managers of CV activities can learn and benefit from disappointments. Based on 
a single firm case study of a large high-tech company, the study emphasizes strategic benefits 
of learning, or developing new competencies, through CV activities. Similarly, based on a single 
firm case study of a large European electronics firm, Keil, McGrath, and Tukiainen (2009) argue 
that the main benefit of CV activities is the development of new capability rather than CV 
teams’ commercial success. The study argues that, although CV activities are mostly seen as 
failures from a financial perspective, knowledge and capabilities developed, or learned, 
through CV can be maintained within the firm (Keil et al., 2009). 
In this line of CV research which emphasizes strategic aspects of CV and the value of ‘learning 
from failure’, the Resource-Based Theory (RBT) has been suggested as a potential theoretical 
perspective to develop a deeper understanding of CV’s contribution to the firm (e.g. McGrath 
et al., 1994). A fundamental premise of the RBT is the heterogeneity of the firm (e.g. Penrose, 
1951), and CV is closely linked to the generation of the heterogeneity because it enables the 
firm to uniquely combine internal and external resources in new ways. As McGrath et al. (1994: 
355) put it, “the experimental learning created through [corporate] venturing allows a firm to 
create firm-specific and idiosyncratic insight into future possibilities”. Here, what contributes 
to the firm’s uniqueness includes managerial actors conducting CV activities. It is because “no 
two individuals are likely to develop the same set of belief structures … they will tend to 
simplify reality in an idiosyncratic way” (Ibid.). Considering its firm-specific nature of CV 
activities, it can be suggested that case studies of a single firm could generate both 
theoretically and empirically meaningful contributions. From the perspective of the Resource-
Based Theory, however, we still have a limited understanding of how firms conduct CV 
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activities as a way to combine resources in new ways (for their survival and future growth). 
This calls for further research on CV focusing on the process side of CV, and this will be 
discussed in the following section. 
2.5  Concluding reflection 
Selective CV literature has been reviewed in this chapter. Findings from the review shed light 
on several gaps in the CV literature which can be addressed by this thesis. These gaps are 
closely related to further study areas in the CV literature that are also found from the review 
of Burgelman’s seminal studies on ICV (in Section 2.3.2). This section summarizes those gaps 
and explores potential contributions the thesis can generate towards the CV literature. 
2.5.1 CV programs as strategic vehicles 
CV is an innovation practice undertaken by large established firms with a range of objectives. 
Many researchers and practitioners agree that CV activities are not so much a means for only 
achieving financial objectives as they are strategic tools available to firms. Here, it should be 
noted that CV is not a singular and predefined object such as different tools in a toolbox; it is 
rather a multipurpose tool including multiple features.22 Considering CV as a strategic vehicle, 
the study of CV activities at the level of the program becomes an important research agenda. 
A ‘program’ is a collection of related processes that are articulated to implement a specific 
practice. In corporate settings, resources are officially allocated to the program once its plan 
secures an approval from the management by convincing them of the program’s legitimacy. 
Therefore, the CV program can be an effective unit of analysis to understand strategic use of 
CV practices, and there are some examples of program-level studies (e.g. Exxon’s ‘Exxon New 
                                                            
22 The researcher acknowledges that this idea of ‘CV as a singular objective’ was inspired in a discussion 
with Professor Edward Steinmueller. 
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Ventures’ program (Sykes, 1986); IBM’s ‘Innovation Jam’ program (Bjelland and Wood, 2008)). 
However, we have, it would seem, a limited understanding of CV practice at the level of the CV 
program. For example, as reviewed in Section 2.3.2, even Burgelman’s research on ICV is based 
on the study of projects rather than specific programs. Burgelman (1983b) interpreted the 
process model of ICV by analyzing six internal ICV projects. This model explained the ICV 
process as the development of bottom-up and autonomous strategic behaviors of actors at the 
operation level, which was later rationalized by the corporate management in a top-down 
retrospective way (Ibid.). As Burgelman (1983b: 229) put it, ICV was regarded as “primarily a 
bottom-up process”, which is not necessarily the result of deliberate, top-down strategic 
planning. Even with the establishment of the NVD (or a CV unit), Burgelman claimed that it 
could be “a manifestation of corporate management’s uneasiness with autonomous strategic 
behavior” (Ibid.: 242), trying to consolidate ICV efforts without a clearly formulated strategy.23 
In the classic study of ICV, there is no description of CV programs which were deliberately 
planned and operated by the firm. 
Today, large firms’ knowledge of CV practice has advanced, although CV activities often show 
patterns of “seemingly endless cycle” (Burgelman and Valikangas, 2005: 26), or CV cyclicality 
(see Section 1.2.2). Perhaps CV activities cannot just be regarded any more as a firm’s response 
to bottom-up and autonomous strategic behaviors. Now, firms proactively adopt CV as an 
innovation practice with different forms of CV programs. Through meticulously designed CV 
programs, different modes of CV (e.g. internal and external CV) can be mixed (MacMillan et al., 
2008: 1). For example, as already reported by Sykes (1986), who was a CV manager of the 
Exxon New Ventures program, Exxon’s CV program was originally a “mix of venture capital and 
                                                            
23 In Burgelman’s (1983b) own words, “The establishment of a separate, new venture division may be 
more a manifestation of corporate management’s uneasiness with autonomous strategic behavior in 
the operating system than the adaptation of the structure to implement a clearly formulated strategy” 
(Burgelman, 1983b: 242). 
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internal investments” (Sykes, 1986: 276), thorough which 19 ICV projects and 18 CVC 
investments were managed between 1970 and 1980. Also, the design of a CV program can 
extend sources of new ideas to include people outside the firm beyond internal employees 
(e.g. Chesbrough, 2003). 
This suggests that the CV literature needs to be updated by further program-level studies on 
CV, which then can provide insights for the strategic management of CV activities. In addition, 
the review of the CV literature suggests that it is timely to move beyond typology or taxonomy 
type of studies about modes of CV activities. As noted in Section 1.3.1, this thesis aims to 
develop a better understanding of CV cyclicality at the level of the firm in a way that helps 
managers manage CV activities. The thesis therefore addresses the question about how 
corporate venturing activities (or programs) are developed, terminated, and then re-started at 
the case firm. Hence, this research can contribute to the CV literature as a program-level study 
on the process of CV activities of a large firm. 
2.5.2 CV unit as a main actor of CV 
Considering CV as an innovation practice, the study of main actors of CV activities becomes an 
important research agenda. In general, innovation practice is mainly driven by entrepreneurs, 
who are seen as “an individual or group who sees an opportunity and takes the risk of trying 
to exploit it” (Tidd and Bessant, 2014: 7). In CV settings, there is a wide range of entrepreneurial 
actors including people within the firm (e.g. employees who propose their entrepreneurial 
ideas) and often outside the firm (e.g. members of external start-ups invested in by a CVC fund). 
For the examination of main actors of CV, the review of the CV literature suggests that the 
multi-hierarchical nature of large firms needs to be taken into consideration. Firms were often 
regarded as a unitary agent, or “a singular decision taker” (Grant, 1996). In reality, however, 
firms are organizations with multiple layers of units, where each unit has actors with different 
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roles and authorities (e.g. managers, senior managers, top management, etc.). 
As to the multiple levels of strategy and structure in CV settings, Narayanan et al.’s (2009) 
systematic review of the CV literature in the period from 1995 to 2004 provides a good frame 
of reference. The review identifies that CV practices have been examined at three levels of 
analysis: (1) the parent firm-; (2) the CV unit-; and (3) the CV team-level. Studies on CV at the 
parent firm-level have focused on types and objectives of CV activities from parent firms’ 
viewpoint. They also include studies of CV landscapes using global surveys (e.g. Battistini et al., 
2013) and the scale of CVC investments (e.g. Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). At the CV unit-level, 
research on CV has examined the design and performance of CV programs (i.e. program-level 
analyses) and the structure of the CV unit itself (e.g. Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). At the CV team-
level, CV studies include the development of internal CV teams (e.g. Keil et al., 2009) and also 
the examination of external start-ups backed by CVC funds (e.g. Park and Steensma, 2012). 
Having identified the three levels of CV analysis, it can be claimed that individual actors residing 
within the CV unit (or the NVD) are the main actor of CV activities. Those individuals are 
responsible for managing CV programs, and they themselves can be regarded as entrepreneurs. 
Here, the CV unit plays a key role as a collective actor in designing and operating CV programs; 
hence, to develop a clear understanding of the CV unit becomes an important research topic. 
However, the review of the CV literature suggests that our understanding of the CV unit, as a 
main actor of CV, has not yet been sufficiently advanced after Burgelman’s (1983b) classic 
study on internal CV. As reviewed in Section 2.3.2, Burgelman investigated the multilayered 
hierarchy of actors in CV settings, and underlined the crucial role of middle-level managers 
residing in the New Venture Division (NVD) (i.e. the CV unit). The CV unit plays a key role of 
organizational championing as a group of “venture manager’s manager[s]” (Ibid.: 241). 
Whereas, top-level managers exert control over the CV activities “through the manipulation of 
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structural context” (Ibid.: 242) by structuring activity, which includes “[t]he creation of the NVD 
as a separate organizational unit [and] the definition of positions and responsibilities in the 
department of the NVD” (ibid.: 239–240). 
Recently, CV researchers began examining more about the CV unit such as a typology of CV 
unit (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008) and its interaction between the parent firm (Hill and 
Birkinshaw, 2014).24 However, we still have limited knowledge of the CV unit, such as the role 
of CV unit associated with CV programs; the formation of the CV unit; and the interaction 
between the CV unit and other parent firm- and the CV team-level actors.25 This calls for 
further research on the CV unit to develop a better understanding of the main actors of CV 
activities. As we shall see in Section 3.4.2, this thesis develops a conceptual framework about 
the direction of CV which considers the CV unit as one of the dimensions. Therefore, part of 
this thesis can be positioned in the CV literature as a study on the CV unit within the large firm. 
2.5.3 A processual approach to CV research 
One of the general consensus in the CV literature is that managing CV is not an easy task which 
poses a number of managerial challenges (e.g. Sykes and Block, 1989; Block and MacMillan, 
1993; Burgelman and Valikangas, 2005; Lerner, 2013). Not surprisingly, the idea of venturing 
by large incumbent firms, as if they were small and innovative start-ups, has been regarded as 
‘oxymoronic’ (e.g. Burgelman, 1984b) and ‘paradoxical’ (e.g. Ginsberg and Hay, 1994). From 
                                                            
24 Hill and Birkinshaw (2008: 425) defined the ‘corporate venture unit (CVU)’ as “a distinct organization 
unit controlled by the parent firm that has responsibility for investing in business opportunities that are 
new to the corporation … which may engage in a variety of forms of investment, from making 
investments in independent start-ups, to incubating internal business ideas, to spinning out businesses.” 
25 As the role of actors in CV settings, Day (1994) examined the role of champions at different levels (e.g. 
bottom-up, top-down, and dual-role champions) in internal CV, and suggested that the dual-role 
champion in the firm’s upper ranks “who acts both as product champion and organizational sponsor” 
(Day, 1994: 148) is important when innovative ideas are highly uncertain. Recently, Basu et al. (2016) 
explored the process of external CV in searching for external knowledge and integrating it into the 
parent firm. They found that managers in CVC units play a key role in “building bridges between specific 
[external] ventures and relevant mainstream units [inside the firm]” (Basu et al., 2016: 149). 
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the review of Eastman Kodak’s CV activities and its failure in the 1980s, Ginsberg and Hay (1994) 
correctly highlighted the oxymoronic nature of CV activities in large firms: 
Organizations are designed to administer, maintain, and protect the status quo; 
ventures strive to create and nurture that which has never existed before. Managers 
are responsible for developing routines to handle day-to-day problems; entrepreneurs 
must be free to operate strategically and to allocate resources in response to highly 
unstructured conditions. … Can the entrepreneurial and the management function 
coexist successfully in the same company? (Ginsberg and Hay, 1994: 384–385) 
If the firm wants to use the CV as its strategic vehicle, and to avoid an oxymoronic trap, if there 
is one, it would be important to have a clear understanding of the process of CV activities. 
Enkel and Goel (2012) also suggested that, for example, procedural clarity and procedural 
discipline of CV are critical factors for the successful management of CV. 
Since the process study of ICV (Burgelman, 1983b), CV researchers endeavored to develop an 
understanding of the CV process (e.g. Sykes and Block, 1989; Block and MacMillan, 1993). More 
recently, researchers have examined diverse facets of the CV process, which include the 
process of idea generation (e.g. Husted and Vintergaard, 2004); capability building (e.g. Keil, 
2004); and organizational structuring (integration of corporate ventures into business divisions) 
(e.g. Van Burg et al., 2012). The review of the CV literature, however, suggests that there need 
to be more studies on the CV process which take into consideration CV programs and their 
main actors (e.g. the CV unit). 
In Section 1.2.2, this thesis particularly highlighted CV cyclicality at the level of the firm. Some 
studies in the CV literature have mentioned the waxing and waning of CV activities (e.g. 
Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Chesbrough, 2000; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Burgelman and 
Valikangas, 2005; Lerner, 2013). Here, recurrent patterns of CV activities, which include start, 
termination, and re-initiation of those activities, may collectively contribute towards the 
cyclicality in corporate venturing. With regard to this recurrent phenomenon, this thesis 
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specifically addresses our knowledge of the cyclicality of CV at the firm level (see Section 1.2.2). 
In the extant CV literature, there are exploratory but contested viewpoints on the cyclical 
nature of CV activities: termination versus evolution. For example, Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
explained that CVC (a mode of CV) was designed for the “periods of severe technological 
discontinuity” (Gompers and Lerner, 1998: 4), describing CV programs as an activity that is 
originally meant to be short-lived and soon terminated. This being the case, a firm’s ‘CV cycles’ 
could be the result of termination of CV activities (or programs) repeated over time. 
Whereas from the viewpoint of evolution, CV cycles can be a result of deliberate and 
experimental effort. Back in the 1970s, Norman Fast (e.g. Fast, 1977; Fast, 1978) helpfully 
supplied an insight. Fast (1977) argued that NVDs’ long term mission—to develop new 
businesses—and their short-term life span ultimately generates a dilemma. Among the 
eighteen NVDs (or, CV units) he studied, half of them were terminated during the study, 
showing an average life span of four years. However, he found that those surviving NVDs were 
evolved as well by changing, for example, objectives and types of activities (e.g. CV programs). 
If this is the case, we need to know more about the evolution of CV units and CV programs in 
order to develop a deeper mature understanding of CV cyclicality. 
As will be discussed later in the thesis, this thesis is a process study of CV activities which takes 
consideration into both the main objective of CV programs and the main actor (i.e. the CV unit). 
Findings of the study will provide an insight as to the recurring phenomenon of CV cyclicality. 
In addition, given the emphasis on CV as a means to innovative new resource combinations to 
create a new business (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999), this study will cast light on the process of 
combining resources in new ways through CV activities.  
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CHAPTER 3  
RETHINKING ‘DIRECTION’ AND  
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1  Introduction 
In Chapter 1, managerial challenges practitioners face in managing corporate venturing (CV) 
were identified. Key challenges found through engaging with those practitioners were 
converged into the concept of ‘direction’ (see Section 1.3.2). As emphasized by Tidd and 
Bessant (2014: 21; emphasis added), “innovation is about creating value through change”, and 
hence rather than random changes, managing innovation in a strategic manner requires a 
“clear sense of direction”. However, interactions with, and observations of, a number of 
managers across different hierarchical levels revealed that there is often considerable 
ambiguity about how the concept of ‘direction’ is interpreted by actors within the organization. 
Motivated by this managerial problem, this chapter sets out to address the research questions 
of the thesis (see Section 1.3) by exploring different understandings of direction in strategic 
settings and also in the context of CV activities. 
In general, the word direction is used in a colloquial sense. For example, the Oxford dictionary 
defines direction as “a course along which someone or something moves”; “a general way in 
which someone or something is developing”; and “general aim or purpose”. 26 Going back 
beyond the modern dictionary, the English word ‘direction’ came from the Latin verb dirigere, 
which means ‘to set straight’. 27  According to an etymology dictionary, initially in the 
fourteenth century, the word was about “orderly arrangement”, which is about putting things 
                                                            
26  Oxford Dictionary (n.d.) ‘Definition of direction in English’ Available from: https://en.oxford 
dictionaries.com/definition/english [Accessed 25 January 2017] 
27 The word dirigere is composed of ‘di’ which means ‘apart’ and ‘regere’ meaning ‘to keep straight’. The 
normative noun form is directio. 
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in order. 28  In the fifteenth century, however, it is described as the “action of directing” 
something. By the 1660s, its meaning became a “course pursued by a moving object”, which 
is the modern meaning of direction.29 
In modern academic discourse, the notion of direction has been extensively applied when 
examining and describing changes in a variety of target objects and phenomena. For example, 
Arrow’s (1962) classic study on the resource allocation for innovation was part of a book 
entitled The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (emphasis added). Because of its 
inseparable relationship with change, innovation researchers have repeatedly discussed a 
wide variety of kinds of directional concepts in technological, economic, and social changes. 
These include ‘trajectory (i.e. direction) of technological change’ (Dosi, 1982); ‘direction 
argument’ in the innovation process (Nightingale, 1998); ‘direction of innovation’ in the 
government’s mission-oriented financing (Mazzucato, 2013a; 2013b); and ‘directionality of 
innovation’ that considers alternative pathways for progress (Stirling, 2008; 2009; 2011).30 
Similarly in the strategy literature, where strategy is “about the direction of organizations, and 
most often, business firms” (Rumelt et al., 1994: 9; emphasis added), strategy researchers have 
examined directions in strategy settings: ‘Direction of strategic change’ associated with 
changes in generic strategies (Zajac and Shortell, 1989; Zajac et al., 2000); ‘strategy as vector’ 
(Burgelman, 2002a); ‘direction of search’ in corporate R&D (Stuart and Podolny, 1996); and 
‘direction of strategic change’ affected by managers (Hartog and Neffke, 2017). 
This illustrative list of research shows that ‘direction’ is a dimension which discerns changes 
                                                            
28  Online Etymology Dictionary (n.d.) ‘Direction’ Available from: http://www.etymonline.com/ 
index.php?term=direction [Accessed 25 January 2017] 
29 Ibid. 
30 Stirling (2008) stressed that innovation does not follow a linear and pre-determined pathway for a 
progress but it has a directionality: “innovation is a vector, rather than just a scalar quantity” (Stirling, 
2008: 263). 
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over time, i.e. dynamics, in a target being examined; however, the notion of direction itself in 
a specific context could also be a target of research, as how we see the concept—direction per 
se—will have (ontological and epistemological) impacts on our approaches to research. 
Having identified the core element of the thesis—a better understanding of the concept and 
dynamics of ‘direction’ in the context of CV activities—this chapter aims to review the wider 
relevant literature. As this thesis is a theory building rather than a hypotheses testing study, 
which attempts to develop theoretical building blocks from an in-depth analysis of a small 
number of cases, the review of the extant literature is an important step: (1) to prepare a priori 
potential constructs and (2) to find relevant literature to which emerging findings can be either 
situated or contested (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).31 
In this chapter, Section 3.2 reviews notions of ‘change’ and ‘direction’ in the organizational 
change and the strategy literature, which finds two main types of the direction of firms’ 
strategy distinguished by its focus on state versus process. Section 3.3 then reviews three 
lenses on strategic change, and scrutinizes the two types of direction through the identified 
three lenses. By modifying underlying assumptions of ‘direction’ in the strategy literature, this 
section suggests an alternative way of framing direction. Finally, Section 3.4 develops an 
analytical framework that will be used to examine the CV practice of the case firm in the 
remainder of the thesis. 
3.2  Literature review on ‘change’ and ‘direction’ 
Direction is one of the key attributes of change (Demers, 2007). When something changes its 
states, courses, or processes, its dynamics can be captured through the notion of direction. 
                                                            
31 As will be discussed in Chapter 4 on the research design of the thesis, this step helps strengthen 
internal validity, generalizability, and the conceptual level of theories built from case study research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 544). 
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Considering the inseparable relationship between direction and change, the way in which we 
understand direction may well be related to the perspectives on, and knowledge of, change. 
Given limited literature that explicitly discusses the concept of ‘direction’ (except, e.g. Johnson, 
1992; Proctor, 1997; Siguaw et al., 2006; Werhahn et al., 2015), this section continues by 
reviewing the concept of ‘change’ in the organizational change literature. 
3.2.1 ‘Change’ in the organizational change literature 
Scholars have examined the concept of ‘change’ from a variety of disciplines and theories (e.g. 
Solow, 1957; Rosenberg, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Gersick, 1991; Weick and Quinn, 
1999; Tidd and Bessant, 2013). For example, in the strategic management literature, changes 
within the organization has been one of the classic questions along with purposes, direction, 
and choices (Pettigrew et al., 2006: 3). In innovation studies, a key question is about “Change 
… in the things (products/services) which an organization offers, and change in the ways in 
which they are created and delivered” (Tidd et al., 2001: 6). Here, the way in which change is 
viewed is quite diverse, and what underlies this diversity is, as Van de Ven (2007: 14) rightly 
emphasized, “a philosophy of science that informs a scholar’s approach to the nature of the 
phenomenon examined (ontology) and methods for understanding it (epistemology)”. 
In the organizational change literature, change is often regarded as ‘one type of event’ and 
defined as “an empirical observation of difference in form, quality, or state over time in an 
organizational entity” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995: 512). However, there have been some 
shifts in the perspectives on change in the organizational change literature. From a 
chronological analysis of the literature, Demers (2007) suggests that those shifts can be 
characterized by the ‘debate between adaptation and selection’ in the early 1970s and the 
‘debate between transformation and evolution’ from the early 1980s. As Demers (2007) points 
out, the central question in the debate over adaptation and selection was whether 
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organizations can change themselves (or not). Depending on varying degrees of managers’ 
freedom of action, this can be displayed by a continuum of perspectives on change, where 
voluntarism (e.g. Child, 1972) is positioned at the one end and environmental determinism (e.g. 
Hannan and Freeman, 1984) at the other. 
However, in the early 1980s, there occurred a significant shift in the way organizational 
changes are perceived, which is put forward as tensions between changes by transformation 
and by evolution (Demers, 2007). As Van de Ven and Poole (1995) stressed, the focus of 
organizational change shifted to the actual process of change (e.g. how and why organizations 
change, or evolve, over time).32 Demers (2007) highlights the essence of this shift as follows: 
Change is now studied as an episode, a series of actions and events, rather than as a 
difference or an outcome, as in the previous period. Questions relating to both the 
nature of change (its content, scope, magnitude, and direction) and the dynamics of 
change (its pace, timing, and the sequencing of actions) come to the forefront. (Demers, 
2007: 46; emphasis added) 
In a way, this shift of viewpoints shows theoretical approaches that contested against each 
other in the context of organizational change: contingency and configuration theories (Demers, 
2007) (see Table 3.1). In contingency theory, organizations are regarded as loosely coupled 
systems which can change incrementally while being contingent upon a number of constraints 
(i.e. contingencies) often external to the firm (e.g. Woodward, 1965; Thompson, 1967; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969; Donaldson, 1996). Whereas, in configuration theory, organizations 
are assumed as tightly integrated systems of “interdependent and mutually supportive 
elements” (Miller and Friesen, 1984: 1) which can change radically but in a coherent way. Here, 
                                                            
32 In this thesis, ‘process’ is defined as “the progression (i.e., the order and sequence) of events in an 
organizational entity’s existence over time” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995: 512). As to the definition of 
‘process’, Van de Ven (1992) noted that its meaning is used in three distinctive ways: “(1) a logic that 
explains a causal relationship between independent and dependent variables, (2) a category of concepts 
or variables that refers to actions of individuals or organizations, and (3) a sequence of events that 
describes how things change over time” (Van de Ven, 1992: 169; emphasis added).  
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‘organizational configuration’ can be defined as “any multidimensional constellation of 
conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur together” (Meyer et al., 1993: 
1175).33, 34 With a holistic view of firms, configuration theorists have argued that there are 
common combinations of organizational elements, i.e. configurations, which frequently occur 
together among strategic, structural, and other dimensions (e.g. Mintzberg, 1979; Miller, 1981; 
Miller and Friesen, 1984; Miller, 1986; Miller, 1987; Miller, 1996). 
Table 3.1: Theoretical approaches in the organizational change literature 
 1970s 1980s– 
Theory Contingency theory Configuration theory 
Viewpoint on 
change 
 Debates between  
adaptation and selection 
 Debates between  
transformation and evolution 
Viewpoint on 
organizations 
 Loosely coupled systems 
 Change incrementally while being 
contingent upon a number of 
contingencies 
 Tightly integrated systems 
 Change radically but in a coherent way 
key questions 
 Can organizations change themselves? 
 
 How can organizations adapt themselves 
to contingencies (often external to the 
firm)? 
 How can organizations generate change? 
 What process can be used by 
organizations to generate change 
internally (even without stimuli external 
to the firm)? 
Source: Elaborated by the author, based on Demers (2007) 
Importantly, the move from contingency theory to configuration theory in the theoretical 
approach in the organizational change literature (see Table 3.1) provide us with an insight into 
the conceptualization of ‘direction’ in the context of CV. Having contingency theory as an 
                                                            
33 The term ‘configurations’ was presented as ‘archetypes’ and ‘gestalts’ (e.g. Miller, 1981; Miller, 1987), 
where the word ‘gestalt’ originally means ‘form’ and ‘shape’ in German (Oxford Dictionary) that are used 
interchangeably. 
34 More specifically, ‘configuration’ is defined as relatively few “common alignments of elements” (Miller, 
1996: 506; emphasis added), which is “relatively few and very different from one another” (Miller, 1981: 
1; emphasis added). As a result, it forms an “internally consistent set of attributes” (Miller, 1981: 11) 
among strategy, structures, and technologies at a given time (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Miller, 1981; 
Miller and Friesen, 1984; Miller, 1986; Miller, 1987; Miller, 1996). 
 
 [52] 
 
interpretive framework, organizational change was regarded as “a deliberate but reactive and 
constrained process of gradual adaptation” (Demers, 2007: 8). However, from a configuration 
approach, it is accepted that organizations can generate change proactively by reconfiguring 
their internal elements, even without stimuli external to the firm. Especially, this is the case in 
innovation practices, such as corporate venturing, which emphasize the importance of firms’ 
proactive change (e.g. Tidd, 2001) rather than a responsive one. Building on this insight, 
Section 3.4 in this thesis develops an analytical framework about the direction of CV, which 
explores how the firm reconfigures its strategic and structural elements in the context of CV. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the etymological origin of the English word ‘direction’ in the 
fourteenth century was an ‘arrangement in order’, and this suggests that thinking about 
‘direction’ through a configuration logic is to revisit the previous meaning of the word. 
3.2.2 ‘Direction’ in the strategy literature 
To review the notion of direction discussed in the strategy literature, books and articles in the 
strategic management literature were systematically examined, applying several key words 
and phrases such as ‘direction’, ‘directionality’, and ‘change’. Despite the importance of the 
concept of ‘direction’ in strategy, it has only been discussed explicitly in quite a small number 
of studies. Recently, for example, Hartog and Neffke (2017) examined new managers’ 
influences on “determining the strategic direction of their organizations” (Hartog and Neffke, 
2017: 2), using the terms strategic change and direction of strategic change. Drawing on 
Boeker’s (1997) operationalization of ‘strategic change’, where the subject of change is “the 
overall set of products and services the organization competes in” (Boeker, 1997: 213), Hartog 
and Neffke (2017) measured ‘strategic change’ as being “the change in an establishment’s 
main line of business” (Hartog and Neffke, 2017: 5). This subsection continues by reviewing 
two main concepts about ‘direction’ in strategic settings found from the strategy literature. 
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Burgelman’s strategy vector 
Earlier in the strategy literature, Burgelman (2002a) argued that strategy has a directionality. 
Based on a “comparative longitudinal study” (Burgelman, 2002a: 325) of Intel, he proposed 
the concept of strategy vector to explain Intel’s strategy-making process, which was mainly led 
by Andy Grove—the CEO of Intel from 1987 to 1998. Strategy vector was developed from the 
term ‘vectoring’, which Grove himself used to explain his strategic approach: 
Grove described his approach as “vectoring” Intel’s strategy-making process. Vector—
a quantity having direction and magnitude, denoted by a line drawn from its original to 
its final position (Oxford English Dictionary)—seems an apt metaphor to describe his 
efforts to align strategy and action. By creating a strategy vector, Grove was able to 
drive Intel in the intended direction with a total force equal to all the forces at its 
disposition. (Burgelman, 2002a: 326; emphasis added) 
According to Burgelman (2002a), strategy vectoring was an effective strategic approach in 
resolving the conflict between i860 (RISC) and x86 (CISC) microprocessors, because Grove as a 
CEO was able to “vectorize everybody at Intel in the same direction … [and] created an induced 
strategy process … suited for exploiting the rich opportunities in the PC market” (Burgelman, 
2002a: 335–336). 35  As we shall see in Section 3.2.3, Burgelman’s strategy vector can be 
categorized as a case of the direction of strategy, which this thesis refers to as Type I direction. 
Zajac’s direction of strategic change 
In the strategy literature, the topic of direction was systematically studied by Edward Zajac. 
Along with co-authors, he conceptualized the direction of strategic change (Zajac and Shortell, 
1989; Zajac et al., 2000). As will be discussed in Section 3.2.3, Zajac’s direction of strategic 
change is categorized as what the thesis refers to as Type II direction. 
                                                            
35 ‘Reduced instruction set computing (RISC)’ and ‘complex instruction set computing (CISC)’ are types 
of microprocessor architectures. 
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Strategic change, as defined by Zajac et al. (2000: 436), is “changes in an organization’s core 
strategy”. Here, the word ‘strategic’ is not being used as an adjective to describe changes that 
are strategic. Instead, the subject of ‘strategic change’ is the strategy—especially the content 
of strategy—which undergoes change. ‘Strategic change’ in this context then refers to changes 
in strategy, which do not have to be ‘strategic’ in the sense of being well thought through. For 
example, a new CEO could come in and implement a poor-quality strategy. When a firm has a 
strategy, ‘strategic change’ highlights the firm’s decision and following events to change its 
strategy from an old state to a new strategic content. If we think about IBM, their strategies 
have changed from being a mainframe supplier to a PC supplier, and to a service supplier. Here, 
the direction of strategic change captures the shift from being a mainframe supplier to a PC 
supplier, or from being a PC supplier to a service company. 
Zajac and Shortell (1989) believed that organizations change their strategies in response to 
changing environmental conditions, where the impacts of environmental shifts on strategic 
change are not random. Hence, they suggested that there is “a directional pattern of changes” 
(Zajac and Shortell, 1989: 415) in generic strategies when industries experience a severe 
environmental shift. From the empirical analysis of strategic changes in the health care 
industry, Zajac and Shortell (1989) argued that “effects of the dramatic environmental shift led 
to a strong industry-wide shift away from the Defender strategy and towards the Analyzer 
(primarily) and Prospector strategies” (Zajac and Shortell, 1989: 427). This argument clearly 
shows that the direction of strategic change indicates the difference in the content of strategy, 
capturing the movement from one generic strategy to other.36 Extending this line of thought, 
                                                            
36 As to generic strategies, Miles et al. (1978: 550) suggested that there are three strategic types of 
organizations (prospectors, analyzers, and defenders), each of which has unique strategy [i.e. generic 
strategies]. Prospectors are organizations continuously searching for opportunities in the market. 
Analyzers are organizations which operate both in stable and changing markets, hence they pursue 
efficiency in stable areas while closely monitor competitors in changing markets. Defenders are 
organizations in a narrow market, therefore, relatively inactive in searching for new opportunities (Miles 
and Snow, 1978). 
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Zajac et al. (2000) later argued that “the timing, direction, and magnitude of strategic changes 
can be logically predicted based on differences in specific environmental forces and 
organizational resources” (Zajac et al., 2000: 429; emphasis added). 
Theoretically, Zajac’s direction of strategic change was conceptualized by drawing on generic 
strategies literature (e.g. Miles et al., 1978; Porter, 1980) and the theory of strategic fit (e.g. 
Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Ginsberg and Venkatraman, 1985; Venkatraman, 1989). 
These theories, or approaches, allow us to unpack two main assumptions underlying the 
direction of strategic change concept. One of the assumptions is that there are pre-defined 
generic strategies that firms can adopt.37 However, Zajac and Shortell (1989: 413) refuted the 
idea that generic strategies are equally viable options that can be selected and implemented. 
This leads to the other assumption that changes in external environments can cause firms to 
change their generic strategy. Considering strategic change “as a function of changing 
environments” (Zajac and Shortell, 1989: 413), they stressed the knowledge of “changes in 
generic strategies over time in response to changing environmental conditions” (Zajac and 
Shortell, 1989: 413-414). 
Importantly, the second assumption is closely related to strategic fit between environmental 
conditions and strategy.38 In conceptualizing the direction of strategic change, Zajac adopted 
the viewpoint that there are particularly appropriate “fit, match, or congruence” (Zajac and 
                                                            
37 As Herrmann (2005) pointed out, the idea about ‘generic strategies’ is a dominant design in the 
development of strategic management, which consistently attempts “to answer the fundamental 
question of how firms achieve sustainable competitive advantage” (Herrmann, 2005: 111). He argues 
that the development of strategic management similarly follows the cycle of technological change 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990) with the development of dominant designs (Utterback and Abernathy, 
1975; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) in strategy theories, such as ‘generic strategies’ and the 
‘resource-based view’ of the firm. 
38  As Grant (2012: 219) pointed out, the concept of fit has been widely accepted and applied: 
“Organizational economics, sociotechnical systems, and complexity theory have all emphasized the 
importance of fit between an organization’s strategy, structure, management systems, culture, 
employee skills—indeed, all the characteristics of an organization”. 
 [56] 
 
Shortell, 1989: 429) between environmental conditions and firms’ strategy, and this means 
strategic fit, which is “a core concept in normative models of strategy formulation” (Ibid.). 
‘Fit’ has its theoretical root in contingency theory (Ginsberg and Venkatraman, 1985). The 
concept of matching organizational resources with environmental conditions has been 
supported from early stages of the strategy literature (e.g. Chandler, 1962; Andrews, 1971; 
Hofer and Schendel, 1978), and the organization literature similarly suggests that there is a 
desirable match between environmental conditions and structures (e.g. Burns and Stalker, 
1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). By using the ‘direction 
of strategic change’ concept, Zajac attempted to expand “the static orientation that the 
concept of [strategic] fit has historically implied” (Zajac et al., 2000: 429) to cover dynamic fit. 
Because when firms try to maintain their strategic fit to changing environmental conditions, 
they inevitably confront “the question of strategic change” (Ibid.). 
3.2.3 Two types of direction of strategy 
From the review of the strategic management literature, it is found that there are two main 
concepts about ‘direction’ in strategic settings: (1) the direction of strategy (e.g. Burgelman’s 
(2002a) strategy vector) and (2) the direction of strategic change (e.g. Zajac et al. (2000)) (see 
Section 3.2.2). In this thesis, these two ways of thinking about ‘direction’ will be referred to as 
Type I and Type II, respectively. 
Direction of strategy (Type I) 
One way of thinking about direction in the strategy literature is the direction of strategy, which 
is an indication of the content of the firm’s core strategy. When a firm faces its external 
environment, it can choose a number of strategic options that reflect how the organization will 
respond and change. The choice of which strategy to adopt reflects the direction of strategy, 
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and the type of generic strategy the organization adopts (e.g. being a ‘defender’ or a 
‘prospector’ in Miles and Snow’s (1978) generic strategies) is an example of Type I direction. 
For example, Burgelman’s (2002a) strategy vector reviewed in Section 3.2.2 corresponds to 
the direction of strategy. By setting a strategy vector (or a direction of strategy) in the early 
1990s, the CEO of Intel set the firm’s next position with regard to its core product 
(microprocessor) and architecture. This allowed the CEO to direct, or to “vectorize everybody 
at Intel in the same direction” (Burgelman, 2002a: 335–336). However, as Burgelman 
emphasized, this strategy vector can create an induced-strategy process leading to 
‘coevolutionary lock-in’, which he defined as: “a positive feedback process that increasingly 
ties the previous success of a company’s strategy to that of its existing product-market 
environment, thereby making it difficult to change strategic direction” (Burgelman, 2002: 326; 
emphasis added). Here, the emphasis on changes in strategic direction calls for our attention 
to another type of direction, the direction of strategic change (Type II direction), which will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Direction of strategic change (Type II) 
The other way of thinking about direction is the direction of strategic change (strategy-change), 
which is identified in the body of strategic change literature (e.g. Zajac and Shortell, 1989; 
Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997; Zajac et al., 2000). Here, the direction of strategic change 
(Type II direction) reflects changes in the content of the firm’s core strategy, which is a move 
from one Type I strategy to another (i.e. the strategy change, not the change is strategic). 
For example, Zajac’s direction of strategic change (Zajac and Shortell, 1989; Zajac et al., 2000) 
represents the direction of change between different types of generic strategies (e.g. from a 
‘defender’ to a ‘prospector’ in Miles and Snow’s (1978) generic strategies). This type of 
directional changes occurs when environmental conditions are shifting, and the firm is 
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responding by selecting a new (more appropriate) strategy from a set of pre-defined generic 
strategies, as if it was choosing a new tool from its toolbox when conditions change. 
The conceptual difference between the two types of direction can be more clearly understood 
using a vector analogy (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1 ‘Direction of strategy’ (Type I) and ‘direction of strategic change’ (Type II) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
The figure indicates that a strategy itself has a direction (the direction of strategy), and the 
content of strategy (as a plan) at time t (Strategyt) and time t+1 (Strategyt+1) can be represented 
by vectors with their own directions (reflecting where the organization is now and where it is 
planned to be in the future). Here, changes in the content of strategy (shifting from one plan 
to another) have another direction (the direction of strategic change), which can be 
represented by the difference of the two vectors. 
In a way, these two types of direction demonstrate a stark contrast in strategy content and 
strategy process division, which Herrmann (2005: 113) referred to as the “separation between 
strategy process and strategy content researchers”. The direction of strategy is about the 
nature and characteristics of strategy per se, which is a fundamental interest in strategy 
content research. Whereas, the direction of strategic change is more associated with the 
question of how strategy is changed, which is a main interest area in strategy process research. 
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As will be discussed in Section 3.3.2, this vector metaphor suggests that both Type I and Type 
II directions mainly focus on the content of firms’ strategy seen through the rational lens on 
strategic change. Assuming that there is a stable equilibrium between the firm’s environmental 
conditions and subsequent organizational responses, an appropriate generic strategy at time 
t (Strategyt) under certain conditions is expected to be different from a new appropriate 
strategy at time t+1 (Strategyt+1) under different environmental conditions. This suggests that 
the firm should—in the ‘normative’ (Zajac et al., 2000: 430) sense—change its strategy, aiming 
toward a new fit, or a new equilibrium. As a result, the strategy will change from Strategyt to 
Strategyt+1, which can be captured by the direction of strategic change. 
3.3  Rethinking ‘direction’ through the three lenses on strategic change 
When scrutinizing the concept of direction, Rajagopalan and Spreitzer’s (1997) exhaustive 
review of strategic change literature helps us to reflect the direction of strategic change 
(changes in strategy) theoretically. In particular, three lenses on strategic change suggested 
from their review open up a new avenue for further discussion about the ‘direction’ concept. 
3.3.1 Three lenses on strategic change 
Changes in strategy can be explored in a variety of ways, and there are many theoretical 
approaches that can be adopted in analyzing strategic changes. Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 
(1997) suggested that those approaches can be classified into three distinctive theoretical 
lenses: the rational, learning, and cognitive lenses. As we shall see in Section 3.3.2, these lenses 
can be used in scrutinizing the two types of direction (Type I and Type II) discussed in the 
previous subsection (see Section 3.2.3), and in developing an analytical framework about the 
direction of CV in Section 3.4.2. 
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The rational lens on strategic change 
The first theoretical lens suggested by Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) is the rational lens on 
strategic change. This lens informs us that changes in firms’ strategies can be analyzed by 
examining the linkages among ‘environmental conditions’ (e.g. munificence, uncertainty), 
‘organizational conditions’ (e.g. size, age, and prior performance of the firm), ‘strategic change’, 
and ‘organizational outcomes’ (e.g. firm performance) (Ibid.). 
As Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) pointed out, ‘strategic change’ through the rational lens 
is the changes in the content of the firm’s strategy. This is the very strategic change associated 
with Type II direction (see Section 3.2.3), where firms are seen as continuously trying to 
establish a fit with changing environmental conditions; hence, pursuing the fit is “a sequential, 
planned search for optimal solutions for well-defined problems” (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 
1997: 50). This suggests that the rational managers’ main role is to establish a fit by “the 
creation and implementation of a strategic vision [or the direction of strategy]” (Ibid.). 
The rational lens has the same limitations as the other two lenses, such as less clarity on the 
operationalization of environmental and organizational conditions, a lack of correspondence 
between theoretical constructs and operational measures (Ibid.). However, as will be discussed 
in Section 3.3.2, one critical limitation of the rational lens is its perspective on the external 
environment that is assumed as given and objectively determined. In addition, this lens has 
“the narrow definition of strategic change (i.e., changes in the content of strategy alone)” 
(Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997: 55) without enough consideration of the role of managers 
(managerial actors) when changes in strategies occur (Ibid.). 
The learning lens on strategic change 
Due to the limitations of the rational lens on strategic change, managerial actors and their 
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(managerial) cognitions associated with strategic changes can be considered. Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer (1997) referred to these alternative theoretical approaches as the learning and 
cognitive lenses on strategic change. 
In the learning lens, strategic changes are analyzed by examining additional linkages by 
considering managerial actions. This results in a broader definition of ‘strategic change’, as it 
includes both changes in the content of strategy (a narrow definition of strategic change in the 
rational lens) and changes in environmental and organizational conditions brought about by 
“managerial actions in the process of change” (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997: 57).  
Through the learning lens, strategic change is viewed as an iterative and evolutionary process, 
which is a more realistic and holistic approach in contrast to the rational lens. Environmental 
and organizational conditions are “assumed to be uncertain and dynamic” (Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer, 1997: 57) rather than deterministic, immutable, and objectively determined as in 
the rational lens perspective. Here, the role of managers, who are learning through the process 
of strategic change, is “to understand an ambiguous environment through a series of iterative 
actions (e.g., information gathering)” (Ibid.). In other words, the learning lens highlights the 
importance of managerial actors (managers) who can learn from experiences and attempt to 
proactively influence environmental and organizational conditions. 
The cognitive lens on strategic change 
Finally, the cognitive lens perspective on strategic change emphasizes differing interpretations 
of similar contexts, which are influenced by actors’ managerial cognitions. As pointed out by 
Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997: 62), one of the key assumptions underlying the cognitive lens 
is that “the environment cannot be objectively determined; instead, it is enacted by managers 
and represented through cognitions”. In other words, similar, or the same environmental and 
organizational conditions can be interpreted in a variety of ways by different managerial actors, 
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rather than normatively analyzed in a unitary way through the rational lens. 
The distinctive difference between the learning and cognitive lenses is that whereas the 
learning lens places importance on managerial actions, the cognitive lens places its main 
emphasis on managerial interpretations. From the perspective of the cognitive lens, the role 
of managerial cognitions is crucial as they intervene in the middle of ‘environment and 
organizational conditions’ and ‘changes in the content of strategy’.39 
The intervening effect of managerial cognition becomes crucial when it comes to firms’ 
innovation activities. As we shall see in Section 8.2.1, the imperative of R&D and innovation 
can be interpreted differently depending on the perspective of the individual member in the 
top management team (TMT). Under the same environmental and organizational conditions, 
whether they decide to implement strategic change can differ depending on each individual 
actor’s belief structures, such as their propensity for innovation. Even the same individual actor 
can decide whether or not to implement strategic changes differently, if he or she perceives a 
situation in other ways due to changes in their personal belief systems. Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer (1997: 65) noted that, “transformational strategic changes were more likely … to be 
accompanied by shifts in top managers’ belief structures. 
3.3.2 Scrutinizing direction through the three lenses 
The three lenses discussed in the previous subsection enables us to scrutinize the current 
dominant concepts of direction in strategy settings. The current concepts of direction, which 
this thesis categorized as Type I and Type II (see Section 3.2.3), is mainly seen through what 
Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) call the rational lens perspective on strategic change (see 
                                                            
39 Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997: 63) argue that such intervening influences are either through “the 
direct relationship between [managerial] cognitions and changes in the content of strategy” or through 
indirect effects in that cognitions are “manifested in actions”. 
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Section 3.3.1). However, due to some inherent limitations in the rational lens perspective, 
these two types of direction are not conducive to capture and explain changes especially in the 
context of innovation activities. The limitations in the rational lens can be revealed by 
reviewing the underlying assumptions of the rational lens on strategic change. 
Firstly, the rational lens assumes that firms’ external environmental conditions are 
“deterministic and immutable” (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997: 56).40 This postulates that 
the firm’s strategy and structure are contingent upon its environmental conditions. Firms are 
then regarded as capable of evaluating objectively given environmental conditions. 
Secondly, the rational lens assumes the existence of equilibrium. Equilibrium often means ‘a 
mutually consistent state’ in economics. Hahn (1960: 21), for example, defined equilibrium as 
a state where “the intended actions of rational economic agents are mutually consistent and 
can, therefore, be implemented” (as cited in Teece, 1984: 90). However, equilibrium in the 
rational lens is more of an “organization–environment equilibrium” (Miles et al., 1978), which 
is a state where the organization establishes an effective alignment with external 
environmental conditions.41 
Thirdly, in the rational lens on strategic change, the organization is assumed as an equilibrium-
seeking rational system. Seen through the rational lens, firms are perceived as organizations 
responding to environmental conditions, attempting to establish “an effective organization–
                                                            
40 The term ‘Deterministic’ is associated with environmental determinism in population ecology (e.g. 
Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1984), which emphasizes the role of external environments in 
deciding organizations’ longevity. Similarly, the term ‘immutable’ describes how environments have the 
effect of being unchanging constraints upon organizations. 
41 Similarly, Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) noted that the population ecology (e.g. Aldrich, 1979; Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977, 1984) and the new institutionalism (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991) “treat 
organizations as atoms subject to the law of large numbers and other macropressures that force 
populations of firms into an equilibrium state” (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997: 80; emphasis added). 
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environment equilibrium” (Miles et al., 1978: 547) with environmental conditions. 42 Here, 
change is the rational adaptation of the organization to external conditions, which is to make 
rational decisions responsively to achieve an organization–environment equilibrium, or in 
Tushman and Romanelli’s (1985: 186) term, “an external consistency”. 
In the last couple of decades, the rational lens on strategic change has been complemented by 
the learning and cognitive lenses on strategic change (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997) (see 
Section 3.3.1). Emphasizing the role of actors with managerial actions (the learning lens) and 
managerial cognitions (the cognitive lens), these two lenses, taken together with the rational 
lens, “provide a more comprehensive understanding of strategic change than any perspective 
by itself” (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997: 69-70). This suggests that it is worth rethinking 
about ‘direction’ through the complementary—learning and cognitive—lenses. 
In order to conceptualize ‘direction’ in the context of CV, Section 3.2.1 has discussed that a 
new concept of direction needs to capture organizational proactive change generated by 
reconfiguring their internal elements, even without stimuli external to the firm (see Table 3.1). 
Looking through the learning and cognitive lenses, we can ask questions that challenge the 
assumptions underlying the rational lens and then modify them. This thinking process 
generates more realistic assumptions, which allow us to develop a new framing of ‘direction’ 
in the context of CV, which will be discussed in Section 3.4.2. 
Are external environmental conditions deterministic and immutable? 
The learning and cognitive lenses suggest that external environmental conditions need to be 
                                                            
42  Drawing on the theory of strategic fit (e.g. Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Ginsberg and 
Venkatraman, 1985; Venkatraman, 1989) (see Section 3.2.2), these equilibrium-related assumptions can 
be explained by a fit between external environmental contingencies and organizations. The logic of fit 
reads: the higher the fit between the firm’s environment and its content of strategy, the better the firm’s 
performance. The organization as an equilibrium-seeking rational system captures organizational 
changes to achieve a fit, or a match, between firms’ environmental and organizational conditions. 
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“assumed to be uncertain and dynamic” (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997: 57), rather than 
objectively given and immutable. The rational lens provides a narrow definition of ‘strategic 
change’ as it only considers changes in the content of strategy (see Section 3.3.1). However, 
environmental conditions can also be changed influenced by managerial actors, who attempt 
to change the environment proactively, or who interpret the same environment differently.43 
If ‘strategic change’ considers only certain changes in the content of strategy, which is the very 
definition through the rational lens, ‘strategic change’ is not necessarily strategic. Here, the 
subject being changed is ‘strategy’, where changes could be random rather than the outcomes 
of strategic thoughts. The definition of ‘strategic change’ can be broadened by including 
changes in environmental conditions influenced by managerial actors. This enables the term 
‘strategic change’ to capture ‘changes that are strategic’, rather than only ‘changes in strategy’ 
(i.e. strategy-change). 
Is there an equilibrium between environmental conditions and the organization? 
The assumption of equilibrium is one which generates plural perspectives in academic 
disciplines. In economics, for example, equilibrium is often regarded as ‘a mutually consistent 
state’, but it has been challenged by scholars with an evolutionary perspective, who criticize 
neo-classical economics for its strong assumptions of rationality due to ‘imperfect knowledge’ 
and the ‘imperfect competition’ of economic actors (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi and 
Nelson, 1994). Similarly, in the strategy literature, the assumption of equilibrium has been 
challenged by strategy theorists with behavioral approaches (e.g. Bromiley and Papenhausen, 
2003; Powell et al., 2011).44 The behaviorists are characterized by their belief about what 
                                                            
43 This is in line with Demers’s (2007: 9) criticism of contingency theory: “… the assumption of severe 
environmental constraints on managerial choice inherent in this view [the contingency approach] is 
strongly challenged, particularly by European scholars. … They oppose the notion that the environment 
is a given, a constraint over which organizational members have no control.” 
44 For example, Bromiley and Papenhausen (2003) argue that “two core assumptions of economic 
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underlies “the choice process of strategic actors” (Levinthal, 2011: 1517), and they have 
“realistic assumptions about human cognition, emotion, and social interaction” (Powell et al., 
2011: 1369). As Bromiley and Rau (2013) highlighted, one of the key assumptions in a 
behavioral approach to strategy is ‘unknown optimum’: 
[R]ealistically, no one can ever consistently and repeatedly make the best of all possible 
decisions. For complex organizations and situations, it is not even clear what an 
optimum means. Even if an optimum level of performance exists, bounded rationality 
implies decision makers cannot identify it. Instead, firms compare performance to their 
past performance and that of other similar firms. (Bromiley and Rau, 2013: 12) 
In the rational lens on strategic change, it is assumed that there is an “organization–
environment equilibrium” (Miles et al., 1978), or “an external consistency” (Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985: 186). However, organizations’ radical and proactive change can be better 
enabled by “intra-organizational consistencies” (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985: 177). 45 
Therefore, to capture and explain changes in the context of innovation activities, a modified 
assumption reads: equilibria do exist, but it is not so much an effective alignment between 
environmental conditions and organizations but rather an internal consistency, which is “an 
internally consistent combination of strategy, organization and technology that provide 
superior performance in a given environment” (Tidd, 2001: 178). 
                                                            
analysis—managers and employees make optimal decisions and markets operate in equilibrium—have 
undesirable implications in strategic management research”, because these assumptions are (1) 
inconsistent with the empirical evidence; (2) inconsistent with the objective of the research to find a 
better choice—because “the optimality assumption means all choices were optimal”; and (3) followed 
by “factually incorrect generalizations” that “there can be no rules that will improve performance” 
(Bromiley and Papenhausen, 2003: 413-414; emphasis added). They suggested that an alternative to 
such assumptions may be adopting a behavioral view, which “accepts psychological and sociological 
findings about organizations” and “recognizes bounded rationality, emotions”, and other factors 
(Bromiley and Papenhausen, 2003: 419), then, as a result, can explain how firms behave more 
realistically. 
45 Tushman and Romanelli (1985: 214) noted that organizations can initiate ‘metamorphic changes’ 
which are either “proactive responses to changing competitive conditions or the result of crises which 
follow extended periods of economic decline.” 
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Is the organization an equilibrium-seeking rational system? 
The rational lens’s assumption about the organization as being an equilibrium-seeking rational 
system can be challenged in the context of innovation activities such as corporate venturing 
(CV). In innovation studies, the assumption of the equilibrium-seeking firm is questioned, as 
innovation is regarded as the realization of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1934/1982). 
Here, what is important is Schumpeterian activities of “disrupting equilibrium” (Schumpeter, 
1937/1989: 166) rather than to attain a state of equilibrium.46 In CV, incumbent firms are 
seeking to generate their new business (see Section 2.2); hence, what firms do is to deviate 
from or even disrupting a status quo equilibrium state.47 
Again, this calls for our attention on managerial actors, or innovators, who are the agents of 
changes and play a key role in the organization’s proactive change. Despite actors playing a 
crucial role in disrupting an equilibrium, the rational lens focuses on discrete changes in the 
content of strategy with less consideration of managerial actors as if they were inside a “black 
box” (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997: 55). Here, rational managers are regarded as “strategic 
thinkers who could rationally plan and direct performance enhancing changes” (Hirsch and 
Lounsbury, 1997: 81). Looking through the learning and cognitive lenses, however, 
organizations are perceived as systems constituted of both individual actors at different levels 
(e.g. managers, top management, etc.) and collective actors (e.g. organizational units). This 
provides an insight that a new framing of direction needs to consider actors of innovation 
activities to capture organizational proactive change through innovation. 
                                                            
46 In Schumpeter’s (1937/1989: 166) own words, as cited in Fagerberg and Verspagen (2009: 220), 
“there was a source of energy within the economic system which would of itself disrupt any equilibrium 
that might be attained.” In this quote, the ‘source of energy’ is ‘innovation’ meant by Schumpeter (Ibid.). 
47 Stacey (1995: 485) criticized—both stable and unstable—equilibrium in the context of innovation by 
saying, “where the primary task is that of generating new products and services, continually renewing 
and transforming, then both the stable equilibrium and the unstable equilibrium states are death.” 
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3.3.3 Towards a new framing of direction 
This chapter has reviewed the dominant concepts of direction in the strategic management 
literature. The review suggests that there are two main types of ‘direction’ in the strategy 
literature: (1) the direction of strategy (e.g. Burgelman’s (2002a) strategy vector) and (2) the 
direction of strategic change (e.g. Zajac et al. (2000)). By examining these direction concepts 
through three lenses on strategic change suggested by Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997), it has 
now become clear that the extant concepts of direction—the direction of strategy (Type I) and 
the direction of strategic change (Type II)—are related to the rational lens on strategic change. 
In order to scrutinize the current concepts of direction, three main assumptions underlying the 
rational lens were articulated in Section 3.3.2. The rational lens assumes (1) external conditions 
as deterministic and immutable; (2) the existence of equilibrium between the firm and its 
external environmental conditions; and (3) organizations as equilibrium-seeking rational 
systems. However, in the last couple of decades the rational lens on strategic change has been 
complemented by what is called the learning and cognitive lenses (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 
1997). These two lenses emphasize the proactive role of actors with managerial actions and 
cognitions. With these different ways of looking at strategic change, a modified set of more 
realistic assumptions are generated: (1) environmental conditions are uncertain and dynamic, 
which can be changed influenced by managerial actors; (2) organizations’ proactive change 
can be better enabled by an internal consistency; and (3) what firms do for innovation is to 
deviate from or even disrupting a status quo equilibrium state. These modified assumptions 
suggest that researchers should take account of the impact and influence of key events 
generated by actors in organizations. 
One of the critical limitations of the direction concept is that it is mainly confined within the 
boundaries of the content of strategy. However, in reality, actors who are agencies of firms’ 
managerial actions play crucial roles in both developing and implementing strategies. Focusing 
 [69] 
 
on changes in the content of strategy, strategic change may be viewed as organizational 
response to the external environment. However, if we are to consider the organization’s 
proactive change that is particularly important in innovation settings, the concept of direction 
also needs to consider managerial actors who are attempting to seize opportunities and to 
shape external environments. These ideas are in line with changes in the organizational change 
literature summarized in Table 3.1, where the perspective on change shifted from adaptation 
(i.e. to adapt the organization to contingencies often external to the firm) to transformation 
(to generate change internally even without stimuli external to the firm). 
The discussion made in this subsection suggests that there would be a new way of framing 
direction by placing emphasis on actors of innovation activities. 48 Unlike extant concepts of 
direction in the strategy literature, which have mainly focused on the content of strategy, this 
framing allows us to think direction in a new way: It takes account of both (1) actors of 
innovation activities—who in the organization innovate—and (2) primary strategic objectives 
of the innovation activities—why (i.e. for what reasons) the organization conducts innovation 
activities. The following section discusses this new framing of direction in detail. 
  
                                                            
48 Although this thesis highlights the role of actors in innovation practice called corporate venturing and 
sets out to develop a new framing of ‘direction’, this study does not rely on the ‘strategy-as-practice 
(SAP)’ approach (Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 2006; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007), which has emerged 
since early 2000. Researchers in this school see ‘practices’ as tools of, and a means to, strategy-making, 
and they have examined topics such as ‘textual practices (e.g. strategic plans)’, which is the outcome of 
strategic planning (Fenton and Langley, 2011); ‘meeting and workshop practices’ for strategic reflection 
(Jarzabkowski and Seidl, 2008); and the role of ‘materials’ in strategizing (Lê and Spee, 2015), etc. 
From the SAP perspective, strategy is seen as not so much something that firms have, but as “something 
people do” (Whittington, 2006: 613; emphasis in the original). Attention is therefore given to the roles 
of managers and other actors in the organization engaged in strategy work, emphasizing that strategy 
needs “to be understood as an activity or practice” (Golsorkhi et al., 2015: 8). Although their emphasis 
on actors and practices has some overlap with this thesis, however, this study mainly focuses on the 
role of collective actors within structural units (who drive innovation activities), which is not strongly 
linked to the SAP approach’s main focus, such as ‘the micro-level social activities’ and ‘individual actions’ 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2015). 
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3.4  Analytical framework of the research 
Based on the review of the organizational change literature (see Section 3.2.1) and the 
strategic management literature (see Section 3.2.2), this thesis suggests that the direction of 
CV relates to an internal consistency, within the firm conducting CV activities, between the 
firm’s structure (with actors residing in the structure) and its strategy. To address the research 
questions (see Section 1.3), this thesis develops an analytical framework about the direction of 
corporate venturing (CV), which combines both who in the organization innovates (main 
managerial actors who conduct CV activities) and why (the primary strategic objective pursued 
by the CV program). This is a new way of framing direction in innovation settings, which 
considers the concept of direction from an internal firm perspective. 
Rather than focusing on the content of the firm’s strategy (Type I direction), or changes in the 
content of strategy (Type II direction) (see Section 3.2.3), this new framing of direction involves 
defining the starting and end points. The direction of CV starts with the main managerial actors 
who conduct CV activities, and it has as its goal, or an initial end point, which is a primary 
strategic objective that the CV program pursues and is designed to achieve. Thinking about 
direction in this way allows us to see it as a combination of who in the organization innovates 
and why, which is associated with two fundamental questions in innovation studies. 
To ensure the validity of the re-conceptualization of direction, the concept needs theoretical 
support (i.e. an appropriate theoretical framework) and also empirical support which shows it 
is both a valid and useful analytical tool for examining empirical phenomena (i.e. It fits within 
an appropriate analytical framework). The concept then can be used as a means of measuring 
key features of the direction of CV and its dynamics (i.e. changes over time). Therefore, this 
section aims to generate an analytical lens to conduct both theoretically rigorous and 
empirically justified research. In order to prepare an analytical framework, this section 
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continues by reviewing a theoretical framework (resource orchestration theory) which 
underlines the role of managerial actors and their resource related activities (Section 3.4.1). 
Drawing on resource orchestration theory, an analytical framework about the direction of CV 
is developed by reviewing relevant literature related to each of the axes of the analytical 
framework (Section 3.4.2). 
3.4.1 Theoretical framework: Resource orchestration theory 
In this thesis, research orchestration (RO) theory (Sirmon et al., 2007; Sirmon et al., 2011) is 
adopted as a theoretical framework to develop an analytical framework about the direction of 
CV. It is because there are significant overlaps between what RO emphasizes (the role of 
managerial actors and the internal process of resource combination) and what have been 
found to be crucial in rethinking ‘direction’: the role of actors in innovation settings (Section 
3.3.2) and firms’ proactive change by reconfiguring their internal elements (Section 3.2.1). In 
addition, the review of CV literature concluded that more attention needs to be given to 
managerial actors of CV activities (see Section 2.5.2) and the process of combining resources 
in new ways through CV activities (see Section 2.5.3). 
Research orchestration (RO) is a relatively recent theory that is being developed from a 
framework. RO was proposed as a means to address main challenges in resource-based 
theory—a lack of attention on actors and processes. In the field of strategic management 
research, one of the central and relatively unique questions is “how firms compete” (Peteraf, 
1993: 179). In dealing with this question, the resource-based view of the firm emerged (e.g. 
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) and developed along the lines of research (e.g. Barney, 1991; 
Barney et al., 2001; Barney et al., 2011). The resource-based view then evolved to become 
resource-based theory, which is “one of the most prominent and powerful theories for 
understanding organizations” (Barney et al., 2011: 1299). However, resource-based theory 
 [72] 
 
faced criticism for its lack of information about actors and rather static approaches to 
resources. As Sirmon et al. (2011: 1391) pointed out, “the role of managers is the most 
underdeveloped element [in resource-based theory] … in terms of the resource-related 
processes or actions”. Priem and Butler (2001: 33) also criticized resource-based theory 
because “the processes through which particular resources provide competitive advantage 
remain in a black box”. 
Emphasizing the role of managerial actors and the process of resource combination, Sirmon, 
Hitt, Ireland, and Gilbert (2011) proposed RO framework (see Figure 3.2). Advocators and 
supporters of RO framework, or theory, highlight that to possess resources with special 
characteristics (e.g. valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable) (Barney, 1991) is 
necessary but insufficient to link the firm’s resources to its competitive advantage and value 
creation (Sirmon et al., 2007; Carnes et al., 2017). Instead, they argue that the process of 
resource management has to be distinguished from the characteristics of resources being 
managed (Sirmon et al., 2007; Sirmon et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 3.2 Resource orchestration framework (comparing resource management and asset 
orchestration framework) 
Source: Reproduced from Sirmon et al. (2011). 
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As shown in Figure 3.2, RO is developed by the integration of ‘resource management’ (Sirmon 
et al., 2007) and ‘asset orchestration’ (Helfat et al., 2007) frameworks.49 From the perspective 
of RO, “resources must be managed effectively in order to produce innovation” (Carnes et al., 
2017: 473). Its theoretical arguments suggest that managers’ resource-related efforts can be 
divided into the three main actions of structuring, bundling, and leveraging (Sirmon et al., 2007; 
Sirmon et al., 2011). Specifically, structuring is aimed at the formation of the firm’s ‘resource 
portfolio’, which is “the sum of all firm-controlled resources (i.e., tangible and intangible 
assets)” (Sirmon et al., 2007: 278); bundling is the integration of resources to build the firm’s 
capabilities; and leveraging is the application of the firm’s capabilities to create value. Here, 
what is important is the synchronization of the firm’s resource orchestration actions (Sirmon 
et al., 2011). 
Today, RO has been adopted by researchers in the fields of strategy and innovation studies to 
address actor- and dynamic-focused questions associated with firms (e.g. Chadwick et al., 2015; 
Baert et al., 2016; Carnes et al., 2017). Nevertheless, as RO is at a very nascent stage in its 
developmental process as a theory, there are some gaps that can be filled by further research. 
Currently, the subprocesses of RO inherit those of resource management framework (Sirmon 
et al., 2007): (1) structuring involves ‘acquiring’ external resources, ‘accumulating’ resources 
internally, and ‘divesting’ unnecessary resources; (2) bundling incorporates ‘stabilizing’ to 
improve current capabilities incrementally, ‘enriching’ to extend current capabilities, and 
‘pioneering’ to create new capabilities; and (3) leveraging involves ‘mobilizing’, ‘coordinating’, 
and ‘deploying’ (see Figure 3.2) (Sirmon et al., 2011). However, if we take account of multiple 
levels of managers coexisting within the firm, subprocesses of RO can differ by managerial level 
                                                            
49  Resource management framework (Sirmon et al., 2007) is a process- and manager-oriented 
framework, which is defined as “the comprehensive process of structuring, bundling, and leveraging the 
firm’s resources with the purpose of creating value for customers and competitive advantages for the 
firm” (Sirmon et al., 2011: 1392; emphasis added). 
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(Sirmon et al., 2011: 1404). Hence, Sirmon et al. (2011) suggest that one of the future research 
agenda in the development of RO is the depth of RO (resource orchestration across levels, or 
managerial hierarchy, within the firm). Furthermore, the scope to which the logic of resource 
orchestration can be applied varies across the firm. This is suggested as another future 
research agenda: the breadth of RO (resource orchestration across the scope of the firm) (Ibid.). 
As we shall see in the following subsection (Section 3.4.2), the analytical framework of the 
thesis is developed by considering both the depth (multiple levels of structures and actors) and 
the breadth (multiple levels of strategies) of RO. This will help the thesis to generate theoretical 
contributions to knowledge in addition to provide novel empirical insights. 
3.4.2 Analytical framework: Direction of Corporate Venturing (CV) 
At the start of Section 3.4, it has been suggested that the direction of CV relates to an internal 
consistency, within the firm conducting CV activities, between the firm’s structure (with actors 
residing in the structure) and its strategy. Maintaining this perspective, this thesis develops an 
analytical framework that can help address the research questions by combining a focus on 
both the main managerial actors who conduct CV activities, and on the primary strategic 
objective that the CV program pursues and is designed to achieve. As we shall see in the thesis, 
this framework, which is a new framing of direction, helps explain the case firm’s CV activities 
repeated over time. 
To position the framework in the CV and the strategic management literature, this analytical 
framework is developed by drawing on resource orchestration theory (see Section 3.4.1). As 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggested, theory-building research does not follow a purely inductive or 
deductive logic. Instead, it begins with identifying and measuring possible constructs, which is 
followed by the iterative process of analyzing data; finding patterns; and tying emergent 
findings (including hypotheses being shaped) to the existing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
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Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). During this iterative process, an analytical framework is 
necessary as an investigative tool of research. It is a tentative research outcome, which later 
can be developed into a conceptual framework, which is a type of theory (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 1996; Ravitch and Riggan, 2016) that can describe a phenomenon of interest 
(e.g. Gartner, 1985).50 
Given that internal consistency between structure (with actors residing in the structure) and 
strategy is important, an analytical framework can be generated along two dimensions: (1) the 
main managerial actors of CV activities and (2) the primary strategic objective of a CV program 
(see Figure 3.3). Specifically, one axis of the framework is referred to as locus of innovation, 
which is the starting point of the direction of CV and cares where in the organization an activity 
starts. This X axis reveals the main actors of CV activities as either being ‘technology-driven’ or 
‘market-driven’. The other axis is strategic objective, which is the end point of the direction. 
The Y axis displays two possible primary goals of CV programs: ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’. 
 
Figure 3.3 The direction of corporate venturing (CV) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
The theoretical background to the analytical framework’s dimensions can be provided by 
                                                            
50 The conceptual development process will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 on research design. 
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drawing on the underexplored, prospective research agenda of research orchestration (RO) 
theory: the depth (multiple levels of structures and actors) and breadth (multiple levels of 
strategies) of RO (Sirmon et al., 2011). Firstly, the depth of RO considers managerial actors 
positioned at, and interacting across, different levels (i.e. managerial hierarchies) within the 
firm.51 From the depth of RO: 
… multiple levels of managers coexist, with each level contributing, in different ways, to 
the achievement of a competitive advantage. As such, the structuring, bundling, and 
leveraging subprocesses of resource orchestration likely differ by managerial level. 
(Sirmon et al., 2011: 1404) 
Specifically, RO theory suggests that mangers’ structuring action forms the firm’s resource 
portfolio, which is “the sum of all firm-controlled resources (i.e., tangible and intangible assets)” 
(Sirmon et al., 2007: 278). However, the depth of RO informs that managers’ resource-related 
actions—structuring, bundling, and leveraging—would be differ by managerial levels in the 
organizational hierarchy. In particular, top management’s structuring may well differ from that 
of middle-level managers. It is because from the viewpoint of top management, managerial 
actors themselves are included in resources (human resource) that need to be structured.52 
As explained, the X axis (locus of innovation) of the analytical framework represents the main 
actors of CV activities. In this thesis, locus of innovation refers to a distinct group of individual 
actors who reside in specific structural units within the firm and dominantly manages a range 
of CV activities (e.g. CV programs, CV teams, etc.). Of course, main actors of CV activities can 
emerge in a bottom-up manner. This is what Burgelman’s (1983b) classic study on internal CV 
observed and interpreted with the development of the process model of ICV, describing CV 
                                                            
51 More discussion about the depth of RO from the case will be addressed in Section 7.3. 
52 As Sirmon et al. (2011) acknowledged, some elements in the ‘asset orchestration’ (Helfat et al., 2007) 
framework are “not explicitly addressed in the resource management framework” (Sirmon et al., 2011: 
1394). Such elements include organizational and governance structure, business model, and innovation 
(see Figure 3.2). Top management’s structuring action discussed in this thesis addresses the role of 
‘organization structure’ in RO. 
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activities as bottom-up and autonomous strategic behaviors of actors at the operation level 
(see Section 2.5.1). However, firms can also proactively adopt CV as an innovation practice. In 
this case, the locus of innovation within the firm can be a result of top management’s (e.g. a 
CEO) resource structuring action, which is followed by CV programs deliberately planned and 
operated by middle-level actors at the locus of innovation. This is supported by a theoretical 
claim from the depth of RO: “… top management is more likely to delegate authority to middle 
managers to direct the necessary structuring, bundling, and leveraging actions” (Sirmon et al., 
2011: 1405).53 As we shall see in Section 7.3, a pattern emerges from the empirical data shows 
that the locus of innovation at the case firm swung between the technology side (i.e. 
technology-driven) and the marketing side (i.e. market-driven) within the firm. 
Secondly, the breadth of RO takes account of multiple levels of strategies across the firm (e.g. 
corporate- and business-level strategies) where RO logics can be effectively applied. RO theory 
suggests that “[o]rchestrating resources is critical to developing and implementing a range of 
firm strategies” (Sirmon et al., 2011: 1394). Here, the idea underpins the breadth of RO is that 
to orchestrate resource needs to consider different levels, or layers, of strategies across the 
scope of the firm. It is because “different strategies at the corporate and business levels require 
a unique set of capabilities to effectively implement them” (Ibid.: 1407).54 
Following the review of CV literature, this thesis specifically focuses on the strategy at the level 
of the CV program (see Section 2.5.1). From the RO perspective, managerial actors, particularly 
middle-level managers, design and operate a range of CV programs by conducting resource-
related actions—structuring, bundling, and leveraging. However, for an effective 
implementation of CV strategies, the breadth of RO informs us that their resource 
                                                            
53  The authors adopted this idea from the review of Floyd and Lane (2000) about the bottom-up 
strategy-making sequence. 
54 More discussion about the breadth of RO from the case will be addressed in Section 7.4. 
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orchestration actions need to be guided by an overarching strategy (i.e. program-level 
strategy), which may not be those of corporate- or business-level strategies. 
As noted, the Y axis (strategic objective) of the analytical framework represents the primary 
goal of the CV program (i.e. a program-level strategy). As Burgelman and Von Hippel assumed, 
the main aim of CV at the level of the firm can be regarded as ‘business diversification’ 
(Burgelman, 1980; Burgelman, 1983b) and ‘new business creation’ (Von Hippel, 1973; 1977) 
(see Section 2.2.2). However, at the program level, firms implementing CV strategy could have 
a diverse portfolio of projects, or CV teams, to explore new business opportunities (by 
searching for novel and innovative ideas). Or conversely, they can focus on a specific emerging 
technology or commercial opportunity to utilize, i.e. to exploit, identified business 
opportunities. As we shall see in Section 7.4, a pattern emerges from the empirical data shows 
that the primary strategic objective of CV programs changed between exploration and 
exploitation. This distinction of exploration and exploitation may appear to be not entirely 
consistent with two modes of learning activity suggested by March (1991): “the exploration of 
new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties” (March, 1991: 71; emphasis added). 
However, given that exploitation aims to achieve “refinement, … implementation, [and] 
execution” (Ibid.), CV activities’ strategy at the program level—to identify new business 
opportunities and to utilize identified opportunities—can be captured by the exploration–
exploitation terminology. 
The framework in Figure 3.3 is a CV typology which reveals different types of an internal 
consistency between structure (with actors residing in the structure) and strategy when a firm 
operates a CV program. As we shall see in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, this typology helps explain 
the firm’s resource orchestration process through CV activities (Chapter 7). In addition, it 
allows us to better understand and explain Company Alpha’s repeating CV cycles (Chapter 8).  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
55 
 
4.1  Reflection on research design 
A thesis is a coherent set of defensible arguments providing an original and substantial 
contribution to existing knowledge (Booth et al., 2008). As the origin of the word ‘thesis’ in 
Greek meaning ‘to place’ suggests, researchers try to place their arguments on a certain body 
of knowledge by defending their arguments in a convincing way—in light of others’ criticism 
and intellectual scrutiny.56 A thesis therefore is an outcome of a research process, through 
which a chain of arguments being generated are logically and robustly supported by 
appropriate evidence. 
Here, the research process necessarily reflects a researcher’s philosophical perspective on the 
research (i.e. how a researcher sees and understands the world) (Van de Ven, 2007). As Van 
de Ven (2007: 58) highlights, ‘realism’ is a perspective which “contends that there is a real 
world existing independently of our attempts to know it”, and this thesis follows the viewpoint 
of critical realists: 
… [T]here is a real world out there, but our attempts to understand it are severely 
limited and can only be approximated. This perspective argues that all facts, 
observations, and data are theory-laden and embedded in language. Moreover, most 
phenomena in the social world are too rich to be understood adequately by any single 
person or perspective. Consequently, any given theoretical model is a partial 
representation of a complex phenomenon that reflects the perspective of the model 
                                                            
55 Translated by Robert Eno. (Original text: “子曰 “視其所以, 觀其所由, 察其所安. 人焉廋哉? 人焉廋哉?”) 
56  Oxford Dictionary (n.d.) ‘Definition of thesis in English’ Available from: https://en.oxford 
dictionaries.com/definition/thesis [Accessed 25 January 2017] 
The Master said: Look at the means he employs, observe 
the sources of his conduct, examine what gives him 
comfort—where can he hide? Where can he hide? 55 —Book II of The Analects of Confucius 
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builder. (Van de Ven, 2007: 14) 
How to generate arguments by linking claims and their supporting evidence is, or should be, a 
matter of ‘scientific reasoning’, whether it is mainly deductive or inductive, or a mixture of 
both. This brings us to the importance of ‘research design’, which is ‘an action plan’ (Rowley, 
2002), or ‘a blueprint’ (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013), for implementing the scientific reasoning 
process in the research. 
As Hakim (2000: xi) highlights, “Research design is the point where [research] questions raised 
in theoretical or policy debates are converted into feasible research projects … that provide 
answers to these questions.” Research design, as a blueprint for the research, should be 
distinguished from ‘research methods’. For example, in building a brick house (i.e. a research 
project), the house is built according to its blueprint (i.e. research design); however, its 
implementation, such as grading, framing, and roofing, represents builders’ activities (i.e. 
research methods). In this example, both the house and the research project need to be robust 
enough to withstand the forces of gravity in the former, or the criticism of readers in the latter. 
This analogy of ‘house building’ also suggests that there is an aspect of ‘intellectual invention’ 
in research design, which may well provide an originality to the research. Sometimes, this 
inventive nature in research design makes some fields of research advance relatively slowly. 
Platt (1964) argued that some fields of science are advancing very rapidly because they are 
applying “a particular method of doing scientific research … [which can be] systematically used 
and taught” (Platt, 1964: 347).57 However, especially in social science where research designs 
are usually embedded in the real world rather than some laboratory settings, inventing a 
                                                            
57 John Platt, who is an American physicist and biophysicist, suggested the process of ‘strong inference’, 
highlighting the power of “accumulative method of inductive inference” (Platt, 1964: 347). In his article 
in Science, he emphasized the need for alternative hypotheses and ‘the logic of exclusion’ which negates 
and excludes irrelevant hypotheses. 
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research design that can be systematically and repeatedly applied is both time consuming and 
challenging. This chapter discusses the research design (Section 4.2) and methods employed 
(Section 4.3 and 4.4), and some research issues will also be discussed to show how the research 
was conducted to confront the challenges in the research (Section 4.4). 
4.2  Research design 
In order to explore CV cyclicality at the level of the firm, as noted in Section 1.3.1, this thesis 
adopted a case study approach (e.g. Ragin, 1997; Morgan, 2012; Yin, 2013). As Ragin (1997: 30) 
highlights, cases are “meaningful but complex configurations of events and structures” (Ragin, 
1997: 30). They are single, purposefully chosen objects that are empirically explored in parallel 
with concept formation and elaboration. According to Morgan (2012), a case study approach 
is seen as particular “modes of scientific reasoning” (Morgan, 2012: 667), and she highlights 
that ‘a case study’ is “an in-depth study of a single whole” (Ibid.: 668), which involves open-
ended investigations of a bounded whole object in the complexity of a real-life setting to 
generate a complex, narrated account by applying potential research methods (e.g. survey, 
statistical, and historical work).58 The outcome of case studies needs to be tested for validity 
(internal, construct, and external validities) and reliability for their rigorousness (Cook and 
Campbell, 1979; Gibbert et al., 2008).59 
The research setting in the early stage of this research was characterized by both a relative 
lack of existing empirical data and well developed theoretical approaches with clearly defined 
                                                            
58 From Yin’s (2013: 16) definition, “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident.” Morgan (2012: 668) however pointed 
out that a better definition is necessary in social scientific fields, although Yin’s definition is widely 
quoted especially in sociology and management fields. 
59 As Yin (2013) suggests, ‘internal validity (or logical validity)’ can be enhanced by theory triangulation, 
‘construct validity’ by data triangulation, and ‘external validity’ by case studies of different organizations 
(or different cases within one organization). 
 [82] 
 
dimensions that can be tested. Given the limited extent of previous studies to guide data 
collection and interpretation, there is clearly a danger of generating unrobust results. Hence, 
a research design is needed that will generate robust and meaningful findings, and move 
beyond a simple descriptive study. Given the research setting and the focus on a ‘how’ 
question, the research design of this thesis adopted a qualitative case study approach (Yin, 
2013). As stressed by Ragin (1999), data from cases can be collected by using qualitative or 
quantitative data collection methods, or combining both. Hence, “data collection techniques 
per se can be seen as relatively neutral” (Ragin, 1999: 1140), and “what matters most is the 
researcher’s goal” (Ibid.), which is dominantly divided into “making facts understandable and 
making causal-mechanistic predictions” (Ibid.: 1150). Ragin underlines that research designs 
and methods follow research goals: the first goal is followed by case-oriented research and the 
second by variable-oriented research. Drawing on Ragin’s (1997; 1999) classification, the 
research design of this thesis can be explained as case-oriented research using qualitative 
methods (e.g. Miles et al., 2014) for data collection and analysis.60 
Specifically, this thesis adopted a case study approach to examine a single, purposely chosen 
firm. A single-case study approach is particularly useful in examining critical, revelatory, and 
longitudinal (e.g. temporal changes in the sequence of events) cases (Yin, 2013: 51), and it has 
been adopted by researchers who examined CV activities (Burgelman, 1980; McGrath, 1995; 
Keil et al., 2009). As noted in Section 1.3.1, a large ICT firm in Korea was chosen with the focus 
on the specific phenomenon (CV cyclicality at a firm level), as it is the exemplar of a large firm 
in Korea that repeats CV activities over time. In other words, the single case firm was selected 
by ‘theoretical sampling’ (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), rather than 
                                                            
60 As Ragin (1999) highlights, data collection methods in research can be grouped into qualitative (e.g. 
observation, in-depth interviews) and quantitative (e.g. surveys, analysis of census data) groups. Also, 
data collected from case study research designs can “be qualitative (e.g., words), quantitative (e.g., 
numbers), or both” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534-535). In this thesis, a qualitative case study approach means 
a case-oriented research design using qualitative methods for data collection and analysis. 
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random sampling. To maintain confidentiality, the case study firm is anonymized and called 
‘Company Alpha’. Company Alpha is ideal for the empirical setting of the research because the 
firm has been at the center of all three CV waves in Korea—both indirectly and directly. As 
noted in Section 1.3.1, Company Delta, which is another subsidiary of the Alpha Group, was a 
pioneer of CV in Korea in the mid-1980s.61 However, Company Alpha itself actively conducted 
a range of CV programs both in the second (in the mid-1990s) and third (in the early 2010s) 
waves of CV in Korea.62 
In addition, as the speed of change in the ICT industry is generally faster than other industries, 
it was assumed that this would make observations and analyses clearer and more reliable. For 
example, Christensen (1997) examined sixteen years’ development of the hard-disk-drive 
(HDD) industry between the period of 1976 and 1992, and its high speed of development rate, 
such as the physical size and the disk capacity of HDDs, helped the researcher to identify a 
repeating pattern in the industry and develop an understanding of disruptive technologies (e.g. 
Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen, 1997). Similarly, a relatively faster speed of 
technology development in the ICT industry was expected to help observe and examine the 
repeat of CV activities by the high-tech firm in this industry. 
In order to capture the degree of variance in the case study firm, changes associated with the 
firm’s CV and CVC programs (main units of analysis) were examined in a longitudinal manner. 
As Burgelman (1983b: 224) highlighted, in the study of CV activities where project 
development has a long time horizon, “a truly longitudinal study [is] beyond the available 
                                                            
61 The Korea Economic Daily (1986) ‘Company Delta launches corporate venturing, reducing the risks in 
new business development’ 
62 As we shall see in Section 5.2.1, Company Alpha is an ICT subsidiary of the Alpha Group, which was 
established by the Alpha Group in 1990 with the aim of diversifying its business portfolios into the IT 
industry. Company Delta is another subsidiary of the Alpha Group, and findings of the research suggests 
that Company Delta’s CV activities in the first Korean CV does not have any noticeable influence on 
Company Alpha’s CV activities thereafter. 
 [84] 
 
resources.” Instead, Burgelman suggested that “a longitudinal-processual approach (Pettigrew, 
1979)” (Ibid.) is one viable option. He, therefore, studied the developmental process of six 
internal ICV projects of a single case firm (see Section 2.5.1), in which “each case was traced 
and the progress of each case during a fifteen-month research period was observed and 
recorded” (Ibid.). In this thesis, the case was examined with the focus on CV programs as the 
unit of analysis. The firm’s data associated with CV activities were traced and recorded through 
the fifty-month data collection period of the research (from January 2013 to March 2017). As 
the case study in the thesis examines multiple units of analysis within a single case study firm, 
its research design can be categorized as an ‘embedded case study design’ (Yin, 2013). 
For the data collection and analysis, an analytical framework developed in Section 3.4.2 was 
used as a tentative investigative tool to unpick changes within the case firm. This analysis 
approach is found to be useful because it allowed the within-case analysis of different CV 
programs at Company Alpha. Significantly, a longitudinal-processual approach to the research 
made it possible to identify two different CV cycles within the firm and also to carry out the 
comparison between the two. As George and Bennett (2005: 81) suggested, the comparison 
was “achieved by dividing the single longitudinal case into two”, which as a result generated 
the ‘before’ case (the first CV cycle, which will be analyzed in Chapter 5) and the ‘after’ case 
(the second CV cycle, which will be analyzed in Chapter 6) divided by a discontinuity between 
the two cycles.63 
4.3  Data collection 
Applying the research design discussed in the previous section, data were collected through 
the fifty-month data collection period of the research (from January 2013 to March 2017). The 
                                                            
63 This thesis refers to this discontinuity between the two CV cycles as the hidden period, which will be 
discussed in Section 6.2. 
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data collection and analysis were conducted in overlapping phases throughout the process of 
‘building theory from case study’ research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
As stressed by Eisenhardt (1989: 538), “A striking feature of research to build theory from case 
studies is the frequent overlap of data analysis and data collection.” In addition, due to the 
relatively distinct features of theory building research, the scope of data collection was 
extended (interview questions and data sources being updated) and the research question was 
evolved during the research. 
4.3.1 Initial literature review and pilot interviews (January 2013 to August 2014) 
During the initial research phase, both the initial literature review and the pilot interviews were 
completed. At the outset, bodies of literature on CV and strategic management were reviewed. 
As Eisenhardt (1989) suggested, the initial literature review stage is critical as it helps sharpen 
the broad research question and identify a priori constructs that can help understand and 
explain the case being examined. During this stage, 165 studies on CV and CVC since the mid-
1970s were identified, and by reviewing the literature, potential constructs (and special terms), 
such as ‘CV cyclicality’ and ‘multiple levels of CV analysis’, were identified. 
The initial research phase involving 18 pilot interviews with 5 interviewees was conducted from 
January 2013 to August 2014. The researcher managed to establish access to 5 managers 
within the CV unit at Company Alpha, who were at different levels (1 general manager (the 
director of the CV unit); 2 senior CV/CVC managers; 1 CV manager; and, 1 venture team 
manager). Every interview was a one-to-one interview using video communication programs 
(e.g. Skype, Google Hangouts, and Apple FaceTime). Each interview was conducted in Korean 
and took 30 minutes to 2 hours, all of which were recorded after obtaining the consent of the 
interviewees. In the early part of the pilot interview stage, interviews were conducted in a non-
structured format; whereas at a later stage, interviews were carried out in a semi-structured 
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format because the learning from a series of pilot interviews informed the development of an 
interview guide, which is more closely related to the refined research questions. 
Doing the pilot interviews was an important part of this study, which firstly involved identifying 
two key informants. Key individuals involved in CV activities were also identified, who were 
then contacted for participation in the subsequent in-depth interviews. As Yin (2013: 111) 
highlights, ‘key informants’ play a crucial role in a case study approach because, rather than 
just being a ‘respondent’, they can even provide insights about the current situation and help 
a researcher to get access to other interviewees and some sources of critical evidence. 
Secondly, a key concept (the direction of corporate venturing) emerged by engaging with these 
practitioners, which is in line with an ‘engaged scholarship’ as suggested by Van de Ven (2007). 
It was then assumed that a better understanding of ‘direction’ could help explain CV cyclicality 
at the firm level, which is the empirical phenomenon that motivated this research. 
4.3.2 In-depth interviews and archival data collection (September 2014 to March 2017) 
One-to-one in-depth interviews were conducted 42 times with 28 interviewees from 
September 2014 to March 2017. The list of 28 interviewees in total is summarized in Appendix 
A. They are chosen from internal employees and external professionals in order to build a chain 
of evidence. One group of interviewees is made up of 16 people in Company Alpha: 6 managers 
within the CV unit, 2 top level management (including CTO), 2 general managers, 3 venture 
team managers, and 3 senior managers outside the CV unit who closely collaborated with the 
CV unit.64 The other group is composed of people outside Company Alpha, which includes 3 
members of the CV program’s advisory board, 1 external venture team manager, and industry 
and academy experts in CV domains. The second group of people was interviewed to mitigate 
                                                            
64 Among these people, 5 people overlap with the interviewees in the pilot interview stage. 
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a potential bias due to solely relying on the interviewees within the case firm. 
In the early in-depth interview stage, interviews with these 28 interviewees were conducted 
in Korea during the fieldwork period in the second half of 2014. The interviews were conducted 
in a semi-structured format using the interview guide (see Appendix B), which was developed 
during the pilot interview stage. Using the interview guide is important as it helps establish a 
close link between research questions and the questions for data collection to ensure construct 
validity (Rowley, 2002).65 Every interview was conducted out of the office, and all interview 
procedures were conducted in accordance with the research ethics of the researcher’s 
research institute. In the interview, the researcher provided a brief explanation of the research 
(without directly talking about the research question), and explained the anonymity of both 
the firm and the interviewee and the interviewee’s rights. Then the researcher asked the 
questions based on the interview guide in a semi-structured format. When a new finding or 
evidence was identified, further questions were asked, and some discussion ensued with some 
interviewees. Each interview was conducted in Korean and lasted 30 minutes to 2 hours, and 
all of the interviews were recorded after obtaining the interviewees’ consent. 
During the in-depth interviews in Korea, 5 interviewees (internal employees) who needed to 
be followed up were clearly identified, as they were involved in strategic decisions and key 
operations of CV programs. Therefore, a series of follow up in-depth interviews were 
conducted from late 2014 to March 2017 when important strategic and organizational changes 
occurred in the firm. These interviews were conducted as one-to-one interviews using video 
communication programs, which were also recorded. 
The longitudinal-processual approach to interviews (repeated interviews with the same people 
                                                            
65  As Rowley (2002: 20) highlights, construct validity can be increased by “establishing correct 
operational measures for the concepts being studied.” 
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at various time intervals) is found to be critically important, because it allowed the researcher 
to identify changes in the interviewees’ perspectives on, and knowledge about their CV 
activities. For example, subtle changes in emotions, or attitudes towards the CV programs were 
observed during the period 2012 to 2015. The passion and enthusiasm they had shown for 
their programs changed into lethargy, frustration, and skepticism, which were identified from 
the words, gestures, and facial expressions of the interviewees. It would not have been 
possible to capture such changes if the research design had adopted one-off interviews. In 
addition, some of the follow-up interviews in early 2017 took on the role of post-analysis 
interviews, which corroborated the findings from the analysis. Key informants said they also 
benefited from the research findings (e.g. the evolutionary CV cycles, see Appendix E). 
All interview recording files were stored in NVivo software to develop a case study database, 
which is a way to ensure reliability (Gibbert et al., 2008).66 Throughout the interview stages (in 
both pilot and in-depth interviews), field notes, which is “a running commentary to oneself” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 538)—were written down using Evernote software. About 500 field notes 
were stored in Evernote, which became a complementary case study database. 
Archival data was also collected during this stage for data triangulation purposes. Business and 
news archives were collected: meeting minutes (e.g. Technology Strategy Committee, Annual 
Strategy Committee, etc.); program plans; organizational charts; financial reports; and news 
articles. In particular, there were only a few business archives related to CV activities between 
the 1980s and 1990s; hence, archival data during this period is mostly news articles retrieved 
from Naver News Library. 67  All collected data were stored in the case study database 
(Evernote).  
                                                            
66 NVivo is a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). 
67 Naver News Library (https://newslibrary.naver.com/) provides news articles in Korean newspapers 
from the 1920s to 1999. 
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4.4  Data analysis 
As Eisenhardt (1989: 539) stressed, the data analysis process is at “the heart of building theory 
from case studies, but it is both the most difficult and the least codified part of the process.” 
In this thesis, the data analysis was conducted in line with two data analysis strategies 
suggested by Eisenhardt (1989: 540): (1) “within-case analysis” and (2) “cross-case analysis 
search for pattern”. And this was enabled by “dividing the single longitudinal case into two” 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 81), which are the ‘before’ case (the first CV cycle) and the ‘after’ 
case (the second CV cycle). 
When analyzing the data and displaying its results, data coding and displaying methods mostly 
followed the process that Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested. These methods were 
extended by Saldaña (2013), updating Miles and Huberman’s methods (Miles et al., 2014). As 
Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2013) suggest, the qualitative data analysis process consists of 
‘first cycle coding’, ‘second cycle coding (pattern codes)’, and identifying emerging themes (or 
propositions) through the support of ‘analytic memoing’ (Miles et al., 2014). 68  First cycle 
coding initially processes the chunks of collected data into meaningful segments; Second cycle 
coding then groups those segments “into a smaller number of categories, themes, or 
constructs” (Miles et al., 2014: 86). 
The data analysis process can be divided into four stages. Firstly, as the major portion of the 
qualitative data was interview recording files (36 hours), recordings were initially processed by 
transcribing this into text. During this stage, 14 in-depth interviews that were found to be 
critical were transcribed word for word, and then translated into English by the researcher. 
The other interviews were summarized immediately following the interviews with some 
                                                            
68  Codes can be defined as “labels that assign symbolic meaning to the descriptive or inferential 
information compiled during a study” (Miles and Huberman, 2014: 71). 
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important parts being transcribed verbatim. The researcher’s transcription and translation 
work was useful in familiarizing the researcher with the data and developing a more in-depth 
understanding of the case in both Korean and English language contexts. The use of both 
languages at the analysis stage, however, raised an issue regarding a degree of potential bias 
as a result of selecting limited English words for specific Korean words and expressions. Hence, 
data coding was conducted using transcriptions in Korean, and thought processes were also 
conducted in the Korean language and ex post translated.69 
Secondly, as part of the within-case analysis, the first cycle coding was conducted using the 
‘descriptive coding’ and ‘in vivo coding’ methods.70 During this stage, the ‘provisional coding’ 
method was additionally applied as this research used the analytical framework to analyze the 
data. As Miles and Huberman (1994: 58) suggest, “creating a provisional “start list” of codes” 
from a conceptual framework or research questions are an effective way of coding. Drawing 
on the analytical framework, provisional codes such as ‘locus of innovation’ and ‘strategic 
objective’ were prepared by the researcher to undertake provisional coding. The qualitative 
data were electronically coded using NVivo, and the list of provisional codes used is 
summarized in Appendix C. 
Through the first cycle coding, 29 key events related to the developments and operations of 
CV programs were identified; these key events are displayed in a tabulated format in Table 5.2. 
                                                            
69 As will be discussed in Section 9.3.3, the subjective nature of translation was addressed by explicitly 
dividing the language for thought and analysis processes and the language for written words. The use 
of the Korean language, during the thought process of data coding and the analysis process, generated 
the subsequent richness of the interview data—from being conducted in the first language of the 
interviewees and the language archival data was written. (The author acknowledges that these benefits 
were inspired in a discussion with Josh Hutton.) 
70 These are types of elemental coding methods (Saldaña, 2013: 83). ‘Descriptive coding’ captures “the 
basic topic of qualitative data” (Miles et al., 2014: 74) in words or short phrases to capture specific topics 
for categorizing. Whereas ‘in vivo coding’ assigns codes to data using the interviewee’s own language 
(Ibid.), which is effective as it can be used to capture useful sound bites from the interviews to support 
findings. 
 [91] 
 
Next, based on the key events, the timeline of Company Alpha during the period 1990 to 2015 
was compiled, which is displayed in Figure 5.2. Finally, by elaborating on the sequence of key 
events, detailed write-ups (135 pages, double spaced) on the ‘before’ and ‘after’ cases along 
with analytic memos were generated as an outcome of the within-case analysis. As Eisenhardt 
(1989: 540) stressed, this stage allowed “the unique patterns of each case to emerge”, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 5 (the first CV cycle as the ‘before’ case:) and Chapter 6 (the second 
CV cycle as the ‘after’ case). 
Thirdly, a further cross-case analysis following on from the within-case analysis was carried out 
to search for patterns; this cross-case analysis stage overlapped with the second cycle coding 
using the ‘axial coding’ method.71 Groups of similar codes identified in the previous stage were 
reduced to a small number of categories or themes, where category becomes the ‘axis’ of axial 
coding (Saldaña, 2013: 218). The within-case analysis documents of the first and second CV 
cycles and initial codes were reviewed and manually categorized. 
During the cross-case analysis and the second cycle coding, some patterns were identified as 
a result of comparing the two CV cycles. For example, four CV programs in the first CV cycle 
and six CV programs in the second were categorized into similar types (see Table 6.3). In 
addition, the dimensions of the analytical framework were refined through the process of 
analysis, which was a highly iterative process. These categories emerging through the axial 
coding supported the division of locus of innovation, which is one dimension in the analytical 
framework, into ‘market-driven’ and ‘technology-driven’. Similarly, emerging patterns 
confirmed that strategic objective, which is the other dimension, can be divided into 
‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’. These dimensions will be discussed in Section 7.3 and 7.4. 
                                                            
71 According to Saldaña (2016: 244), ‘axial coding’ “extends the analytical work from Initial Coding and 
… [t]he “axis” of Axial Coding is a category (like the axis of a wooden wheel with extended spokes) 
discerned from first cycle coding.” 
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4.5  Conclusion 
Considering “conceptual framework is a theory” (Maxwell, 2013: 40), the conceptual 
framework developed in this thesis by building theory from case studies is the “final product” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 545) of this research. However, this conceptual framework is not a set of 
hypotheses which have passed through hypothesis testing research. As Ragin (1987; 1999) 
discussed, hypothesis testing can be generally enabled by variable-oriented research (see 
Section 4.2). The outcome of case-oriented research in this thesis, however, develops a 
conceptual framework with its underlying testable hypotheses. Here, the conceptual 
framework should avoid ad hoc explanations that may be “idiosyncratic to the specific cases 
of the study” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 544). Hence, a key part of the analysis process is to sharpen 
the hypothesis and make a link to the existing literature (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) in 
order to ensure internal validity and to widen external validity (Gibbert et al., 2008). 
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the case firm will be analyzed using the research design and 
methods that have been discussed in this chapter. Following on from this, in Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8, the developed conceptual framework is set out alongside the changes in direction 
(the direction of CV) within Company Alpha, and the factors influencing these changes. Chapter 
7 includes a discussion of the theoretical interpretation of the developed conceptual 
framework from the perspective of resource orchestration theory (Sirmon et al., 2007; Sirmon 
et al., 2011) discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 8 then applies this developed conceptual 
framework to analyze the case through the new framing of direction.  
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CHAPTER 5  
COMPANY ALPHA’S CORPORATE VENTURING PROGRAMS: 
THE FIRST CYCLE OF CORPORATE VENTURING (1997–2002) 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter has two main goals. One is to establish contextual knowledge about the empirical 
settings by reviewing the profile of the case firm, which enables a more robust analysis of the 
case in Chapter 5 and 6. The other is to analyze the first CV cycle at Company Alpha (1997-
2002), which includes a range of CV and CVC programs that were developed and terminated 
during this period. 
As Van de Ven and Huber (1990: 213) stressed, “describing and explaining the temporal 
sequence of events that unfold” is important with respect to the question of how changes 
occur over time. In this chapter, the ‘before’ case study, which was discussed in Section 4.2, is 
described by weaving the sequence of key events identified from the within-case analysis into 
a narrative around the topic: the first CV cycle. 
In this chapter, Section 5.2 reviews the case firm, summarizes 29 key events, and provides the 
firm’s 26-year timeline. Section 5.3 then explains a detailed description of Company Alpha’s 
CV programs in the first CV cycle. And Section 5.4 concludes. 
5.2  Case briefing: Company Alpha 
Company Alpha was chosen as a case study firm and the rationale for the selection has already 
been discussed in Chapter 4. Subsequently, this section reviews the profile of the firm and 
compiles a timeline of Company Alpha associated with CV programs during the period from 
1990 to 2015 (see Appendix D). This timeline is one of the significant empirical outcomes of 
this research, which informs subsequent analyses in the remaining parts of the thesis. 
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5.2.1 Profile of Company Alpha72 
Company Alpha is an Information Communication Technology (ICT) service firm in Korea. The 
company is an ICT subsidiary of the Alpha Group, which is a multinational ‘business group’ 
headquartered in Korea with over 30 subsidiaries as of 2015.73 Company Alpha was established 
by the Alpha Group in 1990 with the aim of diversifying its business portfolios into the IT 
industry.74 Since then, Company Alpha has developed into a leading IT system integration (SI) 
firm in Korea, which had an annual revenue of about $1 billion by the year 1999. 
In 2005, the CEO of Company Alpha (hereafter CEO#5) set out the corporate vision as “the 
global top ten IT service company”, which was shared through internal emails, public media, 
and the keynote speech at a corporate anniversary event. As a leading ICT service firm in Korea, 
Company Alpha’s main business areas encompass: IT consulting, system integration (SI), IT 
outsourcing (ITO), IT infrastructure (e.g. data center), and IT solution services. 75 Table 5.1 
summarizes the definitions of the firm’s business areas as of 2012. 
  
                                                            
72 The issue of anonymity: This thesis is based on the case study of a firm which is anonymized for the 
reasons discussed in Chapter 4, such as sensitive data pertaining to the firm. The name of the case study 
firm and other relevant data (e.g. titles of archival data, names of specific job positions, etc.) are 
modified as much as possible to ensure anonymity. In line with this approach, sources of quotations not 
from academic materials (e.g. journal articles, books) are mostly cited in footnotes, if necessary, in 
slightly adjusted forms. There is a consensus among researchers (e.g. Rasmussen, 2011) that 
confidentiality could be derived by anonymizing the information of cases and interviewees, and the 
confidentiality facilitates wider and deeper access to archival data and induces more open and honest 
responses from interviewees. 
73 Borrowing the definition from Chang and Hong (2000: 429), a business group is “a gathering of 
formally independent firms under the single common administrative and financial control of one family.” 
For instance, well known Korean large business groups include Samsung, LG, and Hyundai; and Chang 
and Hong (2000: 429) notes that top 30 business groups “accounted for 40 percent of Korea’s total 
output as of 1996”. 
74  Alpha Group’s official website (Alpha Group (n.d.) ‘Pioneering the Digital Age’, History Timeline 
[Accessed 18 July 2016]) 
75 The analysis of business archival data identified that Company Alpha used the business jargon ‘service 
lines’ to mean business areas (business domains) of the firm. 
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Table 5.1: The definitions of main business areas of Company Alpha (as of 2012)76 
Business Area Definition 
IT Consulting 
“Advisory [and implementation] services that help clients assess different 
technology strategies and, in doing so, align their technology strategies with their 
business or process strategies.”77 
System 
Integration (SI) 
“The process of creating a complex information system that may include designing 
or building a customized architecture or application, integrating it with new or 
existing hardware, packaged and custom software, and communications.”78 
IT Outsourcing 
(ITO) 
Service that provides “IT-enabled business process, application service and 
infrastructure solutions for business outcomes.”79 
Infrastructure 
(Infrastructure as 
a Service) 
“A standardized, highly automated offering, where compute resources, 
complemented by storage and networking capabilities are owned and hosted by a 
service provider and offered to customers on-demand.”80 
IT Solution 
Service that provides products (software packages), combination of products and 
services to address customers’ business problem. 
Source: Elaborated by the author, based on Gartner IT Glossary (http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/) 
and the business archival data of Company Alpha. 
It should be noted that in a longitudinal study, having a set of definitions of the business of the 
firm being analyzed and technologies at a specific point of time is important. This is because 
they may well be used as a frame of reference in discerning changes in businesses and 
technologies resulting from the development of managerial and technological capabilities. For 
example, the analysis of the firm’s business archival data shows that the definition of 
                                                            
76 These definitions are based on the review of Company Alpha’s business archives between the period 
2010 to 2012, and by drawing on up-to-date definitions suggested by Gartner, a top-tier IT consultancy 
firm. 
77  Gartner (n.d.) ‘IT consulting’, Gartner IT Glossary, Available from: http://www.gartner.com/it-
glossary/it-consulting/ [Accessed 18 July 2016] 
78 Gartner (n.d.) ‘System integration’, Gartner IT Glossary, Available from: http://www.gartner.com/it-
glossary/system-integration/ [Accessed 18 July 2016] 
79  Gartner (n.d.) ‘IT outsourcing’, Gartner IT Glossary, Available from: http://www.gartner.com/it-
glossary/it-outsourcing/ [Accessed 18 July 2016] 
80  Gartner (n.d.) ‘Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)’, Gartner IT Glossary, Available from: 
http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/infrastructure-as-a-service-iaas/ [Accessed 18 July 2016] 
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‘Infrastructure’ business area was updated after 2008 due to the rise of relevant emerging 
technology (cloud computing technology) and the growing understanding of the on-demand 
concept in the firm. 
As of 2015, Company Alpha’s annual revenue was $6.6 billion, and the number of employees 
was about 13,000, with branches located around the world (e.g. US, UK, China, Brazil, India).81 
The major customers were the Alpha Group’s affiliated companies, organizations in the Korean 
government, and other public and private organizations, globally. 
5.2.2 Timeline of Company Alpha (1990–2015) 
Based on the data collected from the fieldwork, this thesis now examines organizational 
changes in Company Alpha over the research time period. Changes of, or in, organizations can 
be examined from two different perspectives: the external and internal viewpoints of the firm. 
The former is the change observable from outside the firm, which is about the change 
associated with the scale of the firm and is usually based on publicly available data (e.g. annual 
revenues, number of employees). Whereas, the latter (the internal viewpoint) is more strategic 
and incorporates changes that cannot be as easily observed from outside the firm; however, 
this can be identified by examining the data retrieved from inside the firm (e.g. interviews with 
employees, business archival data). 
Drawing on financial and human resources data, organizational changes from the external 
viewpoint are compiled as shown in Figure 5.1. The figure shows changes in the number of 
employees, annual revenues, and operation incomes between 1995 and 2015. 
                                                            
81 In this thesis, all monetary values in Korean Won (KRW) are converted to US Dollars (USD) at the 
average exchange rate of 2015 (1 USD = 1,130 KRW on average in 2015). 
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Figure 5.1 Changes in the number of employees and annual revenue (1995–2015) 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on the data obtained from the Data Analysis Retrieval and 
Transfer (DART) system (https://dart.fss.or.kr/) and the business archives. 
Figure 5.1 indicates two particular trends in the organizational changes at Company Alpha from 
the external viewpoint. As to the first trend, it is apparent from the graph that the increasing 
rate of annual revenue can be divided into two stages: the first stage (from 1995 to 2007) with 
a relatively less compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 13.2%, and the second stage (from 
2007 to 2015) with a higher CAGR of 20.2%. However, the second trend indicates that although 
the total number of employees increased in accordance with the growth of the annual revenue, 
the period from 1999 to 2000 shows a noticeable decrease in the number of total employees.82 
The two trends discerned from the above analysis are important because they form the 
organizational context, which allows a more realistic and insightful analysis of organizational 
change from the internal viewpoint. For example, they enable a better understanding of actors’ 
motives behind activities and the firm’s authentic objectives (or goals, aims) for CV programs. 
Although Figure 5.1 and the two trends will be referred to later, the sudden decrease in the 
                                                            
82 According to a newspaper article published in December 1999, the annual turnover rate of Company 
Alpha, which was 3% in general, increased to 4% in 1998 and then to 5% in 1999 (The Kyunghyang 
Shinmun (1999) ‘A report on Company Alpha’). 
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number of employees in 1999 is discussed here prior to the analysis. 
With respect to the radical decrease in human resources for high-tech companies in the ICT 
industries in the late 1990s, Beck (2000), then Director of Research at the Korea Economic 
Institute of America, explains that many business groups in Korea suffered a human resource 
drain due to start-up (venture) companies at this time. Due to the rapid growth of ICT start-up 
(venture) companies during this period, the migration of employees on mass to venture 
companies damaged Korean high-tech companies’ internal structures. 
CVC-SM-A, who was a Corporate Venturing Capital Senior Manager responsible for the CVC 
investment from 2000 to 2005, confirmed that the decrease in the number of employees at 
Company Alpha in the late 1990s was due to the venture boom in Korea: 
In the late 1990s, there was a venture boom in Korea. In our company [Company Alpha], 
we had a human resource drain on a massive scale because our firm was one of the 
largest IT companies in Korea. At that time, actually the management was preparing a 
lay-off plan; however, due to the venture boom, skilled members were beginning to 
leave the company instead of people to be laid-off. (CVC-SM-A, personal interview, 
2014; emphasis added) 
By drawing on the data retrieved mainly from inside the firm—from interviews with business 
people and reviews of business archival data—organizational changes from the internal 
viewpoint are revealed as shown in Table 5.2. The table highlights key events and dates related 
to Company Alpha’s CV programs between 1990 and 2015. 
As to the analysis process, after collecting Company Alpha’s business archival materials and 
having transcribed the interviews, the data was stored into NVivo, Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). Then the analysis process was continued by 
identifying key events and a detailed sequence of events associated with the development and 
termination of the firm's CV and CVC programs. 
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Table 5.2: Key events and dates related to Company Alpha’s CV programs 
No Date Key Events 
External 
Environ- 
ment 
Strategy Struc- ture People 
Progra
m/Proje
ct 
1 1990 May Company Alpha was established.      
2 
1993 
September New Chief Executive Officer (CEO#3) was 
appointed. 
     
3  The first autonomous R&D program for 
employees, ‘Research Challenge’, was initiated. 
     
4 
1997 
July The ‘Special Law for Venture Business Promotion’ 
was enacted by the Korean government. 
     
5 October The first corporate venturing (CV) program, ‘ICV-
α1’, was announced with three ICV teams. 
     
6 December 
Korean economic crisis occurred, receiving 
financial support from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
     
7 1998 December New Chief Executive Officer (CEO#4) was 
appointed. 
     
8 1999 June–July Two ICV teams were spun-off (web development 
agency, internet search company). 
     
9 
2000 
March CEO#4 announced new corporate-level business 
strategy and formed the New Venture Division. 
     
10 March–
July 
The CV program was continued as ‘ICV-α2’; The 
first corporate venture capital (CVC) program, 
‘CVC-α’, was announced in July and began 
operations. 
     
11 
2001 
- 
KOSDAQ market collapsed and hit the lowest in 
September 2001, after the burst of the dot-com 
bubble in the spring of 2000. 
     
12 September The New Venture Division was disbanded.      
13 2002 December New Chief Executive Officer (CEO#5) was 
appointed. 
     
14 
2006 
January New Chief Technology Officer (CTO#12) was 
appointed. 
     
15 September 
A corporate-level three-year technology 
roadmap, ‘IT Roadmap’, was firstly announced 
to the public. 
     
16 2010 January 
CTO#12 mandated the Technology Strategy 
Team to develop a new ‘R&D process’ innovation 
strategy. 
     
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17 December New Chief Executive Officer (CEO#6) was 
appointed. 
     
18 
2011 
April 
A firm-level new business ideation program, 
‘2011 Corporate Idea-α’, was operated by the 
Technology Strategy Group (the de facto CV unit) 
in the Technology Strategy Team. 
     
19 September 
The Emerging Business Team (the official CV unit) 
was newly created within the Strategic Marketing 
Office, and the Technology Strategy Group was 
transferred into the new team. 
     
20 
2012 
January 
A national-level new business ideation program, 
‘National Idea-α, was operated by the Innovation 
Group in the Emerging Business Team. 
     
21 April 
A firm-level new business ideation program, 
‘2012 Corporate Idea-α’, was operated by the 
Innovation Group in the Emerging Business Team. 
     
22 July 
A venture acceleration program, ‘Acceleration-α’, 
began operation, providing IT infrastructure and 
mentoring to internal/external CV teams. 
     
23 
2013 
January 
A global-level new business ideation program, 
‘Global Idea-α’, was operated by the Innovation 
Group in the Emerging Business Team. 
     
24 February 
A firm-level new business ideation program, 
‘2013 Corporate Idea-α’, was operated by the 
Innovation Group in the Emerging Business Team. 
     
25 July 
The Emerging Business Team (the official CV unit) 
was transferred from the Strategic Marketing 
Office to the Corporate R&D Center. 
     
26 December New Chief Executive Officer (CEO#7) was 
appointed. 
     
27 
2014 
April The Emerging Business Team was disbanded.      
28 December The Innovation Group was disbanded.      
29 December A global-level CVC program based at Silicon 
Valley, ‘Global CVC-α’, began operation. 
     
Source: Developed by the author based on interviews, business archival data, and newspaper articles. 
Table 5.2 summarizes 29 key events in total and the dates identified from the analysis. These 
events are either directly related to the development of CV programs (e.g. the initiation of 
special CV programs or projects), potential factors for influencing CV programs (e.g. the 
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appointment of a new top-level management), or possible conditions under which CV 
programs were conducted (e.g. the enactment of law, economic crisis). Hence, five columns 
on the right of Table 5.2 evaluate the types of key events using the five dimensions below: 
 External environment: The event is relevant to an economic, social, or legal factor. 
 Strategic change (corporate-level): The event is related to top-level—business or 
technology—strategy. 
 Structural change: The event is associated with organizational change in structure (e.g. 
annual restructuring). 
 People change: The event is a change in human resource such as a new appointment of top 
management. 
 Program or project: The event is directly related to the development of CV programs (e.g. 
the initiation of special CV programs or a projects) 
Based on Table 5.2, this thesis now compiles a 26-year timeline of Company Alpha during the 
period from 1990 to 2015 as shown in Figure 5.2. This figure unpacks the sequence of events 
focusing on the emergence of a range of CV programs of Company Alpha. In Figure 5.2, each 
row of the timeline matches the dimension in Table 5.2 that was used to evaluate the type of 
events. Only the last dimension (‘program or project’) is expanded to the rows describing 
‘strategy development projects’ (5th row), ‘CV programs’ (6th row), and ‘CV teams’ major 
events’ (7th row). 
The timeline shows the temporal order in the sequence of key events. In addition, the rows in 
the timeline clearly distinguish key events related to CV programs (which need to be placed at 
the forefront for analysis) from other events (which can be placed in the background as they 
played a role as factors and conditions for the change in CV programs). 
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The compiled timeline shows that sets of CV programs are grouped into two periods, one in 
1997–2002 and the other in 2011–2015, each of which represents Company Alpha’s CV 
activities that have different characteristics. More specifically, the CV activities in these two 
periods were both the combination of both CV and CVC activities. For example, CV activities in 
the first period began from the ICV-α1 announced in 1997, which was then followed by the 
ICV-α2 and the CVC-α in 2000. 
Similarly, CV activities in the second period were mixtures of different programs which 
emerged in the period from 2011 to 2015—the Corporate Idea-α, the National Idea-α, the 
Global Idea-α, the Acceleration-α, and the Global CVC-α. But more importantly, it should be 
noted that there were small-scale, and perhaps pilot-like programs before each period: the 
Research Challenge program in 1993 to 1994 and the Mobile App Idea program in 2010. 
It has been found that these two periods, or cycles in the case firm’s history are almost parallel 
to the first and second waves of CV in Korean industrial history. This suggests that the findings 
from the study can contribute to our knowledge of CV and CVC, which will help develop an 
understanding of the dynamics of CV’s waves in Korea, which will be discussed in Chapter 8.  
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5.3  The first CV cycle at Company Alpha (1997–2002) 
This section now elaborates the history of Company Alpha’s CV programs based on the series 
of key events identified in the previous section. The firm’s 26-year timeline related to the firm’s 
CV programs (see Figure 5.2), which is one of the key empirical outcomes of the study, clearly 
shows that two groups of activities were separately carried out in two periods of time. Using 
qualitative and longitudinal analysis, this study found two cycles of CV in the history of 
Company Alpha: the first cycle in 1997–2002, which is analyzed in this section, and the second 
cycle in 2011–2015, which will be analyzed in the following chapter (see Chapter 6). Notably, 
the periods of these two cycles broadly overlap with the two waves of CV in Korean industrial 
history. 
However, it should be noted that there are contextual differences between the two periods: a 
range of CV programs in the first and the second cycles were initiated and implemented by 
different actors with different motives/objectives. This section therefore aims to build a 
“historical narrative” (Hull, 1975) of the first cycle of Company Alpha’s CV, and the next chapter 
will analyze the second cycle in order to identify contextual differences and to establish 
contextualized knowledge before analyzing the changing direction of CV. In order for an 
analysis of the first cycle of CV in the 26 years’ timeline, the left side of the timeline, beginning 
from 1990 and ending at 2003, is taken from Figure 5.2 and enlarged as shown in Figure 5.3. 
  
 [105] 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Timeline associated with CV programs (1990–2003) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
5.3.1 1993: Research Challenge, the launch of an intrapreneurship program 
In September 1993, three years after the firm had been founded (key event #1; hereafter KE#1), 
a new chief executive (hereafter CEO#3) was appointed by the Alpha Group (KE#2). In 1993, 
Company Alpha began running a special R&D program entitled the ‘Research Challenge’. It was 
an individual-led R&D initiative in which selected members were able to participate in an 
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individual software development project autonomously (KE#3).83 An ex-researcher, who as of 
2016 is a Business Development General Manager (BD-GM) in the Mobile Business Division 
(MBD), shared his experience back in 1994: 
Employees, once chosen for the [Research Challenge] program, had the right to develop 
any kind of software they wanted to without worrying about business hours and work 
places. They worked very freely, and called other members just by their nicknames.84 
In planning and operating the program, the R&D Management Team [in the Corporate 
R&D Center] was deeply involved [in the process]. (Ex-researcher, personal interview, 
2016) 
The Research Challenge was the first intrapreneurship (Pinchot, 1985) program in the history 
of Corporate Alpha because the program allowed, or even induced, members joining the 
program to pursue his or her entrepreneurship. In the corporate context, entrepreneurship was 
referred to as ‘passion’, and the members pursued their passion by defining problems, 
committing their resources (e.g. time and energy), attempting to develop technological 
solutions in the form of computer software. If successful, intrapreneurship programs are 
conducive to the innovation of the firm; hence, considering the definition of corporate 
venturing (CV) (see Section 2.2), the Research Challenge was definitely one of the earliest CV 
programs (CV-I-#1) in the history of Company Alpha. 
Among four members who joined the Research Challenge in 1994, one member (hereafter RC-
A) attempted to develop his idea about voice recognition software, which the idea’s owner 
                                                            
83 Unlike other CV programs, documented information about the Research Challenge program and 
business archives such as organizational charts when the program was operated (between 1993 and 
1995) were found to be rare and hard to obtain, or it may be the case that such information was not 
properly archived. In addition, even retired employees interviewed did not remember the details of the 
program enough, which is probably due to the limitation of human memory. Fortunately, the researcher 
was able to find an ex-researcher who remembered the program, and there was one newspaper article 
in the archive of Joongang Ilbo which interviewed a member of the program. 
84 In Korean contexts, calling other people by their first name is socially regarded rude in general. In the 
working environment, therefore, people call others by a combination of their surname and their titles. 
For example, if one is to call Mr. Ian Chang, who is a Business Development Manager, other people, even 
people from other firms, he or she calls him “Hello manager Chang”, rather than “Hello Ian”. 
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had been interested in since he was a computer science (CS) major undergraduate.85 Although 
the voice recognition project ended within a year as a one-off event, another member of the 
Research Challenge (hereafter RC-B) who had an idea about internet searching technologies 
successfully made a transition to a different career pathway. 
Data show that RC-B later participated in the ICV-α1 program, the first CV program launched 
in 1997 (see Section 5.3.2). RC-B set up an internal corporate venture team, Venture-α, in 1997, 
which successfully spun-off in late 1999.86 Considering the size of the business (e.g. annual 
sales revenue and the number of employees) and the valuation in the stock market, Venture-
α is one of the most successful CV teams not only from its firm-level business history but also 
at the national level: the history of CV in Korea. 
5.3.2 1997–1998: The first CV program (ICV-α1), and the economic crisis in Korea 
ICV-α1, the first CV program 
In the spring of 1997, the firm decided its corporate-level strategy as “becoming a global top 
ten IT service company by the year 2005”. And prior to the anniversary celebration event, the 
firm released a statement which described the new strategy in the name of CEO#3.87  
Under the leadership of CEO#3, Company Alpha announced that they were to launch the ‘ICV-
α1’ program (CV-I-#2) from the autumn of 1997 (KE#5). The ICV-α1 was the company’s first 
corporate venturing (CV) program. Rather than financial objectives (i.e. financial gains), the 
                                                            
85  Retrospectively, the idea of this enthusiastic member was not successfully developed and 
commercialized as a real product or service. This draws our attention to the fundamental question of 
how innovation can be managed. 
86 Kim, who was then a junior researcher, was selected as a member of the Research Challenge program 
in 1994 and developed database (DB) software for a year (Ex-researcher, personal interview, 2016). 
87 Company Alpha (1997) ‘Press Release: Company Alpha’s vision for 2005’ 
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newly announced program was initiated mainly for strategic reasons: to explore new business 
opportunities for the firm’s business growth in the future. 
In the case of the earlier CV program, the Research Challenge, it was designed to leverage 
individual employees’ curiosity and creativity that may be generated by providing them with 
an autonomous business environment. People who joined the program were internal 
employees with an entrepreneurial mindset, i.e. intrapreneurs. However, the program’s focus 
was mainly on the novelty of R&D items rather than much consideration of its business impact. 
But later, the program became a prototype for the forthcoming CV programs as the 
experiences and its operation knowhow were fed into the first cycle of CV, which was then 
evolved into the following CV program, the ICV-α1 program. The ICV-α1 was designed to 
explore new business opportunities with its highlighted emphasis on the value of CV teams’ 
business items as to the possibility of becoming the next core business items of Company Alpha. 
The firm’s press release when announcing the program clearly shows the program-level 
strategy of the ICV-α1: 
Extending the intrapreneurship program [the Research Challenge program] previously 
operated, the ICV-α1 program is aiming to nurture internal venture teams and to 
support them so that they can grow up as independent ventures. Rather than just 
eliciting entrepreneurial business ideas from employees, the goal of the ICV-α1 program 
is to explore new business opportunities upon which the company is able to build core 
businesses in the future. The program finds talented individuals inside the firm and help 
them establishing corporate venture teams.88 
When launching the ICV-α1, Company Alpha established three initial corporate venture teams 
(hereafter CV teams), and over sixty members across the company joined the CV teams. The 
new CV teams’ main business models were ‘internet searching’, ‘internet-based retailing (e-
commerce)’, and ‘internet site developing’, respectively. The company’s press release 
                                                            
88 Yonhap News Agency (1997) ‘Company Alpha launches the ICV-α1 program’ 
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reported in a business newspaper provides more detailed information about the program’s 
operation: 
The CV teams are located in a new building located in the southern part of Seoul [the 
capital city of Korea]. As a ‘business sponsor’, Company Alpha [parent firm] supports 
the internal venture teams [CV teams] financially (e.g. initial investment) and provides 
administrative assistance. The initial investment to each CV team is estimated to be 
about $4.5 million. Venture managers now take full charge of managing the ventures, 
such as R&D, sales, and human resource management. CV teams have the time span of 
4 years, and in terms of assessment, there will only be mid-term assessment once in 
two years with no other reporting responsibilities.89 
As to the CV unit who managed the ICV-α1, however, it is difficult to find more information. 
The lack of information hinders a deeper understanding of the role of middle-level managers, 
especially actors in the CV unit who are venture managers’ manager, whose role is emphasized 
by Eric von Hippel in his classic research on CV (e.g. Von Hippel, 1973; Von Hippel, 1977). An 
ex-researcher explained that the R&D Management Team in the Corporate R&D Center played 
a central role in planning and managing CV teams in collaboration with the Human Resource 
(HR) team at the headquarters (Ex-researcher, personal interview, 2016). 
ICV-α1 and the strategy layers of CV 
In analyzing CV activities, multiple layers of strategies and structures which are specific to the 
CV context make the case complex to understand. Researchers therefore have examined CV 
practices at three levels: (1) parent firm-; (2) CV unit-; and (3) CV team-level (Narayanan et al., 
2009: 61). Similarly, there are three levels of strategy in the context of firms’ CV activities: 
parent firm-, program-, and venture team-level strategy. This thesis defines these three levels 
of strategy as the strategy layers of CV, which will be discussed in Chapter 7 (see Section 7.4.1). 
In managing corporate venturing, the link between parent firm-level and program-level 
                                                            
89 Joongang Ilbo (1997) ‘Company Alpha launches the ICV-α1 program, a new model for starting venture 
business’ 
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strategies is important; however, this is one of the under-explored links (Covin and Miles, 2007: 
184). 
In particular, the ICV-α1 case is a good example representing the strategy layers of CV. First, at 
the parent firm-level, the long-term business strategy developed before launching the ICV-α1 
was to change the firm itself by the year 2005 as a leading Internet-based IT service company. 
Here, parent firm-level strategy can be regarded as the direction of strategy that indicates the 
content of firm’s strategy—i.e. Type I direction (see Section 2.2). 
Second, at the program-level, ICV-α1 was designed with the main strategic objective to explore 
new business opportunities through the assessment and selection of ideas entering the 
program’s idea gathering channel. The program-level strategy, however, needs to be guided 
by the parent firm-level strategy by which, like a frame of reference, strategic relevance of 
corporate venture items (i.e. venture team-level strategy) are evaluated and selected. In other 
words, parent firm-level strategy interacts with program-level strategy in the process of 
evaluating venture team-level strategy and selecting CV teams—i.e. deciding what to explore. 
For instance, the business area of three CV teams initially founded—internet searching, 
internet-based retailing, and internet site developing—all represent the parent firm-level 
strategy, which was to become a leading Internet-based IT company. 
The economic crisis in Korea and CV activities at Company Alpha 
Just two months after the launch of the ICV-α1 program, Korea faced an economic crisis, 
receiving financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (KE#6). According to 
Lee et al. (2009: 2), “The era of tremendous growth and stability of the Korean economy … 
came to an end in late 1997 with the Asian economic crisis”. The economic impact of the 
Korean economic crisis—the worst crisis since the Korean War in the 1950s—was severe as a 
report from OECD and World Bank highlighted: “GDP contracted by almost 6% in 1998. 
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Unemployment, which was less than 2.5% in the second quarter of 1997, rose to a peak of 8.6% 
in February 1999, and foreign exchange reserves fell to less than USD 5 billion in December 
1997” (World Bank and OCED, 2000: 25). In addition, the value of the Korean currency dropped 
significantly; the exchange rate between the Korean Won (KRW) and the US dollar (USD) was 
902 won per US dollar at the end of October 1997, but then soared up to 1,836 won per dollar 
by the end of 1997 (Baek et al., 2004: 274). 
Unlike general perceptions that firms decrease their innovation efforts in a period of economic 
challenge (e.g. economic crisis), however, Company Alpha did not cease or abandon their CV 
program. Instead, within the ICV-α1’s scheme sponsored by CEO#3, three CV teams continually 
secured their independent status of being CV teams inside the incumbent firm; they could 
develop products, services (e.g. internet searching service, internet site developing service), 
and businesses (e.g. developing customers network) throughout 1998. An article in a 
technology newspaper in 1998 pointed out this situation: 
Despite the fact that they are part of a large firm, some teams are almost not affected 
by the Korean economic crisis, which draws our attention to this. The firm’s many 
business divisions have failed to secure their budgets; however, these teams were 
invested in as part of their original plans. Company Alpha is going to nurture its internal 
venture teams [CV teams] in order to prepare for their future.90 
In December 1998, just 14 months after the official launch of the ICV-α1 program, a new chief 
executive (hereafter CEO#4) succeeded CEO#3 (KE#7). The change in the top-level leadership 
was rather an unplanned response to external events (impact outside the firm) because CEO#3 
had to move to another position in the Alpha Group. CEO#4, a former head of a business 
division at Company Alpha, was promoted to the CEO. 
                                                            
90 Electronic Times (1998) ‘Company Alpha’s ICV-α1 program in the adversity of the financial crisis’ 
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5.3.3 1999–2000: The peak of the first CV cycle (scaling up and variation) 
When CEO#4 was appointed at the end of 1998, more and more people had been leaving the 
company since early 1998. It was not a situation unique to Company Alpha, because around 
20,000 people were estimated to have left the Alpha Group since the Korean economic crisis 
in 1997.91 In Company Alpha, the number of total employees began to decrease after 1998 
(see Figure 5.1), which was mainly due to the migration to start-up (venture) companies in the 
late 1990s (Beck, 2000). A newspaper article in December 1999 corroborates the firm’s 
managerial problem related to the high turnover of skilled members: 
The company has been proud of being a source of IT specialists in the Korean IT industry; 
however, now it sees the exodus of employees seriously. The more IT ventures were 
newly established, the more employees were scouted or headhunted. The turnover 
therefore has substantially increased. On average, the turnover was about 3%, whereas 
it increased to 4% in 1998. This year, about 300 members have left the company, which 
is 5% in terms of turnover. In order to hold the leaving employees, the firm is alleged to 
offer stock options to their employees from next year.92 
Facing “the exodus of employees”, the top priority of the firm was changed to retain talent. 
CVC-SM-A, who then worked in the Overseas Sales Group in the Overseas Sales Division, 
recalled this situation as: “… massive scale of human resource drains due to the venture boom 
in Korea in the late 1990s” (CVC-SM-A, personal interview, 2014). “Rather than employees in 
redundancy,” CVC-SM-A added in the interview, “people with the high level of technological, 
managerial, and entrepreneurial capabilities were leaving the company.” CVC-SM-A confirmed 
that the retention of talented employees became the main strategic objective of the firm’s 
venturing activities: 
We started the venture investment [program] in 2000 which was finished around 2005. 
… Looking back [in 2014], in the late 1990s, it was not just ‘us’ investing in ventures. 
Back then, there was a strong venture investment climate in which large firms 
                                                            
91 Shindonga (2000) ‘A report on the Alpha Group’ 
92 The Kyunghyang Shinmun (1999) ‘A report on Company Alpha’ 
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aggressively invested in start-ups; it was like a historical flow in that period. In general, 
the main goal of venture capitals is gaining profits [i.e. financial objectives]. But, we did 
not start the venture investment to make profits. In our situation, holding the talented 
employees was crucial. In early 2000, we had got a mission from the top to organize a 
venture investment team. (CVC-SM-A, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
In the midst of this strong venture investment climate, the firm accelerated the speed of ICV-
α1. Originally, under the ICV-α1 scheme, three CV teams were supposed to be reviewed by the 
parent firm by the end of 1999 as to their performance, which was the mid-term assessment. 
However, a decision was taken to spin off two CV teams—one that provided an internet 
searching service (Venture-α) and the other which provided an internet site developing 
service—from Company Alpha in late 1999 (KE#8).93, 94 From Company Alpha’s perspective, this 
spinning off was an attempt to present the firm to employees as sufficiently innovative—a way 
of retaining talent. 
New corporate-level business strategy 
In March 2000, CEO#4 announced a new corporate-level business strategy (KE#9). This was the 
firm’s mid-term business strategy to achieve a corporate-level strategy of transforming the 
firm into “the internet-based IT service company”. 95  The strategy included the business 
strategy to change their business portfolio by: (1) reducing the business portion of system 
integration (SI) business and (2) increasing the portion of internet and global business. “Under 
the new business strategy,” CEO#4 affirmed in the press release, “we will change our business 
portfolio, and we [Company Alpha] will be renewed by the end of 2003 with an annual revenue 
                                                            
93 Yonhap News Agency (1999) ‘Company Alpha spins off two internal ventures’ 
94 Among three CV teams founded in 1997, a team preparing an e-commerce service was transferred 
into a business division of Company Alpha instead of spinning it off. Meanwhile, two other CV teams—
providing medical software and digital content rights management solution—were founded in 1998 and 
1999, respectively. 
95 Company Alpha (2000) ‘Press Release: Company Alpha transforms into the internet-based IT service 
company’ 
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of $2.7 billion and an operating income of $330 million.”96 Again, the parent firm-level strategy 
corresponds to the direction of strategy (Type I direction) which indicates the content of the 
firm’s strategy. 
Finally, under the firm’s updated business strategy, CV activities became a key strategic vehicle 
as a means to achieve the mid-term business strategy. In order to increase the volume of 
Internet and overseas business, the firm decided its parent firm-level strategy to scale up its 
previous CV activities they had been conducting since 1997—the ICV-α1 program. The decision 
was reported: “By investing $18 million in 2000 alone and by investing a total amount of $115 
million by 2003, the firm aims to nurture its internal corporate venture teams and to increase 
its investment in external ventures”.97 
The creation of the New Venture Division and the ICV-α2 
After announcing the new corporate-level strategy (KE#9), Company Alpha overhauled the 
organizational structure based on the new strategy announced by CEO#4. As a result of the 
organizational reshuffling in March 2000, the New Venture Division (NVD) was formed as 
shown in the organizational chart in 2000 (hereafter OC#2000) (see Figure 5.4). 
                                                            
96 Company Alpha (2000) ‘Press Release: Company Alpha transforms into the internet-based IT service 
company’ 
97 Digital Times (2000) ‘Company Alpha announces the business innovation strategy’ 
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Figure 5.4 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, March 2000 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Company Alpha’s business archives and the organizational 
chart in 2000. 
* CFO: Chief Financial Officer; CHRO: Chief Human Resources Officer; CIO: Chief Information Officer; 
COO: Chief Operating Officer; CTO: Chief Technology Officer 
** Structural units colored in blue represent the newly formed divisions when the new corporate-level 
strategy was announced in 2000 by CEO#4. 
The main role of the NVD was to expand its CV activities financially and to manage the activities 
more symmetrically. If we look into the internal structure of the NVD, we find the Venture 
Management Team, which consists of two sub-units: the Incubation Group and the Alliance 
Group.98 As to the process of the NVD’s formation (e.g. gathering and training people), CVC-
SM-A shared her own experiences and observations from an insider’s viewpoint: 
In early 2000, there was a mission from the top to organize a venture investment team. 
An internal recruiting campaign was started to find people for a new team doing 
venture investment tasks. … Inside the newly formed team, the Venture Management 
Team, there were two units: the Alliance Group for external investment and the 
Incubation Group for internal investment. [As a member of the Alliance Group,] I 
estimated the valuation of ventures, and did investment planning, post-investment 
monitoring, etc. … But the members from different backgrounds didn’t have relevant 
                                                            
98 After analyzing organizational charts of the company, it was found that every ‘division’ is made up of 
‘teams’, which then consist of a set of ‘groups’. These hierarchical structures and specific terms 
associated with every single layer in the hierarchy may well establish a unique organizational context, 
which will be further analyzed and discussed in the following chapters. 
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skills, for example, financial investment. So, more people were scouted from VCs and 
other investment banks, and they trained us, such as the evaluation of venture 
valuation, the calculation of net present value, and so on. (CVC-SM-A, personal 
interview, 2014) 
The launch of the first CVC program, CVC-α 
In the middle of 2000, the head of NVD announced that they were to launch a corporate 
venturing capital (CVC) program called the ‘CVC-α’ (KE#10). It was Company Alpha’s first CVC 
program, and it can be categorized as the firm’s new CV program (CV-I-#4). In the statement, 
the head of NVD said that they were going to invest in two ventures—mobile healthcare and 
pharmaceutical start-ups. 
In the second half of 2000, Company Alpha’s CV programs were all running in operation mode. 
CEO#4, in an interview with a Korean newspaper, explained: 
In terms of venture investment, we have an internal venturing [ICV-α2] program, and a 
CVC [CVC-α] program which seeks synergy with potential external venture companies. 
It feels like we are now living in an ‘ice age’ of venture investment; however, our 
company has invested about $22 million this year, which is five times more than last 
year.99 
With respect to the objective of CVC-α, the planning document for the CVC-α program shows 
its main goal was strategic, rather than financial: 
When making investment decisions, our equity investment should be made primarily in 
our current business areas (system integration and IT outsourcing). … Considering that 
financial investment is not our special area, gaining financial profits by venture 
investment is not our top priority. Instead, we need to make profits from our invested 
partners’ business profits.100 
CVC-SM-A, who at that time worked in the Alliance Group of the New Venture Division, 
                                                            
99 Joongang Ilbo (2000) ‘Interview: The CEO of Company Alpha’ 
100 Company Alpha (2000) ‘The plan for the CVC-α program’ 
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confirmed that the main goal of CVC-α was, as the name of the group indicates, to establish a 
venture network (i.e. to secure access to business networks) rather than “capital gains” (CVC-
SM-A, personal interview, 2013). 
5.3.4 2001–2002: The end of the first CV cycle 
After the burst of the dot-com bubble in the spring of 2000, the KOSDAQ market collapsed and 
hit its lowest point in September 2001 (KE#11). Mowery and Simcoe (2002), in their analysis of 
the history of the Internet and computer networking, illustrate this period in the context of the 
US as below, and Korea was not an exception: 
[In the late 1990s,] … [c]ommercial interest and activity were fueled by the availability 
of capital from the US venture capital (VC) industry, as well as the strong performance 
of the US economy. The subsequent “dotbomb” collapse in Internet companies’ share 
prices during 2000–2001 illustrates some of the risks associated with the 
Schumpeterian “swarming” of US investors and entrepreneurs to the Internet. (Mowery 
and Simcoe, 2002: 1370)  
For Company Alpha, despite growing concerns over the risk of venture investment in this 
period, the company continued its CV activities in 2001 and also in 2002. For instance, an 
additional $20 million were invested by the CVC-α in 2001 alone, increasing the total number 
of invested venture companies up to 35 as of the end of 2001. In the case of the ICV-α2, 
Company Alpha, the parent firm of CV teams, decided to increase the pace of the spinning-off 
process. As a result, one CV team was spun off in the first half of 2001, which was followed by 
the spin-off of four other CV teams in the second half of the same year. The only CV team left 
internally was soon terminated, or maybe disappeared. 
At last, the NVD was disbanded in the autumn of 2001 (KE#12), which was less than two years 
after its establishment. In the following year, the rate of operating profits plummeted to less 
than 1%, which was the lowest record in the entire history of the firm. In late 2002, CEO#4 was 
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replaced by a new chief executive, CEO#5 (KE#13). In the years between 2003 to 2005, 
activities either internal of or even external to the company are rarely found in newspapers, 
which is part of what this thesis calls the ‘hidden period’ between the two cycles of CV in the 
history of Company Alpha. This period is analyzed in the next chapter (see Section 6.2). 
5.4  Concluding reflection 
This chapter has analyzed the sequence of events associated with CV programs conducted by 
Company Alpha (see Table 5.2). The analysis specifically focused on the series of key events 
from the establishment of the firm in 1990 (KE#1) to the change of chief executive—from 
CEO#4 to CEO#5—in 2002 (KE#13). 
The empirical analysis found that there was a particular period of time in the history of 
Company Alpha. From 1997 to 2002, a set of CV programs were initiated, developed, and 
hence constituted the firm’s corporate venturing (CV) portfolio. The thesis defines this period 
with the initiation, development, and demise of CV activities inside the firm as the first CV cycle 
at Company Alpha. 
Before the beginning of the first CV cycle, an individual-led R&D initiative (the Research 
Challenge) was operated from 1993 to 1994, which may well be an antecedent of the firm’s CV 
activities. In 1997, the initial CV program (the ICV-α1) designed to explore new business 
opportunities was started. In 2000, the scale of the ICV program was increased (the ICV-α2) 
and the operation unit that managed CV activities (i.e. the CV unit) was formed on the 
marketing side of the firm (the NVD). In 2000, again, a new corporate venturing capital (CVC) 
program (the CVC-α) was added, being incorporated as another part of the firm’s CV activities. 
This finding suggests that Company Alpha’s CV activities in 2000, the peak of the first CV cycle, 
were not so much a set of CV teams but rather a portfolio of different programs (the ICV-α2 
and the CVC-α programs). 
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Finally, the data indicate that all of Company Alpha’s CV efforts were totally ceased in 2003 
after the arrival of a new chief executive, CEO#5, in late 2002 (KE#13). This leads us to ask the 
question whether KE#13, the change of a CEO served as a critical juncture in Company Alpha’s 
corporate venturing journey. The next chapter therefore begins by looking at what actually 
happened after the arrival of the new CEO, especially in a hidden period between the two CV 
cycles (2003–2009). 
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CHAPTER 6  
COMPANY ALPHA’S CORPORATE VENTURING PROGRAMS: 
THE SECOND CYCLE OF CORPORATE VENTURING (2011–2015) 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter continues the analysis of Company Alpha’s CV programs, and analyzes the key 
events ranging from the arrival of CEO#5 in 2002 to the very final event in Table 5.2, the launch 
of a global CVC program in 2014. 
The analysis of these key events demonstrates that the history of Company Alpha from 2003 
to 2015 can be divided into two distinct periods. One is from 2011 to 2015 when, in a similar 
way to what occurred in the first CV cycle (1997–2002), a set of CV programs were initiated 
and subsequently developed, and thus constituted the firm’s CV portfolio; these periods are 
described as the second CV cycle of Company Alpha. The other is from 2003 to 2009 when 
conditions conducive to the beginning of a new CV cycle were formed within the organization, 
which this thesis defines as the hidden period. 
By adopting a qualitative, longitudinal approach (see Section 4.2), the research design of this 
study allows a “within-case comparison” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) between the first 
and the second CV cycles at Company Alpha. After comparing these two cycles, this thesis finds 
a repeating pattern occurring within these two cycles. In addition, the within-case comparison 
illuminates the contextual differences between the two cycles. 
In this chapter, Section 6.2 analyzes the events which took place in between the first and the 
second CV cycles (i.e. during the hidden period). Section 6.3 then explains a detailed 
description of Company Alpha’s CV programs focusing on the second CV cycle. Finally, Section 
6.4 summarizes patterns emerging from the analysis and discusses the findings. 
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6.2  Between the two CV cycles—the hidden period (2003–2009) 
This section continues to analyze the series of key events (see Table 5.2), especially from the 
arrival of CEO#5 in 2002 (KE#13) until just before 2010 (KE#15), during which periods almost 
no CV activities are identified from the media. The analysis of key events and business archival 
data (minutes of top-level management meetings) reveals that there was a hidden period—
from 2003 to 2009—in the history of the case firm, which allowed the formation of conditions 
under which the second cycle of CV at Company Alpha could have been initiated after 2010. 
For the purpose of analysis, the section of the timeline from 2003 to 2015 taken from Figure 
5.2 is shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 Timeline associated with CV programs (2003–2015) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
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6.2.1 2003–2005: New CEO and the direction of strategy (cost reduction) 
The arrival of a new chief executive (CEO#5) and business turnaround 
In the second half of 2002, a strategic decision was made to replace the chief executive of 
Company Alpha, so a chief executive, CEO#5, was appointed in December 2002 (KE#13). 
Although details behind the decision are unclear due to limited accessibility to the data related 
to the decision, the firm’s devastating business performance in 2002 may well have been a 
major reason for this leadership change. 
Starting from 2003, led by CEO#5, Company Alpha’s business performance was quickly 
reverting to normal. A newspaper article in February 2006 reported that when compared to 
2002’s rate of operating profit which was the lowest in its history, the figure for 2006 soared 
up to $180 million, achieving a nearly twenty-fold increase in three years.101 
This rapid business turnaround was mainly due to the fact that corporate-level business 
strategy was sharply focused on cost reduction. The main priority of CEO#5 was to reduce costs 
and to restore the business back to its previous level of profitability. A number of interviewees 
who worked for the company during this period of time said that the two to three-year period 
following the arrival of CEO#5 was a period of cost reduction. CEO#5’s own remark in a 
Technology Strategy Committee (TSC) meeting in April 2004, in the middle of this cost 
reduction period, also corroborates this business strategy: 
In every aspect of our work, we always have to think about cost, competitiveness, and 
productivity. We need a climate, or organizational culture if you like, in which when 
some people meet then they start talking about cost, competitiveness, and 
productivity.102 
                                                            
101 Yonhap News Agency (2006) ‘Company Alpha’s chief executive, CEO#5’ 
102 Company Alpha (2004) ‘TSC#14 Meeting Minutes’ 
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The beginning of the Technology Strategy Committee (TSC)  
During the period when their business performance was being improved (i.e. business 
turnaround), CEO#5 and other top management’s understanding of technology and 
technology strategy was also improved. Central to this improvement was the work of the 
‘Technology Strategy Committee (TSC)’, which was a monthly meeting with a range of 
technology items on the agenda with members including CEO#5; C-level executives (e.g. chief 
technology officer, chief strategy officer); heads of business divisions; heads of teams; and 
selective directors of groups in relevant business divisions depending on the items on the 
agenda.103, 104 
Mandated by CEO#5, a series of TSCs were designed and operated from March 2003 until the 
end of 2008, by the members of the Technology Strategy Team. The goal of the committee set 
by CEO#5 was to improve his understanding of technology and technology strategy and also 
that of other top management team members who were not directly involved with 
technological issues. At the first Technology Strategy Committee (TSC#1) meeting held in 
March 2003, CEO#5 explained why he initiated the TSC: 
For people who haven’t worked in the IT industry before, new IT technologies pouring 
in day after day are very hard to understand. At our company, technology is critically 
important for our business. Let’s make the Technology Strategy Committee a place freer 
than any other meetings; let’s be more flexible in terms of formality. How about inviting 
academics for discussion panels and how about organizing a seminar away from the 
building? This committee should be a place where all members, regardless of their 
backgrounds and work place, participate for the technology development of our 
company.105 
                                                            
103 As to the agenda of TSCs, topics discussed in 2003 that are related to technologies include issues such 
as bioinformatics, semantic web, human computer interaction technologies, etc. 
104 Multiple levels of managers and the title of their positions can be understood more clearly using the 
‘multi-layer framework (MLF)’ presented in Section 7.3.1. 
105 Company Alpha (2003) ‘TSC#1 Meeting Minutes’ 
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Later, in the TSC#3, CEO#5 emphasized the value of the TSC and mandated to expand the scope 
of participants: 
I want to foster this Technology Strategy Committee. For me, it’s strange enough that 
there hasn’t been any activity like this meeting. We need to invite other business 
executives such as our CFO [chief financial officer] and let them think over technologies, 
see R&D projects briefings, and study technology trends.106 
In the TSC#2 held in April 2003, a new corporate-level technology strategy was presented with 
the title, “The direction of execution of Company Alpha’s R&D”.107 The presenter was Director 
of the Technology Strategy Group in the Corporate R&D Center. 108  The presentation 
highlighted that the status quo of the corporate R&D was assessed as being in the substantial 
underinvestment status compared to other global leaders, such as IBM. 109  The director 
suggested two key implications: first, the Corporate R&D Center should be the firm’s source of 
competitiveness; and second, quoting a remark by IBM’s head of R&D, he asserted that 
“Invention without innovation is unnecessary”, which, of course, is in line with the definition of 
innovation in an academic sense (e.g. Freeman and Soete, 1997; Tidd and Bessant, 2013). 
The essence of the newly proposed corporate-level technology strategy was twofold. First, the 
firm would develop a robust technology strategy by applying an ‘IT roadmap’, which is a mid-
                                                            
106 Company Alpha (2003) ‘TSC#3 Meeting Minutes’ 
107 This title is a direct translation of the title in Korean ‘R&D 추진 방향 (R&D chu-jin bang-hyang)’. Here, 
‘추진 방향 (chu-jin bang-hyang)’ has been translated as “direction of execution”. As many Korean words 
are composed of Chinese characters, the term ‘direction of execution’ is actually a combination of the 
Korean word ‘방향 (bang-hyang)’, which is in Chinese ‘方向 (fangxiàng)’ meaning ‘direction’, and 
another Korean word ‘추진 (chu-jin)’, which is in Chinese ‘推进 (tuījìn)’ meaning ‘to push and proceed’. 
Combining the two, ‘추진 방향 (chu-jin bang-hyang)’ literally means the ‘direction in which something 
is being pushed and then proceeded’. 
108 Later in 2012, this presenter, Director of the Technology Strategy Group, was appointed as a new 
chief technology officer, CTO#14. 
109 More specifically, research and development expenditure (% of annual revenue) of Company Alpha 
in 2002 was about 0.5%, whereas IBM invested 5.99% and Accenture 1.8% respectively in the same year 
(Corporate Alpha, 2002, ‘The direction of execution of Company Alpha’s R&D’). 
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term R&D blueprint. Second, the firm would reinforce new business development activities led 
by the Corporate R&D Center. 
However, the ambitious speech by the director from the Corporate R&D Center drew almost 
no attention from the committee members filling the meeting room. There were no following 
up questions and CEO#5 did not support the proposed technology strategy. CEO#5 instead 
emphasized that the main role of R&D and innovation should be to improve the firm’s current 
business. In addition, CEO#5 asserted that the ultimate aim of innovation should be to reduce 
costs and increase profits. His remark in the TSC#2 reveals the perceived value of R&D and 
innovation by CEO#5 as of 2003, in which innovation was regarded as an outcome of R&D that 
improves a status quo of the business: 
I think your benchmarking method needs to be more meticulous. From my viewpoint, 
the direction of the benchmarked company is to improve and innovate their current 
business, rather than to develop completely new business models. We must see it clear 
that their direction is approaching to cost reduction and increasing profits.110 
The TSC was initiated by CEO#5’s mandate primarily because he wanted to learn technological 
issues related to the firm’s business in hand; however, the committee more and more became 
a place where high-level managers, regardless of their backgrounds and roles, could discuss 
the firm’s technology strategy. The series of TSCs as a result played a key role in improving 
CEO#5’s and other high-level managers’ understanding of technology and technology strategy. 
In particular, CEO#5’s perception on the role of R&D and innovation was significantly changed 
over this period, which is analyzed in what follows. 
6.2.2 2005–2007: New corporate-level business strategy: creative destruction for growth 
The change of CEO in 2002 was a critical juncture in the firm’s corporate venturing journey. In 
                                                            
110 Company Alpha (2003) ‘TSC#2 Meeting Minutes’ 
 [126] 
 
retrospect, the reign of CEO#5 was a transition period between the first and the second CV 
cycles. Here, the way in which the chief executive perceived the role of R&D and innovation 
was important in changing the strategic direction of the firm which previously was oriented 
towards cost reduction.111 
CEO#5’s changing perception on the role of R&D and innovation 
Throughout the three years of the TSC (2003–2005), CEO#5 and other top management’s 
understanding of technology and technology strategy was much improved. And, it is apparent 
that how CEO#5 perceived the role of R&D and innovation was totally transformed. 
Early in 2003, CEO#5’s perspective on R&D and innovation was that innovation was nothing 
more than an outcome of R&D, which improves the current business of the firm (see Section 
6.2.1). However, CEO#5 came to see that innovation plays a key role in achieving technology 
leadership, which helps the firm to survive and to grow by being different from others, rather 
than just being satisfied as a follower of the leader. The following series of excerpts taken from 
the TSC minutes of meetings from 2005 to 2007 clearly shows CEO#5’s changing approach to 
the firm’s growth. 
In June 2005, at the TSC#28, CEO#5 placed great emphasis on the firm’s technology capability 
and technology leadership, which in his own words: 
When we say ‘leading capability’, it could be a certain type of strategic capabilities, 
which can be applied for delivering IT consulting business to customers. For us, however, 
what also matters is technological capabilities, or, in other words, technology 
leadership.112 
                                                            
111 As discussed in Chapter 7, this is an example of direction of strategy (Type I direction) and direction 
of strategic change (Type II direction) (see Section 7.2.1). 
112 Company Alpha (2005) ‘TSC#28 Meeting Minutes’ 
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In December 2005, at the TSC#34, CEO#5 reflected back on a series of TSCs during the past 
three years, and raised the issue of whether to stay as a technology follower or to become a 
frontier. This shows the sheer difference in his approach to technology strategy when it is 
compared to that of 2003. At the TSC#34, CEO#5 said: 
There’re three company-wide meetings I am chairing now, and the TSC is one of them. 
I have a grave concern over our technology. Is it impossible for us to show any of our 
technologies to others saying confidently ‘This is a world-class technology’? Should we 
always stay as a technology follower? … I say this to ask all of you to build capabilities 
to secure a technology leadership.113 
In March 2006, at the TSC#37, CEO#5 talked to the TSC members about what he believes the 
fundamentals of the firm namely survival and growth. He described these two as the two 
wheels of the firm: 
There are dual facets of the firms: survival and growth. So to speak, every firm has two 
wheels called survival and growth. By survival, we are talking about ‘present’; whereas 
by growth, we are talking about ‘future’. In order to survive, we need to have profits, 
ensure internal stabilities, and focus on the present such as current customers. As to 
growth, however, it is about the future; for example, new technologies and new R&D, 
which are related to the future.114 
CEO#5’s metaphor of the ‘two wheels of the firm’ reveals a fundamental premise on the one 
hand that firms need profits to survive, which CEO#5 himself had been emphasizing from his 
arrival in 2002. But, on the other hand, this metaphor also highlights that firms need to think 
about growth for the future. From 2006, there was a shift in balance from survival to growth. 
In May 2006, at the TSC#39, CEO#5 initially shared his concern over the “limits to growth”, as 
indicated in his message: 
Now is the time for us to have the spirit of challenge. Clearly, there are limits to growth 
with only the current portfolio of defense-oriented businesses. Over the last three years, 
                                                            
113 Company Alpha (2005) ‘TSC#34 Meeting Minutes’ 
114 Company Alpha (2006) ‘TSC#37 Meeting Minutes’ 
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we’ve designed business processes and fine-tuned the business systems. Now, we need 
to expand our business areas and to challenge. Even if our firm were to grow linearly 
with the current business, our revenues in 2010 would be only $4 or $5 billion. We need 
to develop new business; we need a strategic approach.115 
Later in August 2006, at the TSC#42, CEO#5 warned about the “limit to growth” again and 
highlighted that solely placing emphasis on survival, which is one of the ‘two wheels of the 
firms’, can hinder the growth of the firm: 
In order to increase internal efficiency, we’ve been focusing on profits and internal 
stabilities [from 2002]. We’ve also improved processes which are now applied to 
business systems. However, if we are just sticking to survival we will face the limit to 
growth.116 
More importantly, CEO#5 came to recognize that the firm needs a new way to growth. In June 
2006, at the TSC#40, CEO#5 began emphasizing the value of creative destruction: 
Don’t forget that the baseline of our activities is creative destruction. The principle of 
firms’ survival relies on making profits, and the profits are the rents coming from 
creative destruction.117 
Now, the above series of CEO#5’s remarks shows that there were changes in his perception on 
the role of R&D and innovation, and the changes in the chief executive’s thought processes are 
articulated in Table 6.1. 
  
                                                            
115 Company Alpha (2006) ‘TSC#39 Meeting Minutes’ 
116 Company Alpha (2006) ‘TSC#42 Meeting Minutes’ 
117 Company Alpha (2006) ‘TSC#40 Meeting Minutes’ 
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Table 6.1: CEO#5’s perception on the role of R&D and innovation 
 2003–2005 (Follower’s logic) 2005–2007 (Frontier’s logic) 
Fundamentals of 
firms being 
emphasized 
 Survival through improvement 
(of current businesses) 
 Growth through differentiation 
(by new businesses) 
Key premises 
 - Survival and growth are the ‘two wheels 
of the firms’ 
- If a firm solely pursues survival, it will 
face a ‘limit to growth’ 
Ways to 
generate profits 
 Profiting from cost reduction  Profiting from differentiation 
* Seeking entrepreneurial rent 
Perception of 
Innovation 
 Activities associated with the 
improvement of on-going businesses 
(e.g. product, process) for getting the 
above profits 
- “… is targeted toward the reduction of 
cost and the increase of profit” 
 Activities dedicated to the creative 
destruction for getting the above profits 
Perception of 
R&D 
 R&D for increasing efficiencies of 
existing technologies (i.e. better than 
others) 
- “… their approach to R&D is more about 
the improvement and innovation of 
their existing business” 
 R&D for building effectiveness of new 
technologies, aiming to become a 
technology leader (i.e. different from 
others) 
- “… technology leadership [which is built 
on the technological capabilities]” 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on the analysis of the minutes of TSC meetings from 2003 to 
2005. 
Using the ‘two wheels of the firm’ metaphor, the main wheel of Company Alpha began shifting 
from survival to growth in 2005 as shown in Table 6.1. Before 2005, for example, CEO#5 
emphasized that the way to generate profits was by to generate profit from cost reduction. 
Whereas, from 2006, growth became the main wheel and CEO#5 began highlighting profiting 
from differentiation—being different from others by becoming a technology leader. This 
emphasis was then continued with throughout the following year, changing the follower’s logic 
during 2002 and 2005 to the frontier’s logic from 2005 onward. 
In particular, Table 6.1 shows CEO#5’s changing perception on the role of R&D and innovation 
with relevant quotes. Before 2005, CEO#5 had regarded innovation as activities related to the 
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improvement of on-going business (e.g. product/service and process), but later after 2005 he 
perceived it as activities dedicated to creative destruction. Similarly, R&D had been regarded 
as a way to increase the efficiencies of existing technologies; however, later it was perceived 
as a proactive way of building the effectiveness of new technologies, transforming the firm into 
a technology leader. 
6.2.3 2006–2009: An innovator’s identification of technology opportunities 
In the previous subsections, the analysis of the case suggests that the first key factor 
influencing changes in the direction of CV is (1) a CEO’s changing perception on the role of R&D 
and innovation, in which the chief executive plays the crucial role as the conductor of “resource 
orchestration” (Sirmon et al., 2011; Chadwick et al., 2015). Continuing the analysis, this 
subsection further identifies two more potential key factors: (2) the existence of innovator(s) 
and (3) the emergence of strategic technology, or technologies. These factors will be analyzed 
in more detail by linking them to the conceptual framework (see Chapter 8). But prior to this, 
the historical context and the series of events associated with the other key factors are 
analyzed here. 
A new innovator: The appointment of new chief technology officer (CTO#12) 
In January 2006, CEO#5 appointed CTO#12 to be the new head of the Corporate R&D Center—
the central R&D department of Company Alpha (KE#14). This is one of the critical junctures in 
Company Alpha’s CV history because CTO#12, as a member of the top management team (TMT) 
in charge of corporate-level technology strategy, was the innovator who identified technology 
opportunities before other firms, and even before other key individuals in the organization. 
CTO#12 then successfully gathered resources (e.g. human and financial resources), and 
accumulated them in the Corporate R&D Center—the technology side of the firm. 
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With respect to the appointment of CTO#12 in early 2006, a longitudinal analysis of Company 
Alpha since the arrival of CTO#5 in late 2002 provides a rich context in which to understand 
changes inside the organization. The announcement of CTO#12—as a new executive in charge 
of corporate-level technology strategy—was, as shown in the timeline of the firm (see Figure 
5.2), undertaken in line with the firm’s established business processes (i.e. organizational 
rituals), which modify organizational structures and reallocate human resources at least once 
at the end of the year; this is called ‘annual reshuffling’ in the Korean business context. 
In fact, there had already been a major structural change in 2003 after CEO#5’s arrival. 
Longitudinal data shows that CEO#5 carried out major changes to the organizational structure 
in the annual reshuffling for 2003 (hereafter R#2003), which considerably differs from that of 
2000 under the leadership of CEO#4. 
As shown in Figure 6.2, the organizational chart as of March 2006 (hereafter OC#2006) 
indicates that there were two distinctive characteristics of the new structure, which was 
changed in 2003 and had been maintained until at least 2006. First, all CV departments, which 
previously existed as the NVD and its sub-units (see Figure 5.4), were disbanded. Second, a 
strategy department with the name of the Strategic Marketing Office (SMO) was formed, 
which took in charge of corporate-level strategy and the coordination of diverse division-level 
strategies (e.g. business divisions’ strategy). Unlike its previous position in the OC#2000 in 
which the Strategy Management Team existed inside the Business Administration Office (BAO) 
as a team-level (L3) unit (see Figure 5.4), from 2003, the Strategic Marketing Office (SMO) came 
out to the forefront of the organizational structure as a division-level (L2) unit, which 
demonstrates the SMO’s much increased influence over the firm. 
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Figure 6.2 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, March 2006 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Company Alpha’s business archives and the organizational 
chart in 2006. 
* CFO: Chief Financial Officer; CHRO: Chief Human Resources Officer; CIO: Chief Information Officer; 
COO: Chief Operating Officer; CSO: Chief Strategy Officer; CTO: Chief Technology Officer 
** Structural units in blue color represent newly formed or significantly changed organizational units 
when compared with the organizational chart in March 2000 (see Figure 5.4). 
*** Similarly, the italicized names represent change of the person in the position after the previous 
organizational chart. 
During the first three years (2003–2005), the business strategy was mainly focused on cost 
reduction, which was why CEO#5 emphasized the role of R&D and innovation as a vehicle to 
reduce the cost and increase profits (see Section 6.2.1). According to a Technology Strategy 
Senior Manager (TS-SM-A), the main role of CTO#11 (2002–2005) was to identify redundant 
software products (i.e. IT solutions) that overlapped with other products and services, and to 
consolidate or to discontinue the development of the identified IT solutions (products and 
services) (TS-SM-A, personal interview, 2014). 
By contrast, in 2006, CEO#5 appointed CTO#12 to lead the Corporate R&D Center under the 
newly changed business strategy. It has already been highlighted in the previous subsection 
that the strategic direction of the firm was changed toward creative destruction, which 
pursued the growth of the firm through profiting from differentiation. There was, therefore, a 
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marked difference between the new CTO (CTO#12) and his predecessor (CTO#11). 
For example, CTO#12 began refining a range of processes related to R&D and 
commercialization of R&D outcomes, most notably the technology roadmapping process and 
the new business/service development process. More specifically, the Corporate R&D Center 
had been developing the ‘IT Roadmap’, which is a three-year technology roadmap of the firm, 
since the summer of 2003. But in 2006, the firm initially announced the ‘IT Roadmap’ to the 
public, defining it as “a roadmap for technologies demanding strategic approaches from ICT 
firms for the next three years”.118 
The content of the IT Roadmap drew much attention from ICT firms across Korea; not only 
refining internal technology strategy processes, Company Alpha also began to position itself as 
a technology leader in terms of technology foresight in the ICT sector of the Korean high-tech 
industry. Indeed, the technology capability of the firm was being strengthened over time 
particularly from 2006. 
The innovator’s identification of technology opportunities 
Two years later, in 2008, CTO#12 identified the potential value of the combination of specific 
technologies—smartphone and cloud computing technologies. Although not listed in the key 
events table (Table 5.2), this was a crucial moment between the two cycles of CV, which can 
be described as the innovator’s (CTO#12) identification of technology opportunities. This 
finding suggests that the emergence of strategic technologies that have the potential for the 
firm’s product or service innovation could be one of the key factors for changes in the direction 
of CV, which will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
In fact, the strategic value of these two technologies was beginning to be identified since 2007. 
                                                            
118 Electronic Times (2006) ‘Company Alpha announces the IT Roadmap’ 
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Under the technology strategy planning process, Company Alpha developed an annual 
technology trend report, which was followed by the development of the three-year IT roadmap. 
In 2007, the Technology Trend for 2008 report was developed by the members of the IT 
Roadmap (ITR) project. The report published in August 2007 included smartphone and cloud 
computing as their strategic technologies for 2008, which was then shared with CEO#5 and 
other TSC members in the TSC#45 (December 2007). 
In an effort to increase the understanding of the concept and discuss the potential value of the 
newly identified strategic technologies, CTO#12 set the main topic for the TSC#61 (held in May 
2008) as cloud computing technology.119 Similarly, the TSC#65 (held in October 2008) was 
organized focusing on mobile communication technology.120 Table 6.2, for example, shows 
how the concept of cloud computing was initially defined by the ITR project team in 2007 and 
how the definition was articulated more clearly by the autumn of 2008. 
Table 6.2: Changing definition of cloud computing technology 
Date Definition of cloud computing technology 
August 
2007 
“Computing technologies which connect the Internet in the future through mobile 
devices and information”121 
December 
2007 
“Computing technologies which allow the access to personal computer’s information 
stored in cloud (e.g. server, storage) through mobile device and network”122 
September 
2008 
“Computing technologies that allow the way in which IT resources, such as servers, 
storages, and programs, are used as a service through the internet, rather than 
purchasing and possessing those resources”123 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on the business archives. 
                                                            
119 The title of the TSC#61 session (May 2008) was “The Understanding of Cloud Computing Technology”. 
120 The title of the TSC#65 session (October 2008) was “The Understanding of Mobile Communication 
Technology”. 
121 Company Alpha (2007), ‘Technology Trend for 2008’ 
122 Company Alpha (2007), ‘Technology Trend for 2008’ 
123 Company Alpha (2008), ‘Technology Trend for 2009’ 
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With respect to the two strategic technologies (smartphone and cloud computing 
technologies), CTO#12, in an interview in 2014, explained the reason why he thought back in 
2008 that the combination of the two technologies would be their technology opportunities: 
At that time [in early 2008], I noticed the value of the ‘mobile service’. So-called 
smartphones were released in the market.124 I worked in the IT industry around thirty 
years, and from my viewpoint, smartphones were computers. The smartphones were 
computers that can ring other people. Company Delta’s [which is another subsidiary of 
the Alpha Group] people though thought that smartphones were phones that had 
functions which were smart. This conceptual difference is huge [in terms of the 
perspective on the smartphones]: Is it a phone that is smart? Or, is it a computer that 
has a function to call? (CTO#12, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
CTO#12 added why the way of thinking about ‘smartphones as computers that can call others’ 
was crucial in perceiving the combination of two technologies as strategic technologies that 
will bring entirely new technology opportunities to the firm: 
Assuming that hundreds of millions of computer devices that have phoning features are 
distributed to people in the market, mobile services based on the devices will have the 
‘power of N’ [i.e. economy of scale]. The cost of a single mobile service will be cheaper 
when compared with hundreds of millions of dollars projects that we do; however, 
considering a number of mobile devices which use mobile services [supported by cloud 
computing], the size of the revenue will be massive. (CTO#12, personal interview, 2014) 
CTO#12, however, had difficulties in convincing other people in the organization that the 
upcoming technology opportunity mattered. In his own words: 
In 2008, I met a number of key people across the company and explained this change, 
but no one understood what I was saying [i.e. technology opportunities]. (CTO#12, 
personal interview, 2014). 
In the summer of 2008, CTO#12 was asked for by key members in the board of directors to 
report about the emerging technologies: cloud computing and hardware virtualization 
                                                            
124 While Apple’s smartphone (iPhone) had been announced and distributed since 2007, it was not 
officially released on the Korean market until November 2009. 
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technologies. Within a week, CTO#12 reported to the top-level decision makers of the concept 
of the technologies and their potential value to the company. In the autumn, CTO#12 managed 
to gather human and financial resources into the Corporate R&D Center and initiated the New 
Mobile Service (NMS) project. The aim of the NMS project was to search for novel and ground-
breaking (i.e. new-to-the-world) ideas about new mobile services and their business models, 
especially targeted on leveraging the combination of smart device and cloud computing 
technologies.125 
The NMS project can be categorized as a CV program conducted in the hidden period of time 
between the first and the second CV cycles. However, this was a CTO-led short-term (less than 
two months) internal project operated within the Corporate R&D Center. Furthermore, this 
project was not directly related to the development (or evolution) of CV programs in the 
second CV cycles. Hence, the NMS is not included in the list of ten CV programs (see Table 6.3) 
which this thesis further examines.  
                                                            
125 Company Alpha (2008), ‘The NMS operation plan’ 
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6.3  The second CV cycle at Company Alpha (2011–2015) 
Continuing the longitudinal analysis of Company Alpha’s series of key events (see Table 5.2), 
this section analyzes the key events ranging from the development of corporate-level 
innovation strategy in 2010 (KE#16) to the very last event in Table 5.2, the launch of a global 
CVC program in 2014 (KE#29). The analysis of these key events demonstrates the existence of 
a distinct period of time—from 2011 to 2015—in the history of Company Alpha when, as in 
the first cycle, a set of CV programs were initiated, developed, and thus constituted the firm’s 
CV activities, forming what this thesis describes as the second cycle of CV at Company Alpha. 
6.3.1 2010: New corporate-level innovation strategy and the launch of an individual ideation 
program 
CTO#12’s mandate to develop a new corporate-level innovation strategy 
With the increasing importance of technology in the context of corporate-level strategy, in late 
2009, CEO#5 made an important structural change through the annual reshuffling for 2010 
(hereafter R#2010). The change was implemented at the beginning of 2010, as the temporal 
sequence shown in Figure 5.2 (see Section 5.2.2). 
The organizational chart as of January 2010 (hereafter OC#2010) reveals the important change 
made by the R#2010 (see Figure 6.3). The Corporate R&D Center, which previously existed as 
an independent division-level (L2) unit, became a part of the Technology Division. The 
structural change made by the R#2010 was designed to empower the authority of CTO#12 over 
technological agenda across the firm by aligning relevant human resources under the newly 
formed overarching division—the Technology Division.126 
                                                            
126 Company Alpha (2010), ‘Annual reshuffling plan for 2010’ 
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Figure 6.3 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, January 2010 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Company Alpha’s business archives and the organizational 
chart in 2010. 
* CFO: Chief Financial Officer; CHRO: Chief Human Resources Officer; CSO: Chief Strategy Officer; CTO: 
Chief Technology Officer 
** Structural units in blue color represent newly formed or significantly changed organizational units 
when compared with the organizational chart in March 2006 (see Figure 6.2). 
Following the structural change, CTO#12, in early 2010, mandated the Technology Strategy 
Group to rethink the firm’s R&D process associated with R&D and new business development 
(NBD) activities (KE#16). Here, the scope of rethinking covered the entire stages of innovation 
process (e.g. Tidd and Bessant, 2013), ranging from ideation (i.e. searching for ideas and 
selecting) to the commercialization of ideas (i.e. implementing ideas and capturing values). 
Hence, the task was to develop a new corporate-level innovation strategy that can 
fundamentally change the way the firm conducted its R&D and new business development. 
As to the reason for CTO#12’s mandate, one possible explanation is the size of the human 
resources in the Technology Division, which was increased by fivefold within a year (2009–
2010). After the global economic crisis in the winter of 2008, employees who became 
redundant were redistributed across the company. In 2009, for instance, people who had 
worked in more client dependent areas, such as IT outsourcing departments and data centers, 
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were relocated to the Corporate R&D Center. In the middle of 2009, therefore, the proportion 
of new members increased by relocation amounted to about 12% of the Corporate R&D Center 
(TS-SM-A, personal interview, 2014). In addition, the Process Innovation Division, which took 
the main role of improving on-going businesses by increasing their efficiencies (see Figure 5.4), 
was incorporated into the Technology Division by the annual reshuffling for 2010. This 
structural change increased the size of the Corporate R&D Center by five times with more than 
one thousand personnel.127 
However, an interview with CTO#12 reveals his ‘real’ motive back in 2010 as the mandator of 
developing a new corporate-level innovation strategy. In the interview, CTO#12 explained the 
reasons why he asked the Technology Strategy Group, the strategy unit of the Technology 
Division, to rethink the firm’s R&D process related to R&D and NBD activities and to develop a 
new innovation strategy. One reason was the lack of ideas that could serve as inputs to R&D 
and new business development. CTO#12’s genuine need for new ideas, in his word “a genuine 
thirst for ideas”, was affected by his experience of the New Mobile Service (NMS) project—an 
internal project operated within the Corporate R&D Center between the first and the second 
CV cycles (see Section 6.2.3). CTO#12 recalled: 
There are two aspects in R&D; one is acquiring technologies, and the other is searching 
for ideas. In 2009, what was more important in our situation was the idea. If you ask 
me, the six ideas we had got through the NMS project were fairly good ones; however, 
all those ideas were not necessarily the best ideas. There is an unending anxiety over 
the feeling that “We must have missed something [really good ideas].” So, it made me 
to think that, if we extend the boundary of the team beyond an internal taskforce team, 
maybe we are able to get ideas that we never had thought of before. (CTO#12, personal 
interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
The other reason was, unlike the possible explanation mentioned above, the lack of resources 
                                                            
127 Company Alpha (2009), ‘The NMS operation plan’ 
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especially human resource to search for ideas. The interview with CTO#12 reveals this reason: 
I wanted to elicit ideas; the best ideas from academia, global scholars, workshops for 
research agenda, technology think tanks, and so on. There must be a large number of 
potential business ideas and technologies out there. … Our fundamental problems were 
twofold: ‘lack of ideas’ and ‘lack of resources’ [to search for ideas]. We needed a very 
innovative way by which we can gather those ideas. Therefore, I told them [the 
Technology Strategy Group], “Let’s develop a strategy of how to gather ideas globally.” 
(CTO#12, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
In order to overcome the lack of ideas and resources, the chief of technology strategy directed 
the Technology Strategy Group to develop a new corporate-level innovation strategy by 
applying an open innovation approach. CTO#12, in the interview, said that taking an open 
innovation route was not because he was “an emphatic follower of the value of openness, 
sharing” (CTO#12, personal interview, 2014). Instead, he said it was rather a response to 
internal constraints: 
… It was more of a passive decision. Due to the lack of our own human resource, there 
was no way around but to open [the firm’s boundary] to search for new ideas and to 
develop technologies. This required a new way of thinking and a new process. (CTO#12, 
personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
The development of innovation strategy by the strategy team 
Mandated by CTO#12, the Technology Strategy Group initiated the R&D Process Development 
(RDPD) project with the aim of developing a new corporate-level innovation strategy (KE#16). 
From the viewpoint of CTO#12, the degree of newness he wanted to see from the new 
innovation strategy was quite radical. According to Technology Strategy Manager (TS-M), the 
RDPD project was started in January 2010, but gaining an approval from the top (CTO#12) was 
both time and energy consuming.128 In the word of TS-M: 
                                                            
128 Technology Strategy Manager (TS-M) is one of the middle-level actors and a key informant of this 
thesis which focuses on the role of actors. 
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We reported the strategy for the R&D process innovation to CTO [CTO#12] at least three 
times. First in May [3rd May 2010] and second in July [22nd July 2010], however, both 
of them were rejected because he thought that the strategy we proposed was not 
enough, I mean too small [in terms of scale]. He asked us the question “What do you 
think are the ways for us to gather wholly new ideas from around the world?” (TS-M, 
personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
In the last week of July 2010, CTO#12 at the third strategy meeting finally approved the RDPD 
project’s plan, saying “All are good” (TS-M, personal interview, 2014). TS-M further explained 
the process between the second and the third strategy meetings through which they revised 
the rejected strategy plans to the plan that had been accepted: 
In the last five days, we did a number of benchmarking by searching for global firms’ 
[innovation] cases that are widely believed to be successful. They included the ‘Cisco I-
Prize program’ by Cisco Systems, the ‘Innovation Research Program’ by HP, and the 
‘Extreme Blue program’ by IBM, and so on. (TS-M, personal interview, 2014) 
The accepted new innovation strategy included three global-level programs related to R&D 
and new business development activities: (1) the idea competition (IC) program, (2) the firm–
university research collaboration program, and (3) the university student internship program. 
These programs, however, were still paper documents with plans of programs’ designs, 
processes, and required resources (human and financial resources); hence, the Technology 
Strategy Group initiated the R&D Process Implementation (RDPI) project in the second half of 
2010 in order to implement the new innovation strategy. 
Early implementation of innovation strategy 
When the RDPI project was launched in September 2010, a new Technology Strategy Senior 
Manager (TS-SM-B) joined the project as a new member. Importantly, although not included 
in the key events table (Table 5.2), the joining of TS-SM-B as a new middle-level manager is 
found to be another critical juncture in Company Alpha’s corporate venturing journey. TS-SM-
B with an entrepreneurial mind-set, i.e. an entrepreneurial middle manager, significantly 
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influenced the change of the ‘planned’ innovation strategy throughout the strategy 
implementation stages. For example, influenced by TS-SM-B, the balance between ‘R&D’ and 
‘new business development’ activities was tilted closer to the new business and service 
development activities, rather than R&D activities for new technologies. TS-M explained the 
change in the innovation strategy after the joining of TS-SM-B as: 
The university student internship program was originally designed to articulate ideas 
we already gathered and stored in our ‘idea pool’ [the database with new business ideas 
and technologies]. However, he [TS-SM-B] suggested changing the design of the 
program, and it transformed the internship program as a new way of gathering new 
business ideas. (TS-M, personal interview, 2014) 
In a way, this was a fundamental change in the program’s approach from ‘solving problems’ to 
‘asking questions’. From late 2010, firm–university joint classes were started in several top-
raking universities in Korea, in which students were encouraged to create new business and 
service ideas during the term time. Selected finalists then were invited as interns during the 
summer vacation, and they articulated the ideas and business models they proposed in the 
classrooms with support from the employees of Company Alpha as mentors. 
Once the innovation strategy implementation process had begun, some programs designed in 
the strategy development stage were adopted by the top management. Details of the program 
being adopted were modified to fit into the specific requirements from the top management. 
For example, in September 2010, CEO#5 was requested from a close alliance firm to act in a 
more collaborative way in the process of smartphone manufacturing by providing software-
related ideas and features. Immediately, CTO#12 responded to CEO#5 that the Corporate R&D 
Center had prepared a plan, i.e. ‘planned strategy’. He then mandated the Technology Strategy 
Group to run an ideation program in order to gather ideas for the development of a new 
innovative mobile application. 
In the following month, the RDPI project team in the Technology Strategy Group launched the 
 [143] 
 
Mobile App Idea (MAI) program. The MAI program was composed of three stages. In the first 
stage, employees were invited to submit their ideas for new mobile applications as whatever 
they wanted to develop. Next, selected individuals were then received awards and had an 
opportunity either to develop on their own or to find a development partner within the firm. 
Finally, they were provided with financial support to register their developed mobile 
applications in application market platforms (e.g. App Store, Android Markets, etc.).129 
The MAI was the first CV program in the second cycle of CV (CV-II-#1). And, as the Research 
Challenge launched in 1993 acted as a prototype of CV programs in the first CV cycle (see 
Section 5.3.1), the MAI also acted as a prototype of CV programs in the second CV cycle. In 
2011, the MAI fed into the second cycle of CV and evolved into the upcoming CV program, the 
2011 Corporate Idea-α program. Both the MAI and the 2011 Corporate Idea-α are CV programs 
that form the initiation stage in the evolution of CV at Company Alpha. This will be discussed 
through the conceptual lens of the thesis—the direction of CV (see Section 8.3.1). 
6.3.2 2011: Corporate Idea-α, the first CV program in the second CV cycle 
The appointment of new chief executive (CEO#6) and new top-level management 
Considering the relatively short average tenure of CEOs of large Korean firms, which is 
estimated to be 2.5 years by a consultancy, CEO#5’s more than seven-year tenure was quite 
long. 130, 131 This may well be explained by the highly successful performance of CEO#5 in 
                                                            
129 In addition, the episode of the MAI program shows the interaction between the top management 
and middle managers, for example, how a parent-firm’s strategy affects the program-level strategy of a 
CV unit. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
130 Yonhap News Agency (2016) ‘The average tenure of 30 major chaebols is 2.5 years’, [online], Yonhap 
News Agency, 9 November, Available from: http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/11/08/ 
0200000000AKR20161108168000003.html [Accessed 20 September 2016] 
131 Meanwhile, Kaplan and Minton (2006) estimated that the average tenure of the CEO of large U.S. 
companies since 1998 is six years. 
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turning around the firm’s business performance. Between 2002 and 2010, for instance, 
Company Alpha’s revenues grew from $1.37 billion to $3.83 billion (180 per cent increase) and 
operating income from $9.4 million to $375.5 million (3,700 per cent increase) (see Figure 5.1). 
However, in December 2010, a new chief executive, CEO#6, was appointed (KE#17). CEO#6 
then announced the annual reshuffling for 2011 (hereafter R#2011) in the same month, as a 
result of which a new chief of technology, CTO#13, was appointed. This was part of a chain 
reaction, which is generally accepted as normal practice in Korean business contexts where a 
change in CEO is followed by subsequent changes in the positions of other C-level executives 
(i.e. the composition of the top management team). At Company Alpha, members of the top 
management team such as Company Alpha’s chief financial officer (CFO), chief strategy officer 
(CSO), and chief human resources officer (CHRO) were changed in this way before the end of 
2010. 
A new corporate-level business strategy 
In the middle of 2011, Company Alpha ran the ‘2011 Corporate Idea-α’ program (KE#18), which 
was a new CV program of the firm (CV-II-#2). This program was what Mortara et al. (2013) call 
an “internal Idea Competition (IC)”, in which employees of the firm are invited to propose new 
business and service ideas. 
In order to understand more clearly the strategic process between the two key events—the 
appointment of top management including CEO#6 (KE#17) and the initiation of the new CV 
program, the 2011 Corporate Idea-α (KE#18)—it is crucial to disentangle interactions between 
different layers of strategy: parent firm-level and program-level strategies.132 
                                                            
132 The interaction between different layers of strategy is discussed from a theoretical viewpoint in 
Section 7.3.1. 
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In 2011, Company Alpha set its corporate-level business strategy to aggressively drive new 
business development activities. According to a mid- to long-term business strategy report 
(through 2020), which was developed by a strategy unit in early 2011, the firm’s main business 
areas, such as System Integration (SI) and IT Outsourcing (ITO) businesses (see Table 5.1), were 
at a stagnant stage; hence, the strategy report reads: “Considering a stagnant business 
environment, ... we need to make annual revenue of $4 billion in 2015 from our new business, 
which accounts for 40% of total revenue.” This excerpt shows the updated corporate’s top-
level strategy, which was changed after the arrival of CEO#6 and the new top management. 
In addition, words from the then chief strategy officer (CSO) in a strategy meeting in March 
2011 demonstrate the business context from an insiders’ perspective—a stagnant business 
environment for main business areas—in which new corporate-level business strategies were 
developed: 
How can we make $10 billion revenue in 2015? Developing a new business takes two 
to three years; and the conceiving of new business ideas, however, is not easy. Last year, 
the size of the Korean IT industry was $18 billion, in which three key players competed 
strongly. So, we should go out to the world. What do we then need to have? We need 
to do new business with new products and services, which is providing new IT services 
using our IT solutions. However, what IT solutions do we have? I’m deeply concerned. 
At first, we need to have seed ideas. The ideas then can be scaled up in a top-down 
approach.133 
A program-level strategy and the launch of the Corporate Idea-α program 
After the business strategy was updated to drive new business development activities, the 
following strategic decision was made by the top management team to run an internal IC 
program. The top management believed that, once ideas are gathered, they could scale up the 
size of business proposed at an idea level, and turn them into the firm’s new business items. 
                                                            
133 Company Alpha (2011) ‘Meeting Minutes: New business development strategy planning’ 
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Hence, mandated by the CSO, the Technology Strategy Group (the strategy unit in the 
Technology Division) in cooperation with the New Business Development Group (the new 
business unit in the Strategic Marketing Office) began designing the details of the program.134 
In particular, at the program level, the main strategic objective of a new CV program was 
explicitly articulated to explore new business opportunities at an idea level, as is found in the 
planning document for the program.135 
In designing and operating the 2011 Corporate Idea-α program, the Mobile App Idea (MAI) 
program operated in 2010 played a role as a prototype of the new internal IC program. This 
shows a repeating pattern because a similar change was already observed in the first cycle of 
CV (see Section 5.3.2), in which the Research Challenge program acted as a prototype and was 
later extended into the ICV-α1 program in 1997. 
In April 2011, CEO#6 announced the launch of the 2011 Corporate Idea-α program (KE#18), 
which was the first CV program of the firm in the period of its second CV cycle. Just within a 
month of this, 1,170 employees, which was about 11% of the total number of employees, 
proposed 1,357 items of new service ideas. The ideas were then assessed through three stages; 
and finally, six ideas in total were selected and rewarded in June 2011. In the summer of 2011, 
two teams (CV teams) were formed among the finalists and the employees who proposed the 
ideas became the manager (CV manager) of each CV team. The members of two CV teams 
were then empowered to develop business plans and prototypes of the proposed services.136 
                                                            
134 See the OC#2010 in Figure 6.3. 
135 In other words, the program-level strategy can be described as the strategic direction (Type I direction) 
of the program (see Section 7.2.1). 
136 The business model of one CV team (hereafter Venture-β) was a subscription-based ‘social learning 
platform’, which provides a web and mobile service that allows users to set their personal goals, which 
are then coached and motivated by other people and relevant specialists in the on-line social network. 
In 2012, according to the Venture Manager of Venture-β, Company Alpha invested $1.8 million into 
Venture-β, and the CV team had twelve members by the end of 2013, who joined from a range of 
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Internally, the Technology Strategy Group mainly operating the program was a de facto CV unit, 
which Hill and Birkinshaw (2014: 1900) defined as “a distinct entity controlled by the firm that 
has responsibility for investing in and developing new business opportunities”. 137  But 
interestingly, it was found that no one involved in the design and operation of the program 
used the term ‘corporate venturing’ let alone ‘CV unit’ until the end of 2011. 
6.3.3 2012: The peak of the second CV cycle (scaling up and variation) 
At Company Alpha, the first cycle of CV (1997–2002) reached its peak in 2000 as identified in 
the previous chapter, whereas the second cycle of CV (2011–2015) reached its peak in 2012. 
From the second half of 2011, running and preparing a variety of different CV programs, people 
within the Technology Strategy Group, the de facto CV unit, were beginning to realize that 
what they were doing was a managerial practice called corporate venturing (CV). Meanwhile, 
at the end of 2011, this group was transferred to the marketing side of the firm by the new 
chief executive, CEO#6. 
CEO#6’s perception on the technology opportunities and innovation process 
When becoming the new chief executive, CEO#6 perceived that smartphone and cloud 
computing technologies—which were identified as strategic technologies in 2007 (see Section 
6.2.3)—are lucrative technology opportunities. The words of CEO#6 from an interview with an 
economic newspaper clearly demonstrate such a viewpoint: 
As the shift from the analog to the digital brought new opportunities to the Korean 
electronics industry, the revolution of ‘smart and mobile’ will be a leverage for the 
Korean IT service industry, which have been confined within the Korean local market. 
                                                            
different organizational units across Company Alpha (VM-B, personal interview, 2014). 
137 In their journal article, Hill and Birkinshaw (2014: 1900) defined the term “CV unit” by citing Block 
and MacMillan’s (1993) classic book on corporate venturing: Corporate Venturing: Creating New 
Businesses within the Firm 
 [148] 
 
The diffusion of smartphones along with the growing importance of cloud computing 
infrastructures is opening up a new window of opportunity [i.e. technology 
opportunities]. … The nature of IT service business is to integrate technologies and IT 
systems in a variety of business areas. Hence, we have to experience a great number of 
businesses in different areas. … These days, internal corporate venturing is quiescent; 
however, we will make it active if there are any chances.138 
Meanwhile, as to the question of ‘how to capture’ opportunities that had been identified, 
CEO#6 underlined the role of the corporate headquarters in scaling up the size of business 
being developed from ideas—i.e. the role of the marketing side of the firm in the innovation 
process. Talking about the firm’s commercialization strategy at the TSC held in February 2012, 
CEO#6 shared his perception on the innovation process:139 
When evaluating a market and economic value of a business, knowing an exact size of 
global market is almost impossible. I’ve never seen a case when a top-down approach 
is successful, for example, estimating the size of the global market, say, $100 billion, 
then setting a target market share of 15%, and then planning annual goals. It doesn’t 
work in that way. Instead, a bottom-up approach is important. This is why the real 
business fields [where our employees meet customers] are so important.140 
In particular, CEO#6 asserted that the firm needs to have the capabilities to create a new 
market, both locally and globally, rather than to identify existing markets and acquire their 
shares. In CEO#6’s own words: 
We must gather ideas from our business fields, which is about what kind of business 
opportunities may arise in the next two years. The corporate headquarters then needs 
to develop capabilities that can scale up the size of these businesses both locally and 
globally.141 
  
                                                            
138 The Korea Economic Daily (2011) ‘The Korean IT service industry faces a new momentum’ 
139 Like his predecessor (see Section 6.3.2), CEO#6 ran the 'Technology Strategy Committee (TSC)', which 
was operated by the Technology Strategy Team starting from January 2011. Unlike previous monthly 
TSCs, the New TSC was a quarterly meeting of the top management and heads of business divisions on 
the issue of business and technology strategy. 
140 Company Alpha (2012) ‘New TSC#2 Meeting Minutes’ 
141 Ibid. 
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The creation of the Emerging Business Team 
In September 2011, CEO#6 announced the implementation plan for the mid-term business 
strategy through 2015. The plan included the operation of a new business development (NBD) 
scheme, which will be led by a specialized NBD team to be formed, the Emerging Business 
Team. According to the plan, the main role of the EBT was searching for new business 
opportunities by adopting an open innovation approach. 
Following the strategy implementation plan, CEO#6, in late 2011, carried out a large scale 
structural change through the annual reshuffling for 2012 (hereafter R#2012), which CEO#6 
himself described as “the biggest structural change ever in the history of Company Alpha”.142 
By the R#2012, as shown in the organizational chart as of January 2012 (hereafter OC#2012), 
the Emerging Business Team was newly formed inside the Strategic Marketing Office (KE#19) 
(see Figure 6.4). The Technology Strategy Group (a part of the Technology Strategy Team in 
the Corporate R&D Center) was then transferred en masse to the Emerging Business Team, 
and within this team, the Innovation Group was formed. 
                                                            
142 Company Alpha (2011) ‘CEO#6’s email to the employees’ 
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Figure 6.4 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, January 2012 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Company Alpha’s business archives and the organizational 
chart in 2012. 
* CFO: Chief Financial Officer; CHRO: Chief Human Resources Officer; CSO: Chief Strategy Officer; CTO: 
Chief Technology Officer 
** Structural units in blue color represent newly formed or significantly changed organizational units 
when compared with the organizational chart in January 2010 (see Figure 6.3). 
*** Similarly, the italicized names represent change of the person in the position after the previous 
organizational chart. 
Applying the structural and actor analysis framework (see Section 7.3.1), the R#2012 
empowered the role of the Emerging Business Team. Previously, the de facto CV unit was the 
Technology Strategy Group (L4 unit). However, by the R#2012, the Emerging Business Team 
(L3 unit), sitting inside the Strategic Marketing Office (L2 unit), became the official CV unit. 
This was not only a change in the organizational hierarchy, but it was also a change of the locus 
of innovation from the technology side of the firm (see Section 6.2.3) to the marketing side to 
explore new business opportunities more actively. These changes collectively boosted the 
strength—the degree of the power across the firm—of the new official CV unit, increasing its 
authority in designing and operating CV programs. The dynamics of these changes will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
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Increasing scope and scale of CV programs: The launch of the National Idea-α and the Global 
Idea-α programs 
In 2012, the second CV cycle reached its peak mainly driven by the Emerging Business Team 
(the official CV unit). Maintaining the corporate-level business strategy set out in the first half 
of 2011, which was to drive new business development, the firm put greater emphasis on the 
number of new business ideas, and hence increased the scope and scale of CV programs by 
reproducing a series of CV programs. 
Firstly, the scope of CV programs was extended to cover both internal and external IC programs. 
After the launch of the internal IC program (the ‘2011 Corporate Idea-α’ program), internal 
programs were operated on an annual basis (the ‘2012 Corporate Idea-α’ and the ‘2013 
Corporate Idea-α’ program). But a decision was made to extend the target participants 
external to the firm. Next, when operating external IC programs, the scale of CV programs was 
also expanded—first to the national level (the ‘National Idea-α’ program ran in January 2012) 
and then to the global level (the ‘Global Idea-α’ program ran in January 2013). Among these 
series of CV programs, however, the program-level strategy was almost the same: to explore 
new business opportunities at the level of ideas. 
In the first half of 2012, Company Alpha ran the ‘National Idea-α’ program (CV-II-#3) (KE#20), 
which was the national-level new business ideation program, inviting Korean people to submit 
their ideas for new business, particularly new ICT service ideas. In early 2012, only a month 
after the program was announced, 1,500 people proposed 3,016 new business ideas in total 
under the service areas the firm categorized, such as finance, healthcare, logistics, business 
productivity, and so on. The ideas were then filtered through the processes in first and second 
assessment stages—the first in January and the second in February. In the spring of 2012, in 
the third assessment stage, selected finalists presented their ICT service ideas with business 
models, and the rankings of 12 finalists were decided and rewarded. For the planning and 
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operating of the program, the Emerging Business Team (L3 unit), especially the members of 
the Innovation Group (L4 unit) within the team mainly carried out the tasks. 
In late 2012, the firm ran the ‘Global Idea-α’ program (CV-II-#5) until the first half of 2013 
(KE#23). According to an Innovation Manager (I-M), it was a global-level new business ideation 
program, a geographically extended version of the National Idea-α (I-M, personal interview, 
2014).143 By the end of March 2013, a total of 3,420 people had proposed 2,749 new business 
ideas, and 6 finalists were selected and rewarded in the summer of 2013. 
Meanwhile, the internal IC programs were operated in parallel with the external IC programs 
in 2012 and 2013. The 2012 Corporate Idea-α program ran in the spring of 2012 (KE#21) 
gathered 1,417 new service ideas from 1,626 employees; the 2013 Corporate Idea-α program 
ran in early 2013 (KE#24) and also gathered 1,049 ideas from 1,400 employees. 
In the midst of increasing the scope and scale of CV programs, executives in the top 
management team generally agreed to the idea that the programs run by the Emerging 
Business Team were the strategic vehicle of the firm. However, as to the programs’ strategic 
value, the opinion of the top management was different depending on their main roles. For 
example, the head of human resources (Chief of Human Resource Officer, CHRO) thought that 
the programs were a strategic tool to recruit new people, because the programs were 
becoming effective in promoting corporate brands to the public, making the firm attractive to 
prospective applicants. It was a rare opportunity as Company Alpha’s main customers had 
been either corporate customers or government organizations. However, the head of 
technology strategy (Chief of Technology Officer, CTO#13) believed that the programs were 
mainly an additional source of research items that could be developed and commercialized 
                                                            
143 Previously, before the R#2012, I-M was a Technology Strategy Manager (TS-M), and the interviews 
with I-M from the viewpoint of TS-M were quoted in Section 6.3.1. 
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inside the Corporate R&D Center. Furthermore, the head of business strategy (Chief of Strategy 
Officer, CSO) desperately saw the programs as a strategic tool to find ‘seed ideas’ for new 
business to achieve the mid-term business strategy—by scaling up ideas to new-to-the-firm or 
new-to-the-world business items. From the words of an Innovation Senior Manager (I-SM-A) 
in the Innovation Group, top management in this period treated their CV programs as a “one-
size-fits-all” type of solution (I-SM-A, personal interview, 2016).144 It should be noted that the 
National Idea-α and the Global Idea-α are the scaling-up of CV programs in the reproduction 
stage in the evolution of CV at Company Alpha, and this will be discussed in Chapter 8 (see 
Section 8.3.2). 
The launch of the Acceleration-α program 
In the middle of the two external IC programs, the ‘Acceleration-α’ program (CV-II-#4) began 
its operation from the summer of 2012 (KE#22). The Acceleration-α was a Seoul—the capital 
city of Korea—based program designed to help the finalists of both internal and external IC 
programs to develop service prototypes they proposed and to upgrade business plans, aiming 
to level up those teams as start-ups on a global scale. 
The Acceleration-α provided teams joining the Acceleration-α Center with business spaces 
(offices in the center), IT infrastructures (cloud computing infrastructures, such as computing 
servers, data storages, and networks), business mentoring, legal consultations, and investment 
opportunities. In 2012 and 2013, the finalists—teams not individuals—of the National Idea-α 
and the Global Idea-α moved into the Acceleration-α Center. By the end of 2013, four external 
CV teams in total were doing its business based in their offices at the Acceleration-α Center (I-
M, personal interview, 2014). 
                                                            
144 Previously, before the R#2012, I-SM-A was a Technology Strategy Senior Manager (TS-SM-A), and the 
interviews with I-SM-A from the viewpoint of TS-SM-A were quoted in Section 6.2.3 and 6.3.1. 
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Considering the definition of corporate venturing (CV) (see Section 2.2), the Acceleration-α 
was a new CV program, but its primary objective was different from prior programs. Previously, 
a series of programs were designed to gather new business and service ideas from sources 
internal and external to the firm (i.e. searching for ideas to identify opportunities). However, 
interviews with members of the Innovation Group and the analysis of business archival data 
all suggest that the Acceleration-α was designed to secure vital resources, especially human 
resources and technologies, to implement ideas already identified by other programs (e.g. 
Corporate Idea-α, National Idea- α, etc.). 
As will be discussed in Section 8.2.3, this change in the program-level strategy was decided 
through the Open Venturing Strategy (OVS) project, which was a six-month strategy 
development project. In addition, as we shall see in Section 8.3.3, the emergence of the 
Acceleration-α program as a part of the variation stage in the case firm’s evolution of CV. This 
will be discussed by using the conceptual framework (the direction of CV) (see Section 8.3.3). 
6.3.4 2013–2015: Adaptation in the second CV cycle 
Mid-year reshuffling: A new location of the Emerging Business Team 
In the summer of 2013, CEO#6 announced a small scale mid-year reshuffling plan for 2013 
(hereafter R#2013-2).145 By the R#2013-2, as shown in Figure 6.5, the Emerging Business Team, 
along with the Innovation Group inside, was moved back to the Corporate R&D Center. This 
was a structural change by which the firm’s official CV unit was moved from the marketing side 
of the firm (see Section 6.3.3) to the technology side—the change of the team-level (L3) 
                                                            
145 In the second cycle of CV (2011–2015), since 2013, the period of reshuffling became shorter than 
before, as shown in Figure 5.2. For example, the annual reshufflings in both 2013 and 2014 (R#2013-1, 
R#2014-2) were followed by each year’s mid-year reshufflings (R#2013-2, R#2014-2). 
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organizational unit at the division-level (L2). With respect to the main reason for this change, 
an Innovation Senior Manager-B (I-SM-B) in the Innovation Group explained:146 
All of us [the Emerging Business Team] were moved down to the Corporate R&D Center. 
CSO was concerned about the scale of the business items our team [the Emerging 
Business Team] had been developing.147 Inside the R&D Center, there was a technology-
driven new business development team created by CTO in late 2012. ... I think these 
two teams will be merged late this year [in an annual reshuffling for 2014]. … Our top 
management these days is focusing on business items that would generate revenue 
‘quickly’. We are even doing business in the construction sector, which we haven’t done 
before. [Before the R#2013-2,] A decision has been made that large scale new business 
is to be developed by the Strategy Planning Office, whereas small-scale items in a 
bottom-up approach is by the Corporate R&D Center. (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2013; 
emphasis added) 
 
Figure 6.5 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, July 2013 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Company Alpha’s business archives and the organizational 
chart in 2013. 
* CFO: Chief Financial Officer; CHRO: Chief Human Resources Officer; CSO: Chief Strategy Officer; CTO: 
Chief Technology Officer 
** Structural units in blue color represent newly formed or significantly changed organizational units 
when compared with the organizational chart in January 2012 (see Figure 6.4). 
*** Similarly, the italicized names represent change of the person in the position after the previous 
                                                            
146 Before the R#2012, I-SM-B was a Technology Strategy Manager (TS-SM-B), and the interviews with I-
SM-B from the viewpoint of TS-SM-B were quoted in Section 6.3.1. 
147 The CSO, the head of strategy, was one of the new top management who joined Company Alpha in 
late 2010 (see Section 6.3.2). 
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organizational chart. 
The update of CV strategy by the Emerging Business Team 
After having been relocated to the Corporate R&D Center in July 2013, the Emerging Business 
Team had a strategy workshop in August 2013 to review their outcomes and program-level 
strategies. I-M summarized the main results of the workshop: 
In the workshop, we shared the skepticism widely spread across the firm over us. 
Reviewing our track records, we found that nearly $20 million have been invested in 
our activities over the last three years; a series of annual Idea-α programs were invested 
in with $1.8–2.8 million. In particular, the external ideation program [i.e. external IC 
program] was the biggest source of the cost; however, we could not answer the value 
of the programs except, say, the advertising effect. (I-M, personal interview, 2013; 
emphasis added) 
After the relocation of the official CV unit, the members of the Emerging Business Team 
encountered difficulties in defining and justifying their role and value to the firm. In 2013, I-
SM-B described the problem they faced: 
Let me tell our concern. Being a service company, we don’t have products [i.e. well 
branded IT solutions] and customers. In this situation, I don’t know how to do corporate 
venturing. (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2013) 
In the diagnosis by I-SM-B, he highlighted that the firm did not have well branded IT solutions, 
and it coincided closely with the remarks by a CSO, the head of strategy, in 2011 (see Section 
6.3.2). The lack of IT solutions in the form of commercial products was the firm’s deep-rooted 
problem which was not easily solved.148 
In the summer of 2013, therefore, the Emerging Business Team initiated the Corporate 
                                                            
148 A remark by a top management team member in the TSC#46 (January 2007) shows the firm’s deep-
rooted problem. In the meeting on the issue of new business idea exploration, an EVP criticized the 
speaker by saying: “I think that your proposal that we need to develop our own IT solutions just shows 
the fact that you do not sufficiently understand the foundation of our business.” 
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Venturing Strategy (CVS) project (see Section 8.2.3). The CVS project was not mandated by the 
top, but proposed by I-SM-B. The approved plan then became a six-month project with the aim 
of developing a new program-level strategy. 
Before the R#2013-2, the primary challenge of the CV unit was to gather new business and 
service ideas that could later be scaled up. Hence, the main objective of CV programs was to 
search for ideas in order to identify new business opportunities. Whereas, through the CVS 
project, the members realized that the more critical challenge they had to deal with was to 
secure technologies to implement ideas already identified through a series of CV programs. 
The project concluded that the objective of future CV programs should be to secure vital 
resources, especially technologies, in order to utilize already identified business opportunities. 
The change in the CV program’s strategic objective, which resulted from the CVS project, was 
confirmed by I-SM-B: 
Recently, the updated mid- to long-term business strategy has been announced. Our 
main business areas have been decided more clearly; several business areas such as IT 
services in the financial sector have been ruled out. ... With respect to the cloud 
computing business, we made a decision to make the A technology internally and 
therefore have invested over $70 million over last three years.149 However, I heard from 
a technology architector, who knows this situation well, that this internal R&D project 
had better to be terminated now to reduce the sunk cost if. This calls for a new concept 
of ‘corporate venturing’.150 By doing CV, we can have a relationship with an early-stage 
start-up and later use its technology in developing our [new ICT] service. (I-SM-B, 
personal interview, 2013; emphasis added) 
In the autumn of 2013, the members of the CVS project presented the updated CV strategy to 
                                                            
149 The specific name of the technology is disguised. 
150 In the pilot interview in the summer of 2013, I-SM-B explicitly used the term ‘CV’, which he and other 
members of the CV unit did not use until the end of 2011. This change in the interviewee is an important 
observation as this thesis suggests that the CV cycle of a firm is a set of CV programs evolved along a 
pathway, which may be unique to the firm. In addition, the thesis highlights that some of innovation 
programs at Company Alpha were realized as CV in hindsight, rather than deliberately planned with the 
title of ‘corporate venturing’. 
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CEO#6. The new CV strategy included the design of a new CV program, of which the primary 
strategic objective was to utilize already identified business opportunities by quickly securing 
access to vital resources, especially emerging technologies. I-SM-B, the project manager of the 
CVS project, explained the details of the project: 
In September 2013, we presented the initial plan to CEO [CEO#6] and he agreed to the 
plan: to set up a venture fund and to start CVC activities based in Silicon Valley from 
2014. Starting from October, our project team conducted interviews with almost all 
heads of business departments to identify their technology needs. Based on around 30 
interviews, we compiled a list of technologies we needed. (I-SM-B, personal interview, 
2014) 
However, the official launch of the new CVC program was postponed after the arrival of a new 
CEO (CEO#7) in late 2013. 
The arrival of new chief executive (CEO#7) and the disbandment of the Emerging Business 
Team 
In December 2013, the Alpha Group appointed a new chief executive (hereafter CEO#7) 
(KE#26). A Business Strategy Senior Manager (BS-SM) said that changing the top management 
was inevitable. The attempt to increase revenue volume from overseas markets generated 
financial losses during the tenure of CEO#6 (BS-SM, personal interview, 2016). 
The new CEO, CEO#7, at the beginning emphasized the importance of technologies and 
capabilities. For example, at the first corporate-level business strategy meeting in December 
2013, CEO#7 highlighted the role of capabilities: “As a service company, we can survive only if 
we have our core capabilities, which are invisible by their very nature.”151 
In the following month, at the first business strategy review meeting in January 2014, CEO#7 
                                                            
151 Company Alpha (2013) ‘Meeting Minutes: Global strategy meeting’ 
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emphasized changing the strategic direction of their business, using the term the “inflection 
point” (BS-SM, personal interview, 2016). BS-SM explained the meeting as: 
He [CEO#7] always stressed out the “inflection point” by which he emphasized the idea 
that we should change our main business from SI [System Integration] to new 
businesses centered on our IT solutions. Rather than just doing labor-intensive and low 
value-added businesses, he asserted that we need to do ICT service business based on 
our IT solutions. (BS-SM, personal interview, 2016) 
From CEO#7’s message, the need for having IT solutions as products that can be incorporated 
into new services was, again, the firm’s deep-rooted problem. It was exactly what the CSO, who 
left the firm in late 2011, already pointed out back in March 2011 (see Section 6.3.2). 
In early 2014, CEO#7 organized a series of strategy workshops to review the new business 
development strategy; members included heads of R&D, strategy, and finance. As the result 
of the workshops, CEO#7 decided that any new business development activities would be 
conducted in a top-down manner (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2014). 
Whereas, CEO#7 decided that the key role of the Corporate R&D Center was to focus on 
securing technologies necessary for the development of the firm’s IT solutions. “The new CEO 
[CEO#7] saw,” I-SM-B said, “that the firm did not have technologies.” As a consequence, 
software engineers and researchers who had been spread across the firm were gathered into 
the central R&D unit—the Corporate R&D Center—resulting in a fivefold increase in the size 
of the R&D unit with over five hundred employees (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2014). 
In April 2014, CEO#7 announced the mid-year reshuffling plan for 2014 (hereafter R#2014-2), 
by which the Emerging Business Team was disbanded (KE#27)—the end of its two and a half 
years’ operation since the team was formed in late 2011 (KE#19). By the R#2014-2, some 
members of the Emerging Business Team, including I-SM-B, were reallocated to the 
Technology Strategy Team. It was CEO#7’s decision to lower the central R&D unit’s 
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responsibility for new business development, but to strengthen capabilities for acquiring 
technologies required for the firm (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2014). Meanwhile, the 
Innovation Group in the Emerging Business Team was moved to the Business Planning Office—
the new name of the Strategic Marketing Office. They continued the annual internal IC 
program, the ‘2014 Corporate Idea-α’ program; however, at the end of 2014, the Innovation 
Group was finally disbanded (KE#28) by the annual reshuffling plan for 2015. 
The launch of the Global CVC program 
Starting from late 2014, the global-level CVC program based at Silicon Valley, the ‘Global CVC-
α’ program (CV-II-#6), began its official operation (KE#29). The program’s initial plan was 
approved back in late 2013; however, it took another one and a half years to refine the plan 
and its rationale, and for it to be accepted by the new chief executive, CEO#7 (I-SM-B, personal 
interview, 2015). 
Since being relocated to the Corporate R&D Center, I-SM-B tried to convince CEO#6 to get the 
approval of the plan for a CVC program. In 2013, the R&D arm in the United States was already 
in operation, which was responsible for identifying key technology trends for adding value to 
the ICT solutions of Company Alpha. In 2014, after moving into the R&D arm on the other side 
of the Pacific Ocean, I-SM-B and his team continued preparing the proposal for a CVC program. 
A Corporate Venturing Capital Senior Manager (CVC-SM-B) explained the role of the newly 
found CVC team in Silicon Valley: 
 [The role of our team is] … to bridge the technology roadmap team in Korea [inside the 
Corporate R&D Center] and the R&D arm here [in the US]. The importance of the 
technology roadmap was increased substantially, mainly because our new CEO [CEO#7] 
greatly emphasized the importance of technologies and technological capabilities of the 
firm. (CVC-SM-B, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
CVC-SM-B, in the following interview, further explained the activities his team members were 
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doing: 
The technology roadmap [TRM] has the list of technologies to be acquired from outside 
of the firm [marked with ‘buy’ or ‘collaborate’ options]. As to the technology items we 
identified, we are communicating with managers in the Technology Strategy Team at 
the headquarters. Whereas, as to the technology trend we are monitoring, we are 
talking with the project manager of the IT Roadmap project. (CVC-SM-B, personal 
interview, 2014) 
In late 2014, CEO#7 finally accepted the plan to launch a CVC program. The Global CVC-α 
program was the venture capital run by Company Alpha with a fund size of $30 million. By 
investing in external ventures, especially in their early stages, the program’s strategic objective 
was to secure technologies that could add value to business departments. The focused areas 
of investment were associated with technologies such as ‘mobility’, ‘cloud computing’, ‘data 
analytics’, and ‘securities’, which were discovered by the CVS project. 
In 2015 alone, Company Alpha established more than five strategic partnerships with external 
ventures, and a couple of venture investment deals were under the process of review (The 
details of which are not specifically described here because of the confidentiality of the 
partnerships).152 The Global CVC-α explains the final stage in the evolution of CV at Company 
Alpha as it forms the adaptation stage in its evolutionary change. This will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 8 using the direction of CV framework (see Section 8.3.4). 
6.4  Concluding reflection 
Based on the definition of CV, the empirical analysis has found ten CV programs that were 
developed, terminated, and then re-started in Company Alpha’s CV history.153 These programs 
                                                            
152 In the first half of 2016, the firm announced two CVC investment deals to the public. 
153 As mentioned in Section 6.2.3, there were other innovation activities which could be categorized as 
CV programs; however, those activities that are either one-off events (e.g. the Venture Idea Competition 
in 2001) or not directly related to the development of CV programs in the first and second CV cycles (e.g. 
the New Mobile Service project in 2008) are not included in the list of ten CV programs in Table 6.3. 
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were operated as special programs in the first and the second CV cycles. Table 6.3 summarizes 
the ten CV programs identified from the analysis in Chapter 5 and 6, and the result shows that 
four CV programs were carried out in the first CV cycle and six CV programs in the second cycle. 
Table 6.3: Ten CV programs of Company Alpha (1990–2015) 
First Cycle of CV (1997–2002) Second Cycle of CV (2011–2015) 
Sub- 
section 
Year CV programs or 
other key events 
Description Sub- 
section 
Year CV programs or 
other key events 
Description 
5.3.1 1993 
Research Challenge 
[I-1] 
Individual-level 
autonomous 
R&D initiative 
(KE#3) 
6.3.1 2010 
Mobile App Idea 
[II-1] 
Individual-level 
ideation 
program (more 
of an event) 
5.3.2 1997 
ICV-α1 
[I-2] 
Team-level 
internal IC 
(KE#5); First CV 
program 
6.3.2 2011 
Corporate Idea-α 
[II-2] 
Individual-level 
internal IC* 
(KE#18) 
5.3.3 2000 
New Venture Division 
(NVD) formed 
Major structural 
change (KE#9) 
6.3.3 
2011 
Emerging Business 
Team (EBT) formed 
Major structural 
change (KE#19) 
ICV-α2 
[I-3] 
Team-level 
internal IC 
(KE#10) 2012 
National Idea-α 
[II-3] 
Individual-level 
external IC 
(KE#20) 
CVC-α 
[I-4] 
External venture 
investment 
program (KE#10) 
Acceleration-α 
[II-4] 
Idea 
commerciali-
zation 
 
 
 
2013 
Global Idea-α 
[II-5] 
Team-level
external IC 
(KE#23)
5.3.4 2001 NVD disbanded 
Following the 
disbandment of 
the NVD 
(KE#12), all CV 
programs were 
terminated in 
late 2002. 
6.3.4 2014 
EBT disbanded 
The 
disbandment of 
the EBT (KE#27) 
Global CVC-α 
[II-6] 
External venture 
investment 
program (KE#29) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
* IC: Idea Competition (e.g. Mortara et al., 2013) 
In Table 6.3, all CV programs correspond to the unit of analysis of the research. Here, by 
comparing and contrasting programs between the two CV cycles, the CV programs in two 
different time periods of time provide us the way in which the single firm case study is modified 
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into a comparative case study. With respect to the research design, this analytical approach is 
relevant to what George and Bennett (2005: 81) suggested: “[C]ontrolled comparison can be 
achieved by dividing a single longitudinal case into two—the “before” case and an “after” case 
that follows a discontinuous change in an important variable.” 
The empirical analysis suggests that, there was a special organizational unit within Company 
Alpha, which played a significant role as a CV unit, although its name and position within the 
firm was changed over time. In addition, it has been found that there was a group of 
managerial actors, who took a dominant role in developing and implementing the firm’s CV 
activities. People inside the CV unit may well be venture managers’ managers, whose role was, 
as reviewed in Chapter 3, importantly emphasized by von Hippel (1977; 1973) in the very 
outset of the study of internal corporate venturing (ICV), which, however, have not advanced 
enough. The next chapter therefore discusses the role of these special managerial actors and 
their place within the firm in more detail. This is important because the actors of innovation 
activity serve as a dimension in conceptualizing the notion of direction in the context of firms’ 
CV activities. 
From a retrospective perspective, the unfolding portfolio of CV activities (or programs) led to 
the formation of the corporate venturing (CV) architecture of Company Alpha. Being able to 
look at discrete activities from a holistic viewpoint may well be the merit of the longitudinal 
approach to the study. Changes in the strategic objectives of CV programs are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7. It will be discussed that primary strategic objectives of CV programs 
help refine the end point of the direction of CV, developing the analytical framework (see 
Figure 3.3) into a more solid conceptual framework about the direction in innovation settings. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CHANGING DIRECTION OF CORPORATE VENTURING 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the process of the repeat of CV activities at Company Alpha using the 
idea of changing direction of CV. The analysis focuses on the firm’s CV programs and their main 
actors, and it aims to address the first research question: How are corporate venturing 
activities developed, terminated, and then re-started at the level of the firm? (see Section 1.3.1) 
In Chapter 3, the thesis developed an analytical framework about the direction of CV. Rather 
than only considering the content of the firm’s strategy, as was common in traditional strategy 
literature as discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis additionally focuses on managerial actors across 
different levels, especially on middle level managers who play a dominant role in managing a 
range of CV activities. In addition, this study considers different levels of strategies, especially 
program-level strategy, i.e. the primary goal, or aim, of CV programs. As a result, an analytical 
framework about the direction of CV was developed by combining a focus on both the main 
managerial actors who conduct CV activities, and on the primary strategic objective that the 
CV program pursues and is designed to achieve (see Section 3.4.2). 
The thesis now uses the analytical framework to develop an understanding of the process of 
CV activities repeated over time within the firm. In Chapter 5 and 6, the thesis examined how 
a range of CV programs at Company Alpha emerged, developed, discontinued (or terminated), 
and re-initiated during the period from 1990 to 2015. This chapter examines the case through 
the analytical framework (which is a new framing of direction) to elaborate its sub-dimensions 
and find its empirical support. By ensuring the validity and usefulness of it as a tool for 
examining the empirical phenomenon of interest, this framework can be developed into a 
conceptual framework, which helps understand CV cyclicality at the level of the firm. 
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7.2  The direction of Corporate Venturing (CV) 
7.2.1 ‘Direction of strategy’ versus ‘Direction of strategic change’ 
In Chapter 3, based on the review of the organizational change and strategy literature, it was 
found that the notion of direction in strategy settings has been mainly discussed in two themes: 
(1) direction of strategy (Type I) and (2) direction of strategic change (Type II) (see Section 
3.2.3). Results of the empirical analysis support this finding. As shown in Table 7.1, changes in 
corporate-level strategy and in business strategy to achieve corporate-level strategy have been 
identified through the analysis. As will be discussed here, this allows us to corroborate the two 
types of direction using Company Alpha’s case study. 
Table 7.1: Changes in corporate-level strategy and business strategy of Company Alpha 
Period Corporate-level 
strategy 
CEO 
(Tenure) Business strategy Relevant quotes 
1990– 
1993 
IT outsourcing 
company 
CEO#1, 
CEO#2 
(Not clearly identified) - 
1993– 
2010 
Global IT service 
company 
 
(Service includes 
IT System 
Integration, 
development,  
and maintenance) 
CEO#3 
Sep.  
1993– 
 
<Corporate-level strategy> 
- ““Company Alpha is an IT service company 
which develops, operates, and maintains IT 
systems,” CEO#3 explained. … We will be a 
total IT service company by 2000, with an 
annual revenue of $1.3 billion”154 
- “In the spring of 1997, the firm decided its 
corporate-level strategy as “becoming a 
global top ten IT service company by the 
year 2005””155 (5.3.2)* 
CEO#4 
Dec. 
1998– 
 Strengthening new 
internet business and 
global business (2000–
2002) 
<Corporate-level strategy> 
- Company Alpha announced its vision to 
transform the firm into “the internet-based 
IT service company”156 (5.3.3) 
                                                            
154 Joongang Ilbo (1994) ‘CEO#3, the chief executive of Company Alpha’ 
155 Company Alpha (1997) ‘Press Release: Company Alpha’s vision for 2005’ 
156 Company Alpha (2000) ‘Press Release: Company Alpha transforms into the internet-based IT service 
company’ 
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<Business strategy> 
- “… (1) reducing the business portion of 
system integration (SI) business, and (2) 
increasing the portion of internet and 
global business”157 (5.3.3) 
CEO#5 
Dec. 
2002– 
 Cost reduction (2003–
2005) 
 Strengthening new 
business and global 
business (2005–2010) 
<Corporate-level strategy> 
- “Our vision is to be the global top ten IT 
service company by 2010.”158 (5.2.1) 
<Business strategy (before 2005)> 
- “… direction is approaching to cost 
reduction and increasing profits.”159 (6.2.1) 
- “… we always have to think about cost”160 
(6.2.1) 
<Business strategy (after 2005)> 
- “… we need to develop new business; we 
need a strategic approach.”161 (6.2.2) 
2010– 
Global IT 
solution 
company 
CEO#6 
Dec. 
2010– 
 Restructuring business 
portfolio centered on 
IT solution business 
(2011–2013) 
<Corporate-level strategy> 
- Our vision for 2020 is the “intelligent IT 
solution company”162 
<Business strategy> 
- “[CSO said,] We need to do new business 
with new products and services, which is 
providing new IT services using our IT 
solutions.”163 (6.3.2) 
CEO#7 
Dec. 
2013– 
 Restructuring business 
portfolio centered on 
IT solution business 
(2014–) 
<Business strategy> 
- “[CEO#7 emphasized] we need to do ICT 
service business based on our IT solutions.” 
164 (6.3.4) 
Source: Developed by the author based on the analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
* The number in parenthesis denotes the relevant subsection’s number from which the quote is taken. 
                                                            
157 Ibid. 
158 Company Alpha (2005) ‘CEO#5’s email to the employees’ 
159 Company Alpha (2003) ‘TSC#2 Meeting Minutes’ 
160 Company Alpha (2004) ‘TSC#14 Meeting Minutes’ 
161 Company Alpha (2006) ‘TSC#39 Meeting Minutes’ 
162 Company Alpha (2010) ‘CEO#5’s email to the employees’ 
163 Company Alpha (2011) ‘Meeting Minutes: New business development strategy planning’ 
164 BS-SM (personal interview, 1 April 2016) 
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Direction of strategy (Type I) 
The first notion of direction in strategy settings observed from the case is directly associated 
with the content of strategy. As discussed in Chapter 3, direction of strategy is the term that 
highlights the content of the firm’s strategy, which is defined, adopted, and pursued in order 
to achieve their sustainable competitive advantages (see Section 3.2.3). In large established 
firms, direction of strategy is crucially important because it acts as a frame of reference for a 
range of strategic decisions across the firm. 
Table 7.1 is one of the key results from the case analysis, where the list of corporate-level 
strategies and business strategies at Company Alpha are displayed. This provides examples of 
Type I direction. For example, CEO#5, in 2005, set out the firm’s corporate-level strategy “to 
be the global top ten IT service company”, and to achieve this, set the business strategy as 
‘strengthening new business and global business’. This was shared across the firm through a 
variety of communication channels (e.g. business events, emails, company broadcasting, etc.) 
(see Section 6.2.2). Considering its focus on strategy content, the business strategy in 2005 was 
clearly a direction of strategy. This suggests that all other corporate-level and business 
strategies in Table 7.1 can be regarded as direction of strategy. For example, in 2000, CEO#4 
set the business strategy to ‘strengthening new internet business and global business’ (see 
Section 5.3.3). And from 2003 to 2005, which was early three years of CEO#5’s tenure, the 
business strategy was ‘cost reduction’ (see Section 6.2.1). These are examples of a direction of 
strategy, or Type I direction, at Company Alpha. 
Direction of strategic change (Type II) 
Next, the second notion of direction supported by the case is direction of strategic change 
(Type II direction). Unlike Type I direction, which is primarily focused on the content of strategy, 
Type II direction is mainly concerned with changes in the content of strategies. In particular, 
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these changes occurred in both the corporate and business levels. 
First, at the business-level strategy, Table 7.1 shows that there was a distinctive change in 
business strategies between the tenures of CEO#5 and CEO#6, and this is an example of Type 
II direction. In 2011, in the first year of CEO#6’s tenure, the direction of strategy (Type I 
direction) was changed to ‘restructuring business portfolio centered on IT solution business’, 
which was significantly different from the previous direction under the leadership of his 
predecessor, CEO#5 (strengthening new business and global business). This change of strategic 
direction is in accordance with the notion of the direction of strategic change (Type II direction). 
Drawing on Intel’s case, Burgelman (2002b) divided the history of the firm into three epochs: 
Intel (1) the ‘memory company’ (1968–1985); (2) the ‘microprocessor company’ (1985–1998); 
and (3) the ‘internet building-block company’ (1998–). Here, each title of the epoch can be 
viewed as the corporate-level strategy in each period. As the CEO of Intel in the second epoch, 
Grove directed the content of Intel’s strategy—the direction of strategy (Type I direction)—
mainly towards Intel the ‘microprocessor company’ using the strategy vector approach; it was 
“superbly suited for exploiting the rich opportunities in the PC market segment of the 
microprocessor industry” (Burgelman, 2002a: 336). However, what is also important is to 
scrutinize strategic direction and to consider the change of strategic direction—the direction 
of strategic change (Type II)—not to be trapped in “coevolutionary lock-in” (Burgelman, 2002a). 
In the case of Company Alpha, the history of the firm can be divided into three distinctive 
periods: Company Alpha (1) the ‘IT outsourcing company’ (1990–1993); (2) the ‘IT service 
company’ (1993–2010); and (3) the ‘IT solution company’ (2010–) (see Table 7.1). Similar to 
Intel’s case, the title of each period corresponds to the firm’s corporate-level strategy, which 
is supported by the relevant quotes in Table 7.1. 
In 2011, at the beginning of CEO#6’s tenure, the direction of strategy was significantly changed, 
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focusing on transforming the firm into the IT solution company. This new strategic direction 
was enforced by his successor CEO#7, which CEO#7 himself highlighted as the change of 
strategic direction (Type II) by using the term “inflection point” (see Section 6.3.4). Prior to 
2011, as confirmed by BS-SM, the firm’s strategic direction was oriented toward being an IT 
service company, largely dependent on labor-intensive system integration (SI) business; 
however, CEO#6 and the successor CEO#7 tried more and more to change the direction of 
strategy toward the new corporate-level strategy, IT solution company (BS-SM, personal 
interview, 2016). In this case, the tension between Type I and Type II direction can be described 
as enforcing corporate strategy into the same direction versus shifting it to a new direction. 
Here, managing such tensions is, in Burgelman’s (2002a) words, a means to avoid 
“coevolutionary lock-in”. 
7.2.2 A new framing of direction: Direction of CV 
Apart from Type I and Type II directions that have been mainly considered in the strategy 
literature, this thesis suggests that the direction of CV can be defined as an internal consistency, 
within the firm conducting CV activities, between the firm’s structure (with actors residing in 
the structure) and its strategy (see Section 3.4). This is an alternative way of thinking about 
‘direction’ from an internal firm perspective. Specifically, this thesis attempts to develop a 
conceptual framework about the direction of CV. This is a new framing of direction in 
innovation settings, which is generated by combining both who in the organization innovates 
(main managerial actors who conduct CV activities) and why (the primary strategic objective 
pursued by the CV program) (see Section 3.4.2). Importantly, findings in the thesis 
demonstrate that this new framing of direction helps explain Company Alpha’s CV activities 
repeated over time. 
Before conducting an empirical analysis, this potential conceptual framework existed as a 
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typology of direction, which emerged from the theoretical review of strategy and innovation 
literature. Candidates for specific sub-dimensions which together can constitute the axes of 
the typology were still contested, requiring empirical support. Therefore, this framework was 
applied as an analytical framework for the case study analyzed in Chapter 5 and 6. Results from 
the “within-case analysis” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) of the case firm’s 
empirical data support the validity of this re-conceptualization of direction. Through multiple 
rounds of analysis, which are interactions between empirical analysis and theoretical reflection, 
the analytical framework was developed into the conceptual framework (see Figure 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.1 The direction of corporate venturing (CV) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
Figure 7.1 shows the direction of CV, which is, as discussed in Chapter 3, the combination of 
two dimensions: (1) the main managerial actors of CV activities and (2) the primary strategic 
objective of a CV program (see Section 3.4.2). By mapping each dimension to the axis, the 
direction of CV is generated by the intersection of two axes: locus of innovation (a starting point) 
and strategic objective (an end point). These two axes reflect the answer to two key questions 
about managing CV as an innovation practice: Who in the organization undertakes CV activities? 
And what are the aims of CV programs? 
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The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the two axes (dimensions) in Figure 7.1 can 
be effectively refined by adding sub-dimensions. The first dimension, locus of innovation, is 
divided into (1) technology-driven and (2) market-driven. Next, the second dimension, strategic 
objective, is divided into (1) exploration and (2) exploitation. 
Using the conceptual framework, the series of CV programs in the first and the second CV 
cycles at Company Alpha (see Table 6.3) are analyzed as shown in Figure 7.2. Through the lens 
of the direction of CV, the figure illustrates how CV programs have been developed, terminated 
(or adapted), and then re-started at the level of the firm during the period from the early 1990s 
to 2015, and this is an important finding in the thesis. 
 
Figure 7.2 Changing direction of CV in the first and the second CV cycles at Company Alpha 
Source: Developed by the author. 
The juxtaposition of changes in the direction of CV in two different periods of time allows us a 
cross-time analysis of the two CV cycles (to compare and contrast these CV cycles). This helps 
us understand the dynamics in the cyclical nature of CV activities at the level of the firm, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 8. But before, this chapter continues by discussing changes in the 
locus of innovation (the starting point of direction) (in Section 7.3), and changes in the strategic 
objective of a CV program (the end point of direction) (in Section 7.4). 
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7.3  Locus of innovation: the starting point of the direction of CV 
The starting point of the direction of CV focuses attention on the locus of innovation that exists 
within the firm; this means where in the firm innovation is generated. Findings from the case 
analysis suggest that, inside the firm, there is a distinct group of individual actors within specific 
structural units who undertake a dominant role in managing a series of CV activities. In this 
thesis, locus of innovation refers to a distinct group of individual actors who reside in specific 
structural units within the firm and dominantly manages a range of CV activities (e.g. CV 
programs, CV teams, etc.). Using a vector analogy from physics, locus of innovation can be 
described as a starting point of a vector, as it is the origin of a CV activity where forces are 
exerted on, activating the activity. 
Eric von Hippel (1988), in The Sources of Innovation, explored the ‘functional source of 
innovation’ by examining ‘benefits’ which firms and individuals derive from product, service, 
and process innovation at the industry level. Depending on the functional source of innovation 
(e.g. from using, manufacturing, and supplying), these players are categorized into users, 
manufactures, and suppliers (Von Hippel, 1988: 3). However, locus of innovation suggested in 
this thesis should be distinguished from von Hippel’s approach, as locus of innovation focuses 
on the question about who in the organization innovates (i.e. main actors at the level of the 
firm). Specifically, locus of innovation focuses on roles and characteristics of managerial actors 
in the innovation process by looking at which managerial actors at what part of the 
organization conduct the key role in the process of innovation. Actors at the locus of innovation 
within the firm manage the firm’s innovation activities such as CV, whereby setting 
environments conducive to innovation and helping ideas, being streamed from sources of 
innovation, be enacted. 
This section examines the empirical case of Company Alpha, which is the exemplar of the firm 
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that repeated CV activities over time in Korean CV history (see Section 1.3.1). A pattern which 
emerges from the data demonstrates that the firm’s locus of innovation has moved over time 
between two major sides inside the firm. Specifically, the main managerial actors (and the 
structural units they reside in) of CV activities swung between the technology and the 
marketing sides of the firm. In what follows, this section discusses multiple levels of structures 
and actors by considering the depth of resource orchestration (see Section 3.4.1), and analyzes 
the pattern found from the changes in the locus of innovation.165 
7.3.1 Multiple levels of structures and actors and the depth of resource orchestration 
Firms are often assumed as a unitary agent with economic and strategic motives, which is, in 
Grant’s (1996) term, described as “a singular decision taker”. Taking into consideration of real 
business settings, however, this unified view of organization needs to be modified. Looking 
Company Alpha as a micro-level innovating system, the firm is then viewed as layers of 
organizational units at different hierarchical levels. Here, hierarchies are “layers of sequential 
authority” which are introduced to enable coordination and foster cooperation (Reitzig and 
Maciejovsky, 2015: 1979). 
The modified viewpoint leads us to see the firm as a set of organizational units, each of which 
performs specialized functions that are horizontally divided along the firm’s value chain (Porter, 
1985) (e.g. logistics, marketing and sales, and service, etc.). In the context of large established 
firms, however, organizational units are also vertically divided, revealing hierarchical 
                                                            
165 Borrowing Burgelman’s (1980) term, the case firm is the very example of “an innovating system”, 
which has often been treated as a black box. Traditionally, the ‘systems of innovation’ concept is “one 
of the most important concepts to emerge from SPIS” (Martin, 2012: 1233) especially at a macro-level 
such as the ‘national innovation system’ (e.g. Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). 
Nevertheless, it is essential to pay attention to the systems of innovation at a micro-level, as is 
emphasized by Pavitt (2005) as the way to be further explored by innovation scholars. 
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structures and lines of business communications. Therefore, to examine the main actors of CV 
activities within the firm, taking account of multiple levels of managers is important. 
A multi-layer framework (MLF) for structural and actor analysis 
There is a major consensus that multiple levels of managerial hierarchy can be grouped into 
three levels (top, middle, and operational) (e.g. Floyd and Lane, 2000). However, multiple 
levels of organizational units and managers inside the firm can be articulated by examining a 
series of organizational charts that change over time. Organizational charts are effective tools 
with which to examine the firm’s organizational structure including horizontal and vertical 
divisions. 
Chapter 5 and 6 presented Company Alpha’ organizational charts at five critical junctures 
which are closely associated with major changes in the firm’s CV activities, especially CV 
programs. Findings suggest that there are vertical hierarchies, or layers, in the organizational 
structure, and they can be explained by what this thesis calls a ‘multi-layer framework (MLF)’ 
for structural and actor analysis (see Figure 7.3).166 The MLF is composed of five layers (from 
L1 to L5) of organizational units along with the key managerial actors at each layer. For example, 
Figure 7.3 shows the MLF applied to part of Company Alpha’s organizational chart in 2012 
(OC#2012; see 6.3.3). 
                                                            
166 The five organizational charts at critical junctures analyzed in the thesis are: OC#2000 (Fig. 5.4), 
OC#2006 (Fig. 6.2), OC#2010 (Fig. 6.3), OC#2012 (Fig. 6.4), and OC#2013 (Fig. 6.5). 
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Figure 7.3 A multi-layer framework (MLF) for structural and actor analysis (applied to 
OC#2012) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
The MLF unpacks the internal structure of a large firm into five layers of organizational units 
and shows the main actor(s) at each layer—titles of positions and titles of ranks. First, L1 is the 
top-level unit in the organizational structure, in which the chief executive of the firm is 
singularly positioned as the representative of the top-level management. With respect to L1 
managers, five chief executives of Company Alpha (from CEO#3 to CEO#7) were identified and 
analyzed in the empirical chapters (see Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2). 
Next, L2 is the division-level unit because all business divisions of the firm can be clustered into 
this level; some other units ending with ‘Office’ or ‘Center’ are located at this level, too. L2 
managers include C-level executives—such as the chief technology officer (CTO) and the chief 
strategy officer (CSO)—and ‘heads of business divisions’, all of whose ranks are executive vice 
president (EVP) in general. 
Third, L3 is the team-level unit, which is organized mainly based on major business functions 
(e.g. Business Strategy Team, Technology Strategy Team, Finance Team, Emerging Business 
Team, and Venture Management Team, etc.). A typical L3 manager is in the position of ‘head 
of team’, who is a vice president (VP) in general; but sometimes, a general manager (GM), who 
is one rank lower than VP, takes the head of team position. 
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Similarly, L4 stands for group-level units and L5 for part-level units. Here, L4 units (i.e. Groups) 
are built around sub-functions of the L3 unit (i.e. Team) under which they are located. For 
example, in OC#2012, both the Technology Strategy Group and the Technology Management 
Group were located under the Technology Strategy Team (see Figure 6.4). In terms of 
managerial actors, the L4 managers’ position is ‘director of group’, whose rank is usually 
general manager (GM). 
Finally, despite the fact that L5 is not usually displayed in organizational charts, L5 units are 
important, because although they are the lowest level in the organizational structure, 
substantial tasks and operations are conducted by groups of actors in L5 units led by L5 
managers. These middle-level managers are generally senior manager (SM) in terms of their 
rank, and they lead either a project, or a program, with a ‘project manager’ position. The 
importance of L5 managers are highlighted by researchers as the role of middle managers. 
Depth of resource orchestration 
Drawing on resource orchestration (RO) theory, multiple levels, or hierarchy, of managerial 
actors (i.e. managers) within the firm can be analyzed as an empirical case of the depth of RO 
(Sirmon et al., 2011). As discussed in Section 3.4, RO focuses explicitly on managerial actors 
and their resource-related actions. Although firms already have a strategy, RO suggests that 
its result and performance may well depend on actors who implement those strategies: 
[Inside firms,] multiple levels of managers coexist, with each level contributing, in 
different ways, to the achievement of a competitive advantage. As such, the structuring, 
bundling, and leveraging subprocesses of resource orchestration likely differ by 
managerial level. (Sirmon et al., 2011: 1404) 
In particular, the depth of RO is suggested as a prospective future research area that can 
update resource-based theory (for more on this see e.g. Barney et al., 2011; Sirmon et al., 2011; 
Chadwick et al., 2015). Here, the word ‘depth’ rightly underlines a distinctive characteristic of 
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the large firm being stratified into layers of units with managers at different levels. However, 
the role of multiple levels of actors—who enable the combination of resources in a new way—
is less discussed so far. As Sirmon et al. (2011: 1403) pointed out: “To date, research on the 
role of managerial action in realizing competitive advantages either has assumed the actor to 
be the general manager (i.e., chief executive) or has not specified the manager’s level”. 
When examining the depth of RO within the firm, the multi-layer framework (MLF) sheds light 
on the hierarchies or vertical divisions within large established firms; at least this is seen to be 
the case in the context of large Korean business firms. Importantly, the analysis through the 
MLF helps us examine interactions across different layers of organizational units and different 
levels of actors within the structure. From the observation of changes within Company Alpha, 
especially focusing on changes at the L2 layer (division-level units), the following subsections 
analyze the main types of the locus of innovation (Section 7.3.2) and its changes (Section 7.3.3). 
7.3.2 Two loci of innovation inside the firm: Technology-driven vs. Market-driven 
From the analysis of multiple levels of organizational units and actors (i.e. by looking into the 
depth of research orchestration), it is found that there is a distinct group of individual actors 
who reside in specific structural units within the firm and dominantly manages a range of CV 
activities (e.g. CV programs, CV teams, etc.). The thesis refers to the combination of these 
actors and the organizational units in which they reside, collectively as locus of innovation (LoI). 
Specifically, locus of innovation does not only mean a group of structural units; it means a 
combination of structural units and individuals within the structure, which as a result form a 
group of actors embedded in a common structural context. Rather than solely relying on either 
structural arguments or factors only related to human actors, to consider both organizational 
units and individual actors together through locus of innovation provides more explanatory 
power. It is because the internal environments of Company Alpha—an innovating system in 
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which managerial actors perform their business tasks—are different at each locus of 
innovation, as if the speed and direction of wind differs in different places. 
Technology-driven vs. Market-driven locus of innovation 
The analysis of Company Alpha’s 26 years of data, which include organizational structures, 
business archives, and interviews, demonstrates that there are two main sides within the locus 
of innovation inside the firm (i.e. the innovating system). These two sides can be grouped into 
the technology side and the marketing side of Company Alpha, each of which is referred to in 
the thesis as the technology-driven and the market-driven locus of innovation, respectively. All 
ten CV programs of the firm (see Table 6.3) were designed and operated mainly by one of the 
two sides. 
The two loci of innovation inside the firm can be displayed as in Figure 7.4, which uses the 
OC#2012 (see 6.3.3) as an exemplary case. The figure shows that there are two distinctive 
division-level (L2) units that can act as a locus of innovation—one in charge of corporate-level 
technology strategy (the Corporate R&D Center) and the other in charge of business strategy 
focusing on markets and competitors (the Strategic Marketing Office). The existence of the 
two potential L2 units suggests the possibility of mutual competition between the two to 
become the main actor that drives the firm’s innovation activities (i.e. the locus of innovation). 
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Figure 7.4 Two potential loci of innovation at Company Alpha (Technology-driven vs. 
Market-driven) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
Figure 7.4 serves as a good example to show the internal structure of the locus of innovation 
at Company Alpha. It also suggests that the five layers of the MAF (see Section 7.3.1) can be 
applied as an analytical tool to examine organizational structures (i.e. organizational charts). 
For example, inside the L2 unit (see Figure 7.4), the Corporate R&D Center is led by a CTO (in 
this case, CTO#14; L2 manager), in which the Technology Strategy Team led by the head of the 
team (a VP; L3 manager) is located. Inside the Technology Strategy Team, there is the 
Technology Strategy Group managed by the director of the group (a GM; L4 manager). Middle 
managers (e.g. managers and senior managers; L5 managers), whose distinctive roles have 
been highlighted in the literature (e.g. Kanter, 1985; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Hornsby et 
al., 2009), perform their business activities within the group. 
Features of locus of innovation: (1) Mutual competition 
Two features of the locus of innovation have been found from the analysis of the data. The first 
is mutual competition between the two potential loci of innovation. For example, in developing 
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CV programs, the two sides competed against each other to be the main innovator inside the 
firm, fully sponsored by the top management, especially CEO. With regard to the competition 
between these two sides—the technology-driven and the market-driven—to become the main 
innovator inside the firm (i.e. the locus of innovation), a CTO who had worked at Company 
Alpha from the early 1990s said in the interview: 
Of course, the competition for who will drive new business development exists between 
the two sides [the technology side and the marketing side of the firm]. Although each 
side’s perspectives are different, they commonly believe that the firm needs to do 
something new to ensure its business continuity. The technology side wants to lead the 
firm from a technological viewpoint, whereas the marketing side wants to lead from a 
market viewpoint. Hence the competition between the two is obvious; it wouldn’t be a 
company if there wasn’t such competition. ... The attribute of organization is 
competition. It’s not only the competition in the market, but there’s internal 
competition as well. A typical internal competition is that of the technology side versus 
the marketing side. A person in charge of technology does his/her best from the 
viewpoint of the technology side, and it’s the same in the case of a person in charge of 
marketing. What’s important is, from a CEO’s position, to strike the balance between 
the two sides. (CTO#12, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
The competition between the technology and the marketing side as to the innovation activities, 
especially to seize the initiative for new business development activities, is also supported from 
the interview with a middle manager (L5 manager) in the Technology Strategy Team: 
R&D and marketing departments have their own new business development process. 
In the winter of 2009, we had a strategy meeting to integrate the two processes into a 
firm-level standard business process. But, it ended up after two hours of fierce debates 
over who will lead the new business development initiative. In the meeting, we actually 
used the term technology-driven and market-driven, and we discussed which type 
would be the best process for our company, i.e., between technology-driven and 
market-driven new business development. We, however, didn’t arrive at a conclusion. 
(TS-SM-A, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
Features of locus of innovation: (2) Different logic 
The second feature found from the analysis is that each locus of innovation has different logic. 
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The logic was underlying the actors’ assumptions when they were planning and operating a 
series of CV programs. A manager who worked in both the two loci of innovation described 
that totally different logic was pervasive in the two sides of the firm, as if they were ‘two 
different thought worlds using different languages’. In the manager’s own words: 
In late 2011, my colleagues and I were moved from the Corporate R&D Center to the 
Strategic Marketing Office. Then, we experienced a disconnection from the R&D. Our 
language was totally changed; we didn’t even use the word ‘technology’ in our daily 
talks. … Our way of thinking was changed as well. Rather than thinking about how to 
find new technologies, we were then singularly concerned about how to gather new 
business ideas and how to scale them up in order to develop new IT service business.167 
… In addition, we talked a lot about the size of the market for new business ideas 
proposed. In the Corporate Idea-α [internal IC in 2011], ideas’ market size was not a top 
priority. The item of the winner wouldn’t have been selected, if the market size had 
been our top priority. However, [after we were moved to the marketing side] it became 
more and more important, first in the National Idea-α [external IC in 2012] and then in 
the Global Idea-α [external IC in 2013]. When evaluating ideas in the Global Idea-α, for 
example, proposals were immediately filtered out if its potential market size was less 
than, say, billion dollars. (I-M, personal interview, 2013; emphasis added) 
Table 7.2 summarizes the characteristics of the two loci of innovation, which are articulated 
by comparing and contrasting interviews with key individuals from the both sides of the locus 
of innovation (not only business archives). This finding demonstrates the two distinctively 
different internal environments and the logic within the two sides of a micro-level innovating 
system. When similar CV programs are conducted by the firm, it is often the case that no 
meaningful difference can be observed by outer observers for lack of knowledge about the 
internal context of the firm. However, the content in Table 7.2 provides contextual information 
about the two main actors of CV activities. It helps us develop a better understanding of the 
firm’s behavior associated with its CV programs repeated over time.  
                                                            
167 The necessity for the development of ‘service type’ new IT business is directly associated with the 
CSO’s viewpoint of Company Alpha in 2011 (see Section 6.3.2) 
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Table 7.2: Characteristics of the two loci of innovation (with relevant quotations) 
 Technology-driven Market-driven 
Top level actor in 
charge 
(L2 manager) 
 Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 
- e.g. CTO#12 who identified 
technology opportunities in 2008 
(see Section 6.2.3) 
 Chief Strategy Officer (CSO) 
- e.g. CSO who were concerned about 
the potential market size in 2011 (see 
Section 6.3.2) 
Top level 
structural unit 
(L2 unit) 
 Division-level unit (L2) led by L2 
manager in charge of technology 
strategy (e.g. Corporate R&D Center) 
 Division-level unit (L2) led by L2 
manager in charge of business 
strategy (e.g. Strategic Marketing 
Office) 
Perspective and 
assumptions 
 Looking the world mainly from the 
perspective associated with 
technologies 
- Actors have a good understanding of 
technology 
 Technological opportunities are 
believed to be most important and 
thus prioritized 
- Tries to capture changes in 
technology (i.e. technological 
change) to seize the technological 
opportunities 
 Acquiring technologies and utilizing 
the acquired technologies are 
important 
- R&D activities are emphasized 
- “What technologies will be necessary 
and for what reasons; how we can 
acquire those technologies.”168 
 Looking the world mainly from the 
perspective associated with markets 
- Actors have a good understanding of 
markets (i.e. customers and 
competitors) 
 Market opportunities are believed to 
be most important 
- Tries to capture changes in customers 
and competitors (i.e. market change)  
- “In case of Samsung, for example, they 
transformed the firm from the 
analogue to the digital generation 
and became a leading firm in the 
digital home appliance sector from 
the mid-1990s. Back then, they were 
not a leading digital company. In this 
transition period, looking at behaviors 
of the leader such as Sony was 
crucially important. From the 
viewpoint of leading high-tech firms, 
however, they thought that they 
could change the game by 
technologies. … Similarly, we 
[Company Alpha] in the 1990s also 
looked at competitors first, trying to 
understand their behaviors, rather 
than starting from technology.”169 
 Achieving revenue goals and market 
shares are important 
- Customers’ needs and market 
size/share are emphasized 
- “Our language was totally changed 
                                                            
168 CTO#12 (personal interview, 7 October 2014) 
169 Ibid. 
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[after moving into the marketing 
unit]; we didn’t even use the word 
‘technology’ in our daily talks. … 
Technologies are important; 
however, we started from the 
number.”170 
Main strategy 
 Technology strategy 
- “Technology strategy is the plan for 
how to acquire technologies and how 
to use them.”171 
 Business strategy 
 
Major strategic 
activities 
 Technology Intelligence (TI) activities 
 Technology strategy planning 
- e.g. technology roadmap 
development 
 Market Intelligence (MI) activities 
 Business strategy planning 
- e.g. mid- to long-term business 
strategy planning (see Section 6.3.4) 
Key questions 
 Based on technological opportunities 
identified, how to develop new 
business (new products, IT services)? 
 In order to achieve business 
strategies (e.g. revenue goals), how 
to develop new business (new 
products, IT services)? 
- “We need to have $10 billion revenue 
in 2015, and one third of it should be 
from new businesses.”172 
Source: Developed by the author based on the analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
7.3.3 Changing locus of Innovation (the starting point of direction) 
Changes in the locus of Innovation 
Changes in the locus of innovation are identified through the analysis of five organizational 
charts at critical junctures (see Appendix G), which are associated with a range of key events 
in Company Alpha’s CV activities. As shown in Figure 7.5, the changing pattern indicates that 
the locus of innovation at Company Alpha swung between the technology side (i.e. technology-
driven) and the marketing side (i.e. market-driven) within the firm. 
                                                            
170 I-M (personal interview, 28 October 2013) 
171 TS-SM-A (personal interview, 15 October 2014) 
172 Company Alpha (2011) ‘Meeting Minutes: New business development strategy planning’ 
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Figure 7.5 Changing locus of innovation of Company Alpha in the two CV cycles 
Source: Developed by the author based on the analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
Figure 7.5 demonstrates that the locus of innovation changed over time both in the first and 
the second CV cycles in a similar way. In both cycles, the locus was activated at the technology 
side and moved to the other part—the marketing side of the firm. In the first CV cycle, the 
locus of innovation being moved was deactivated; whereas, in the second cycle, it was moved 
back to the technology side, where the locus of innovation was originally activated from. 
The changing pattern displayed in Figure 7.5 draws our attention as this pattern relates to the 
main managerial actors (and the structural units they reside in) in the process of the repeat of 
CV activities. As to the direction of CV, the locus of innovation constitutes its starting point (i.e. 
the origin of direction), and the finding suggests that the origin of direction changes between 
the two loci of innovation: Technology-driven and Market-driven. 
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Theoretical interpretation from the resource orchestration perspective 
As explained in Section 3.4.2, the depth (multiple levels of structures and actors) and breadth 
(multiple levels of strategies) of RO (Sirmon et al., 2011) provide theoretical backgrounds to 
the dimensions of the conceptual framework (the direction of CV) developed in the thesis. 
Furthermore, findings from the empirical analysis also feed into the development of these 
underexplored, but prospective research agenda of RO theory: the depth and breadth of RO. 
As reviewed in Chapter 3, managers’ resource orchestration actions are composed of “the 
comprehensive process of structuring, bundling, and leveraging the firm’s resources with the 
purpose of creating value” (Sirmon et al., 2011: 1392; emphasis added). Here, the depth of RO 
suggests that managers’ resource-related actions (structuring, bundling, and leveraging) can 
be differ by managerial levels in the organizational hierarchy. Researchers have begun focusing 
on the role of top management team such as “top management resource orchestration” 
(Chadwick et al., 2015). However, different roles of multiple levels of managers need to be 
further understood considering the depth of RO. Specifically, changing locus of innovation 
identified in the thesis can be positioned as an empirical case of the depth of RO. 
Looking at Figure 7.5, the change of the locus of innovation in the first cycle of CV (1997–2002) 
and the second CV cycle (2011–2015) at Company Alpha show a similar pattern. In the second 
CV cycle, for example, the technology side started acting as a locus of innovation (technology-
driven) in the autumn of 2008, which was then shifted to the marketing side in late 2011 
(market-driven). After one and a half years, the locus was moved back to the technology side 
(technology-driven). This changing pattern, combined with the empirical analysis in Chapter 6, 
provides three major empirical insights as to the depth of RO. 
First, resource orchestration actions are initiated by the top management mainly by resource 
structuring. The data show that every change of the locus of innovation was initiated by the 
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top management’s resource structuring actions. Each of the chief executives (CEO#5, CEO#6, 
and CEO#7), who is the L1 manager according to the MLF (see Figure 7.3), carried out resource 
structuring by means of annual reshuffling, which is structural changes accompanied by human 
resource changes implemented at least once a year. 
Some may argue that a locus of innovation can emerge in a bottom-up manner; however, even 
the emergence of a new locus of innovation was preceded by resource structuring by the top 
management. For example, in January 2006, CEO#5 did the annual reshuffling for 2006 
(hereafter R#2006) under the newly changed business strategy oriented towards profiting 
from differentiation (see Section 6.2.3). By the R#2006, CTO#12 was appointed as a new head 
of the Corporate R&D Center (L2 unit) in charge of corporate-level technology strategy (KE#14), 
who later in 2008 carried out a strategic role in turning the R&D unit into the new locus of 
innovation within the firm. 
Second, the change of the locus of innovation within the firm is often a result of top 
management’s (CEO) resource structuring action. When conducting resource structuring, the 
top management changes the locus of innovation between the technology and the marketing 
sides of the firm. As discussed in the previous section, there is mutual competition between 
the two sides (see Section 7.3.2), and the pervasive logic on each side is completely different 
against the other (see Table 7.2). Hence, CEOs, as a conductor of resource orchestration, 
changed the position of the firm’s locus of innovation when necessary. 
For example, in late 2011, a new chief executive CEO#6 changed the locus of innovation from 
the technology side to the marketing side. CEO#6 emphasized the role of the firm’s 
headquarters in scaling up the size of business identified from technology opportunities, which 
he believed to be the role of the marketing side of the firm in innovation processes (see Section 
6.3.3). Therefore, CEO#6 formed the Emerging Business Team (L3 unit) within the Strategic 
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Marketing Office (L2 unit) by the R#2012 (resource structuring) and accumulated human 
resources to the marketing side (the Emerging Business Team) (KE#19). Consequently, 
managers involved in the 2011 Corporate Idea-α—a CV program as an individual-level internal 
IC (see Table 6.3)—were relocated to the market side (market-driven) in an attempt to scale 
up CV activities. In mid-2013, however, the location of the Emerging Business Team was 
changed back to the Corporate R&D Center by the R#2013-2 (KE#25), which was also CEO#6’s 
resource structuring action (see Section 6.3.4). The technology side continued to act as a 
technology-driven locus of innovation by launching the Global CVC-α program (KE#29)—an 
external venture investment program (see Table 6.3). 
Third, after the top-level management’s resource structuring action, subsequent actions are 
delegated to the lower level managers (L2–L5 manager). Company Alpha’s case supports the 
idea that RO actions are delegated to the different levels of managers, who then conduct 
resource structuring and bundling actions. This corroborates a claim by Sirmon et al. (2011: 
1405) that “top management is more likely to delegate authority to middle managers to direct 
the necessary structuring, bundling, and leveraging actions”. 
In 2008, for example, CTO#12 (L2 manager) who identified technology opportunities actively 
conducted resource structuring actions, turning the technology side of the firm—the 
Corporate R&D Center (L2 unit)—into the new locus of innovation within the firm (see Section 
6.2.3). CTO#12 convinced CEO#5 and successfully accumulated resources that were previously 
distributed across the firm, such as business analysts, software engineers, and marketing 
professionals also with financial budgets. Next, in late 2008, CTO#12 conducted resource 
bundling actions. He himself as a project manager, CTO#12 led the New Mobile Service (NMS) 
project, which was the new business development project aimed at exploring new mobile 
service ideas (see Section 6.2.3). 
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While the previous example shows the way in which a L2 manager (CTO#12) conducted RO 
actions (resource structuring and bundling) delegated to him, the analysis also found that how 
middle managers, especially L5 managers conducted RO actions delegated, or empowered to 
them. The role of middle-level managers within the locus of innovation has ben discussed in 
the traditional CV literature with the topic of CV units (see Section 2.5.2). From the RO 
perspecive, CV units are composed of venture managers’ managers (middle-level managers) 
who undertake RO actions for combining resources in a new way. Importantly, the research 
found that they deliberately planned and operated a range of CV programs. 
7.4  Strategic objective: the end point of the direction of CV 
The end point of the direction of CV focuses attention on the main aims of CV programs. In this 
thesis, the direction of CV is described as being oriented towards the primary objective of a CV 
program, which is termed strategic objective (see Section 3.4.2). Using the vector analogy, 
again, the strategic objective can be regarded as the end point of a vector toward which the 
direction of CV is oriented. 
From the analysis of the ten CV programs conducted by Company Alpha (see Table 6.3), an 
emerging empirical pattern demonstrates that the primary strategic objective of CV programs 
changed shifted during the innovation process between exploration and exploitation—one of 
the fundamental theories in strategy, innovation, and organizational learning literature (March, 
1991; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). In what follows, this section 
discusses multiple levels of strategies by considering the breadth of resource orchestration 
(see Section 3.4.1), and analyzes the pattern found from the changes in the strategic objective 
of CV programs. 
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7.4.1 Multiple levels of strategies and the ‘breadth of resource orchestration’ 
Not only structure and actors, firms’ strategies also are not a unitary plan. Instead, a firm’s 
strategy is in its composition multiple layers of strategies, each of which has its own plans and 
goals. These multi-level characteristics of firms’ strategy were already emphasized in early 
studies in the field of strategic management research (e.g. Hofer and Schendel, 1978, Schendel 
and Hofer, 1979; Hambrick, 1980). Here, understanding of interaction among different levels 
of strategies by looking at “interlevel strategic linkages” (Hambrick, 1980: 568) is important. 
With this more realistic viewpoint of strategy, this thesis now examines the primary strategic 
objective of CV programs. When examining strategies at the level of the program, it is crucial 
to take account of the multiple levels of a firm’s strategy. By considering strategic layers, we 
can disentangle different levels of strategies when a range of CV programs are conducted, or 
implemented by actors within the locus of innovation. 
Strategy layers of Corporate Venturing 
In the strategic management literature, multiple levels of strategy have been conventionally 
grouped into three levels: corporate-, business-, and functional-level strategies. This is termed 
as ‘strategic layers’ (e.g. Hofer and Schendel, 1978, Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Hambrick, 1980). 
However, in analyzing multiple levels of strategy in the context of corporate venturing, an 
alternative classification of strategic layers could be more useful. 
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, Narayanan et al. (2009) identified that CV activities have been 
examined at three levels of analysis: the parent firm-; the CV unit-; and the CV team-level. 
Building on this classification, this thesis proposes that multiple levels of CV strategy can be 
more clearly articulated using ‘strategic layers of CV’, which are divided into (1) the parent 
firm-, (2) the program-, and (3) the venture team-level strategies. Table 7.3 highlights the 
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comparison between conventional strategic layers and the strategic layers of CV. 
Table 7.3: Strategic layers (conventional) vs. Strategic layers of CV 
Strategic layers (conventional) Strategic layers of CV Relevant structures 
 Corporate-level strategy 
- Can be divided into corporate-level 
business strategy and technology strategy 
- “… decisions about what businesses to 
compete in” (Boeker, 1997: 213) 
- “... deals with the ways in which a 
corporation manages a set of businesses 
together” (Bowman and Helfat, 2001: 1) 
 Parent firm-level strategy 
- In the context of corporate 
venturing, all three levels of 
strategies (corporate-, business-, 
and functional-level strategies) 
in the conventional strategic 
layers pertain to the parent firm-
level strategy Parent company 
(e.g. Company Alpha) 
 Business-level strategy 
- “… deals with the ways in which ... an 
individual business unit of a larger firm 
competes within a particular industry or 
market” (Bowman and Helfat, 2001: 1) 
 Functional-level strategy 
 Program-level strategy 
- Considering CV programs as a 
strategic vehicle for special 
functions, program-level 
strategy is part of functional-
level strategy in the 
conventional classification of 
strategic layers 
CV unit 
(e.g. The Emerging 
Business Team;  
see Section 6.3.3) 
-   Venture team-level strategy CV team 
(see Section 5.3.2) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
The juxtaposition of the two strategic layers in Table 7.3 shows strategic settings which may 
be unique in the context of CV. First, the parent firm’s corporate-level and business-level 
strategies in the traditional strategy sense are, from the viewpoint of CV, parent firm-level 
strategy. A CV team may later be spun off from the parent firm, which will have its own 
corporate- and business-level strategies. Second, the program-level strategy of CV is a subset 
of the parent firm’s functional-level strategy. CV programs can be adopted by the firm as a 
 [191] 
 
strategic vehicle for special functions such as new business development. The decision ‘to 
initiate a new CV program’ could be a corporate-level strategy; however, how to conduct a 
newly initiated CV program is a functional-level strategic issue of the parent firm. 
Next, these strategic layers show possible ways through which different levels of strategies can 
interact with each other. In conventional strategic layers (the first column in Table 7.3), 
business-level strategies of the firm may or may not interact with corporate-level strategies. 
Similarly, in strategic layers of CV (the second column in Table 7.3), program-level strategies 
can interact with parent firm-level strategies and also with venture team-level strategies. Here, 
interlevel strategic linkages between parent firm-level and program-level strategies is an 
important link which needs to be closely examined (Covin and Miles, 2007: 184). Specifically, 
program-level strategies can be influenced by parent firm-level strategies when deciding CV 
programs’ strategic objective; evaluating new business ideas gathered by programs; and 
selecting ideas which then will be nurtured as new CV teams. 
Breadth of resource orchestration 
Drawing on resource orchestration (RO) theory, multiple levels of strategies across the firm can 
be analyzed as an empirical case of the breadth of RO (Sirmon et al., 2011). As reviewed in 
Section 3.4, RO explicitly focuses on the implementation of strategy rather than strategy 
formulation (Sirmon et al., 2011: 1409). Even though firms have the strategies perfectly 
formulated already, its result and performance will depend on how those strategies are 
implemented. Therefore, rather than just looking at the characteristics resources firms have, 
RO focuses on the process through which the firm’s resources are combined. 
The breadth of RO relates to multiple levels of strategies where RO logics can be effectively 
applied (Sirmon et al., 2011). Here, the word ‘breadth’ represents the extent within the 
strategic layers which is affected by RO actions. For example, depending on the scope of the 
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breadth of RO, firms’ product diversification strategy can be analyzed either at the corporate-
level strategy or at the business-level strategy. As discussed in Section 2.5.1, this thesis 
examines the strategy at the level of the CV program. From the RO perspective, as noted in 
Section 3.4.2, middle-level managers design and operate a range of CV programs by conducting 
resource-related actions—structuring, bundling, and leveraging. However, for an effective 
implementation of CV strategies, the breadth of RO suggests that their resource orchestration 
actions need to be guided by an overarching strategy (i.e. program-level strategy), which may 
not be those of corporate- or business-level strategies. 
When examining the program-level strategy of CV activities, strategic layers of CV (see Table 
7.3) helps discern multiple levels of strategies in CV settings and understand interaction across 
different levels of strategies. The following subsections analyze the primary strategic objective 
of CV programs (Section 7.4.2) and its changes (Section 7.4.3). 
7.4.2 Strategic objectives of CV (program-level strategy): Exploration vs. Exploitation 
During the period from 1990 to 2015, Company Alpha performed a range of distinctive CV 
activities in the first and the second cycles of CV (see Table 6.3). Notably, these CV activities 
were conducted in special forms called programs, which is the unit of analysis in the thesis. In 
corporate contexts, programs are the very resource-related managerial activities into which 
financial resources (i.e. budgets), human resources, and a variety of other resources are 
legitimately accumulated. 
From the analysis of multiple levels of strategies of Company Alpha’s CV programs (i.e. by 
considering the breadth of resource orchestration), it is found that each CV program has a 
primary objective (or goal, aim) which the CV program pursues and is designed to achieve. As 
will be discussed, the data show that such objectives were already planned by middle-level 
managers before the launch of every CV program. Seen through the strategic layers of CV (see 
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Table 7.3), these objectives pertain to program-level strategies which this thesis refers to as 
the strategic objective of CV programs. 
Exploration vs. Exploitation 
The analysis of Company Alpha’s 26 years of data demonstrates that there are two primary 
strategic objective of CV programs: exploration and exploitation. The theory of exploration and 
exploitation (March, 1991; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004) has been 
applied to the CV research (e.g. Schildt et al., 2005; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008); however, the 
review of the literature suggests that the theory still needs to be further linked to the empirical 
case, especially focusing on the strategy at the level of the CV program. 
At Company Alpha, every CV program was conducted with its main strategic objective. To 
launch a new CV program, its rational—such as links between parent firm- and program-level 
strategies and the feasibility of implementation plans—had to be reviewed by top-level 
management and obtained approval depending on the financial scale and strategic importance 
of a CV program. Only approved plans were able to secure resources to initiate the planned CV 
program. I-SM-A, who was the program manager of the National Idea-α, explained how he felt 
when the program’s plan was accepted and financial resources were allocated: 
“I woke up to find the ‘wallet’ fully loaded with cash [i.e. financial resources to 
implement the program]; until then, however, it [the program] had been only a ‘plan’” 
(I-SM-A, personal interview, 2016). 
Once the plan was accepted, CV programs were conducted aiming to achieve each program’s 
main strategic objective, as if the direction of the CV was oriented towards the objective as an 
end point of the directional vector. Due to the richness of primary data (e.g. business archives 
and interviews) which remain and were accessible when the research was conducted, six types 
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of CV programs in the second CV cycle (see Figure 7.6) are closely analyzed in the following.173 
 
Figure 7.6 Six types of CV programs in the second CV cycle at Company Alpha 
Source: Developed by the author. 
CV programs for exploration 
One of the primary strategic objectives of CV programs is exploration, which means to identify 
new business opportunities by searching for new ideas (business, service, etc.) from a variety 
of sources internal and external to the firm. At Company Alpha, several CV programs were 
adopted as a means to search for new business opportunities, and the programs’ outcomes 
clearly show the exploratory nature of these programs’ objectives. 
From 2010 to 2014, as displayed in Figure 7.7, the number of new business and service ideas 
gathered through the four CV programs—Mobile App Idea, Corporate Idea-α (from 2011 to 
2014), National Idea-α, and Global Idea-α—was dramatically increased. In aggregated number 
of ideas, ideas’ number increased from 364 in 2010 to 10,206 in 2014, which was a twenty-
eight-fold increase in four years. It started with the Mobile App Idea in 2010, which was an 
individual-level ideation program that gathered 364 ideas internally (see Section 6.3.1). From 
2011, a series of individual-level internal ICs, the Corporate Idea-α was annually held until 2014, 
                                                            
173 Figure 7.6 is part of Figure 5.2, the 26-year timeline of Company Alpha associated with CV programs. 
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adding to the ideas pool over one thousand new ideas every year (see Section 6.3.2)—except 
the final year when only 254 ideas were gathered. In particular, the 2011 Corporate Idea-α was 
the first CV program in the second CV cycle by which 1,357 new business ideas were gathered 
within a month. Starting from 2012, the source of ideas was expanded first to the national level 
(the National Idea-α) and then on to the global level (the Global Idea-α), which gathered 3,016 
and 2,749 new business ideas respectively (see Section 6.3.3). 
 
Figure 7.7 CV programs for exploration and increasing number of new business and service 
ideas (2010–2014) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
CV programs for exploitation 
Next, the other major strategic objective of CV programs is exploitation, which means to utilize 
identified business opportunities (e.g. new business ideas) by securing access to vital resources 
(technologies, business networks, etc.). At Company Alpha, business opportunities were 
identified mostly in the form of ideas; however, due to the novelty of gathered ideas, either 
new-to-the-firm or even new-to-the-world, technologies that could enable the ideas were 
needed to be internally developed (i.e. make); jointly developed (i.e. collaboration); or secured 
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in other ways (i.e. buying licenses). At Company Alpha, therefore, new types of programs 
emerged as a means to seize business opportunities already identified. 
After 2011, as the number of new business and service ideas was rapidly growing by 
conducting the four programs with the strategic objective of exploration, new types of 
programs with completely different strategic objective were launched. The Acceleration-α was 
started in 2012, and it was followed by the Global CVC-α in 2014 (see Figure 7.8). 
 
Figure 7.8 The emergence of new types of CV programs for exploitation (2011–2015) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
In 2011, only two ideas out of 1,721 new business and service ideas being gathered were 
selected to form CV teams. It marked the official start of CV activities, which was the start of 
the second CV cycle. However, only one team (Venture-β) out of the two CV teams survived as 
of the end of 2011 (see Section 6.3.2). 174  One of the major challenges was the lack of 
managerial resources in the CV unit that can support new venture managers and their CV 
                                                            
174 Venture-β was explained in Section 6.3.2. The other CV team ceased its activity at the end of 2011 
due to a conflict of its business model between an existing business model of the Venture Manager’s 
original team (TS-SM-A, personal interview, 2014). 
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teams. This called for more systematic approaches to help implement new business and 
service ideas already identified, in which to secure vital resources (human resources and 
technologies) was the key (I-SM-A, personal interview, 2016). 
In this regard, the Acceleration-α program was designed and launched to support CV teams—
established either from internal ICs (e.g. Corporate Idea-α) or external ICs (e.g. National Idea-
α, Global Idea-α)—so that they can refine proposed ideas more clearly and develop 
technologies which can implement ideas that remained at conceptual levels. This shows that 
the main strategic objective of the acceleration program was to utilize already identified 
business opportunities (e.g. new business ideas) by securing human resources and 
technologies (see Section 6.3.3). Starting from 2014, the Global CVC-α program was started by 
the Corporate R&D Center with a similar strategic objective. As a result of the Global CVC-α, 
the firm invested in external ventures to acquire technologies necessary for its business 
divisions for their new product (IT solutions) development (see Section 6.3.4). 
7.4.3 Changing strategic objective (the end point of direction) 
Changes in the strategic objective of CV programs 
Changes in the strategic objective of CV programs is identified through the analysis of ten CV 
programs (see Table 6.3) by applying the strategic layers of CV framework (see Table 7.3). As 
discussed in Section 7.4.2, the pattern emerges from the data in the second CV cycle (2011–
2015) indicate that the primary strategic objective of CV programs changed between 
exploration and exploitation. 
In Figure 7.6, early CV programs in the second CV cycle (e.g. Mobile App Idea, Corporate Idea-
α (from 2011 to 2014), National Idea-α, and Global Idea-α) were designed and operated to 
search for novel and innovative ideas, which can be developed as the firm’s new business items 
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for its business growth in the future. The analysis suggests that the primary objective of those 
CV programs was to explore new business opportunities. However, the firm later launched new 
types of CV programs (e.g. Acceleration-α, Global CVC-α) to utilize (i.e. to exploit) identified 
business opportunities, focusing on to secure vital resources (e.g. emerging technologies, 
business networks). A massive number of ideas were gathered through CV programs, and to 
seize the identified opportunities became critical. A similar pattern occurred in the first CV 
cycle (1997–2002). As illustrated in Figure 7.2, the primary strategic objective of CV programs 
in the first CV cycle changed from exploration before 2000 to exploitation in the early 2010. 
This repeating pattern occurring within the first and the second CV cycle of the firm 
demonstrates changes in the strategic objective of CV programs from exploration (i.e. to 
identify new business opportunities) to exploitation (i.e. to utilize identified business 
opportunities). 
As noted in Section 3.4.2, the distinction of exploration and exploitation applied in this thesis 
may not be entirely consistent with March’s (1991) two modes of learning activity: “the 
exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties” (March, 1991: 71; 
emphasis added). However, as Almahendra and Ambos (2015) point out, the application of the 
tension between the exploration and exploitation “have deviated substantially from the scope 
of organizational learning as originally proposed by March (1991) … Scholars have developed 
set of definitions, new conceptualisations, and varied applications in rejuvenating the concept” 
(Almahendra and Ambos, 2015: 1). 
From the analysis of the repeat of CV activities at Company Alpha, it is found that there is a 
changing pattern in CV activities’ strategy at the program level: The primary strategic objective 
of CV programs changed between to identify new business opportunities (i.e. exploration) and 
to utilize identified opportunities (i.e. exploitation). This program-level strategy constitutes the 
end point of the direction of CV, and its change can be captured by a distinction between 
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exploration and exploitation. Specifically, it relates to the transition between exploration and 
exploitation in the innovation process at the level of the program (a program can include a 
diverse portfolio of projects, or CV teams). 
Theoretical interpretation from the resource orchestration perspective 
The breadth (multiple levels of strategies) of RO provides a way in which the changing strategic 
objective of CV programs can be theoretically positioned in the CV literature.175 From the RO 
perspective, RO actions are often initiated by the top management by their resource 
structuring, which may include changes in the locus of innovation (see Section 7.3.3). After the 
top management’s resource structuring action, following resource-related processes are, in 
general, delegated to middle-level managers. Company Alpha’s case shows that middle-level 
managers within the CV unit conducted delegated RO actions—structuring, bundling, and 
leveraging—mainly by designing and operating a range of CV programs. 
The breadth of RO highlights multiple levels of strategies across the firm where RO logics can 
be effectively applied (see Section 3.4.2). For an effective implementation of CV strategies, the 
breadth of RO suggests that middle-level managers’ RO actions themselves need to be guided 
by an overarching strategy (i.e. program-level strategy), and it may not be the same as 
corporate- or business-level strategies. The two primary strategic objectives of CV programs 
found from Company Alpha’s case inform two potential overarching strategies for RO actions. 
This finding suggests that RO actions (structuring, bundling, and leveraging) for exploration and 
those actions for exploitation can be adopted for combining resources to achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage (for the firm’s survival and growth). These program-level strategies 
pertain to the answer to the question: “What should be the main objective for the resource 
                                                            
175 Resource orchestration theory and its link to changing locus of innovation were discussed in Section 
7.3.3. 
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combination activities?”. 
7.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has empirically examined the direction of CV, and a set of findings opens a ‘door’ 
through which we can access an alternative way of thinking about directional concepts and 
arguments in strategy and innovation literature.176 This thesis therefore defines the direction 
of CV as the combination of who in the organization innovates (i.e. locus of innovation) and 
why (i.e. the primary goal, aim, or strategic objective of a CV program). 
The direction of CV is a conceptual framework which provides a typology of ‘direction’ when 
the firm performs a series of CV programs (see Figure 7.2). Findings from this chapter suggest 
that the typology has greater explanatory power to understand organizational and strategic 
change. It informs people, even outside the firm (i.e. external observers), of changing internal 
consistencies of strategy, structure, and managerial actors residing within the structure, which 
are hardly observable unless from inside firms (e.g. untold motives behind CV programs, etc.). 
The conceptual framework helps us understand how the firm combines resources in new ways 
while changing its direction of CV. In the following chapter, factors influencing the change of 
direction will be discussed. In addition, the next chapter discusses an evolutionary pathway of 
CV (i.e. the evolution of CV) along which the firm conduct a series of CV programs over time.  
                                                            
176 The concept of ‘doors’ as an analogy for a pathway to an alternative way of thinking or new meaning 
is inspired by Vine’s (thesis forthcoming) work, in which she used “doors” as an analogous term to 
describe a failure to instantiate new shared meaning in a complex business setting. 
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CHAPTER 8  
FACTORS INFLUENCING CHANGES IN THE ‘DIRECTION OF CV’ 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE VENTURING 
8.1  Introduction 
Having conceptualized the direction of CV and identified its changing patterns in the two 
distinctive periods of time (i.e. two cycles of CV) at Company Alpha, this chapter now turns to 
the second research question: How can different understandings of direction help managers 
and academics understand and explain Company Alpha’s corporate venturing activities and 
how they repeat over time? (see Section 1.3.3) 
From Chapter 5 to 7, Company Alpha’s twenty-six years history of CV (from 1990 to 2015) with 
its ten CV programs was analyzed, and a pattern of change in the direction of CV was found. 
Given that direction is associated with change rather than a static and fixed state, exploring 
factors that influence change of direction helps explain the dynamics of the direction of CV. 
In this chapter, Section 8.2 discusses three main factors that influenced changes in the 
direction of CV. Building on the newly developed conceptual framework (the direction of CV), 
Section 8.3 explores how changes in the re-conceptualized direction can explain the process 
of the repeat of CV activities at Company Alpha, which is repeated evolutionary CV cycles 
aimed at new resource combination. 
8.2  Factors influencing the change of the ‘direction of CV’ 
The three factors that influence changes in the direction of CV are set out here. The first is how 
the chief executive sees the role of R&D and innovation, and this is related to a top-level 
managerial actor (CEO, the L1 manager) who is a conductor of resource orchestration. The 
second is the emergence of a technology, or technologies, that have the potential to create 
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new business and technological opportunities (strategic technologies). At Company Alpha, this 
factor was particularly associated with another top-level managerial actor (CTO, a L2 manager) 
who recognized the value of the strategic technologies. The third is the strategic freedom of 
middle-level managerial actors (L5 managers) who designed plans for CV programs in detail 
and operated the programs while interacting with top-level managers. This section looks into 
these three factors and discusses how those factors influenced the changes in the direction of 
CV. 
8.2.1 CEO’s perception on the role of R&D and innovation 
The first factor that influences the changes in the direction of CV is a CEO’s perception on the 
role of R&D and innovation. It captures how a chief executive sees the role of R&D and how he 
or she defines innovation and the role of R&D in the firm’s innovation process. This viewpoint 
coming from the CEO is crucial as they are the final decision maker in the top management 
team. As Gompers and Lerner (1998: 9) pointed out, “In many cases, new senior management 
teams terminated programs, seeing them as expendable “pet projects” of their predecessors.” 
And, Company Alpha’s case is illustrative of these authors’ observation. 
Drawing on resource orchestration (RO) theory (e.g. Sirmon et al., 2011; Chadwick et al., 2015) 
Chapter 7 discussed how multiple organizational levels and managerial actors interacted with 
each other (see Section 7.3.1). In this analysis, the multi-layer framework (MLF) (see Figure 7.3) 
was used to articulate the depth of RO. In the MLF, the CEO is the L1 manager who leads the 
top-level management and plays a crucial role by conducting resource orchestration mainly 
through resource structuring actions. 
At Company Alpha, and in the broader Korean business context, CEOs’ main resource 
structuring actions are performed by the means of annual reshuffling (see Section 7.3.3). As a 
result of annual reshuffling, for example, structural and human resource changes occur within 
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the firm. During this change, the CEO’s views on innovation and on the role of R&D are crucial. 
This perception varied by CEOs (e.g. CEO#5, CEO#6, CEO#7) and sometimes changed during a 
single CEO’s tenure, as was found in the case of CEO#5. Figure 8.1 illustrates the influence of 
CEOs, which will be discussed as follows. 
 
Figure 8.1 CEOs’ (L1 manager) influence on CV programs 
Source: Developed by the author. 
Perception changing in a single CEO: CEO#5 (L1 manager) 
CEO#5 was appointed at the end of 2002 (KE#13) when the firm faced unprecedented financial 
risks. R&D was mainly seen as a way to improve the status quo of the business, and he focused 
on process and incremental innovation. This may be the reason why CEO#5 responded to the 
new corporate-level technology strategy briefing at the TSC#2 (April 2003) by saying that the 
main role of R&D and innovation is to be a driver of “cost reduction and increasing profits” (see 
Section 6.2.1).177 The CEO’s approach to innovation and the overarching business strategy was 
                                                            
177 Company Alpha (2003) ‘TSC#2 Meeting Minutes’ 
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dramatically changed in 2006, which reflects a change in the direction of strategy from late 
2005 (see Table 7.1). CEO#5 emphasized innovation as the source of creative destruction and 
said the role of R&D is to achieve what he called “technology leadership” (see Section 6.2.2).178 
CEO#5’s changing perception influenced the change of locus of innovation. In January 2006, 
CEO#5 announced the annual reshuffling for 2006 (R#2006) and appointed CTO#12 as a new 
chief of technology (KE#14) in an attempt to empower the technology side of the firm.179 These 
changes set the conditions under which the Corporate R&D Center became the technology-
driven locus of innovation in the initiation period of the second CV cycle, which will be 
discussed in Section 8.3.1. CEO#5’s remarks in the TSC#38 (April 2006) demonstrate his 
changed perception and the thoughts behind the R#2006: 
We can’t entirely focus on short-term R&D items; instead, from a mid- to long-term 
viewpoint, we need to do some research and to prepare for what we are going to do, 
say, after five years. I think we need to start a financial investment on technologies that 
may arrive [at the market] in five years. So far, our R&D department has been, well, an 
outsider in our company as it was not a profit-making unit. From 2006, however, as our 
company becomes much more stable and strong, the role and responsibilities of the 
R&D should be reconsidered.180 
Perception associated with business experiences: CEO#6 (L1 manager) 
The succeeding chief executive, CEO#6, was appointed at the end of 2010 (KE#17), and he had 
a different viewpoint on the role of R&D and innovation (see Section 6.3.3). Although CEO#6 
believed that innovation is the driver of business growth, he firmly believed that the source of 
innovation is the business place where the employees are interacting with customers. This 
reflects CEO#6’s marketing background, which can be observed at the TSC#38 in 2006 where 
                                                            
178 Company Alpha (2005) ‘TSC#28 Meeting Minutes’ 
179 These series of events were discussed from a theoretical viewpoint in Section 7.3.3. 
180 Company Alpha (2006) ‘TSC#38 Meeting Minutes’ 
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he stated: “As I said so many times, the source of business ideas is our employees doing 
business in the market”. 181  In the New TSC he organized after becoming CEO, CEO#6 
emphasized his viewpoint again: 
We must gather ideas from our business fields, from customers in the market, which 
[the ideas] are about what kind of business opportunities may arise in the next two 
years.182 
In addition, CEO#6 asserted the importance of the innovation process helping to scale up the 
size of business (e.g. revenues, number of customers): 
The corporate headquarters then needs to develop capabilities that can scale up the 
size of these businesses both locally and globally.183 
This viewpoint of CEO#6 influenced the change of the locus of innovation in 2011, and hence 
the change in the direction of CV. In late 2011, CEO#6 announced the R#2012 and conducted 
a new resource structuring action, which is an annual reshuffling that accumulated resources 
for CV activities on the market side of the firm.184 This changed the locus of innovation to 
market-driven and heralded the reproduction period of the second CV cycle (see Section 8.3.2). 
Perception associated with industry experiences: CEO#7 (L1 manager) 
CEO#7 joined Company Alpha at the end of 2013 (KE#26). He had worked in hi-tech 
manufacturing firms for his entire career. As a new chief executive, CEO#7 applied what he 
called “a formula for the successful business” which he learned from his previous experiences 
in the manufacturing industry (BS-SM, personal interview, 2014). However, other C-level 
executives were concerned that managerial approaches that had worked in manufacturing 
                                                            
181 Ibid. 
182 Company Alpha (2012) ‘New TSC#2 Meeting Minutes’ 
183 Ibid. 
184 These series of events were discussed from a theoretical viewpoint in Section 7.3.3. 
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industries might not be successfully applied in the IT service industry, as different industries 
may well have a different underlying business logic (Ex-business executive, personal interview, 
2014). 
CEO#7’s first diagnosis of the firm he had just joined was that it had “no viable technologies 
and products in the firm” (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2014). As already mentioned, the lack 
of IT solutions in the form of standardized commercial products was the firm’s deep-rooted 
problem (see Section 6.3.2 and 6.3.4). Hence, CEO#7 enforced the direction of strategic change 
(Type II direction) to transform the firm into an ‘IT solution company’ (see Section 7.2.1). As 
BS-SM said, CEO#7 stressed that the firm needs to become a product-based IT solution 
company: 
… he emphasized the idea that we should change our main business from SI [System 
Integration] to new businesses centered on our IT solutions [i.e. products]. Rather than 
just doing labor-intensive and low value-added businesses, he asserted that we need to 
do ICT service business based on our IT solutions. (BS-SM, personal interview, 2016; 
emphasis added) 
Consequently, the technology and technological capability of the firm was increasingly 
emphasized and, as I-SM-B revealed in interview, this was followed by an update of the 
corporate-level technology strategy, which was synthesized in the firm’s technology roadmap. 
I-SM-B added, “From 2014, the new CEO mandated that the technology roadmap should be 
the baseline under every decision” (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2014). 
This viewpoint of CEO#7 affected the change of the locus of innovation. In 2014 alone, the size 
of the Corporate R&D Center had increased fivefold due to CEO#7’s resource structuring that 
accumulated resources on the technology side. As we shall see in Section 8.3.4, this change of 
the locus of innovation back to the technology-driven triggered the adaptation period in the 
second CV cycle.  
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8.2.2 The identification of strategic technologies 
The second factor that influences the changes in the direction of CV is the identification of 
strategic technologies, where the values of the technologies are identified by the firm’s 
internal actor, or actors. Strategic technologies are technologies that have substantial 
potential to generate new technological and business opportunities for the firm.185 By opening 
a new ‘window of opportunities’, strategic technologies can have a significant impact on the 
firm that identified the potential value of the technologies. 
Scholars have discussed how new technologies can be tightly intertwined with business 
strategy. Perhaps one of the most well-known concepts is Christensen’s concept of “disruptive 
technologies” (e.g. Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen, 1997), which highlights the 
decisive role of relatively less developed technologies in disrupting the established standards 
and assumptions of existing businesses. 
Whether a technology is strategic to a firm or not, is not just a matter of, for example, 
‘maturity’—i.e. whether it is existing or “emerging technologies” (e.g. Rotolo et al., 2015). It is 
rather an identification, or recognition of the value of technologies by actors within the firm, 
that they may well have a significant impact on the firm. In other words, strategic technologies 
do not have to be disruptive; but, some disruptive technologies can be strategic technologies 
to the firm, if their strategic importance is identified by internal actors. 
Chapter 5 and 6 found that Company Alpha’s first and second CV cycles were begun after the 
identification of strategic technologies: Internet technology in the first cycle, and smartphone 
and cloud computing in the second. This heralded the beginning of a new CV cycle. Looking at 
                                                            
185 Strategic technology is defined by Gartner, an IT consultancy, as the technology “with the potential 
for significant impact on the enterprise in the next three years [which have an impact with] a high 
potential for disruption to IT or the business, the need for a major dollar investment, or the risk of being 
late to adopt” (Gartner, 2011). 
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the changing direction of CV, each CV cycle was initiated by exploratory CV programs from 
within the technology-driven locus of innovation (see Figure E.2 in Appendix E). Once the 
technologies were identified, the firm actively started new innovation activities to explore new 
business opportunities by searching for new ideas (business, service, etc.): the ICV-α1 (1997) 
in the first cycle and the Mobile App Idea (2010) in the second. 
‘Internet technology’ in the first CV cycle 
Is the Internet a technology? Drawing on Lipsey et al.’s (1998) criteria for deciding whether a 
technology is a “general purpose technology (GPT)” (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995), 
Mowery and Simcoe (2002: 1369) suggest that the Internet and the World Wide Web 
collectively forms a GPT. This is defined as “an innovation with the potential to transform the 
dissemination of information in a global economy that relies ever more heavily on knowledge.” 
Today, Internet technology is well established but still highly innovative. However, in the mid-
1990s, it was just at the point of moving from being an emerging technology to begin a process 
where it would be rapidly commercialized and open up new technological and commercial 
opportunities. The Internet has developed into its current state through a series of inventions 
and innovations that go back to the early 1960s. In August 1995, its commercial use was fueled 
by the initial public offering of Netscape, and was widely diffused in the late 1990s by key 
players such as Cisco, Dell, and Yahoo (Ibid.). 
In Korea, for example, a newspaper article in 1997 described the competition among major 
Korean business groups triggered by Internet technology as: 
More and more Korean large business enterprises are either strengthening on-line 
service or announcing that they are to start new on-line businesses. It is because a new 
cyber space called the Internet is emerging as a lucrative business area in the upcoming 
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21st century.186 
At Company Alpha, it is less clear whether the Research Challenge that was started in 1993 in 
the Corporate R&D center (KE#3) was a response to the technology opportunities that the 
Internet technology had brought. However, one of the ideas identified through this program, 
and later developed in the ICV-α1, was related to internet searching technologies. This was the 
technological basis of Venture-α—the most successful CV team for both the firm and the 
nation (see Section 5.3.1). 
On the other hand, it is much clearer that in 1997 the ICV-α1 was started in the Corporate R&D 
center (KE#5) to focus on exploring technology opportunities brought about by the new 
Internet technology. Company Alpha undertook other strategic moves such as establishing 
branches in the US, which the firm explained was “to explore new business opportunities in 
the Internet area in advance”. 187  But inside the firm, they launched the ICV-α1, and the 
business models of all the three selected CV teams were based on Internet technology: 
internet searching, internet-based retailing (e-commerce), and website developing 
technologies (see Section 5.3.2). 
(1) ‘Smartphone’ and (2) ‘cloud computing’ technologies in the second CV cycle 
In the second CV cycle, the formation of the direction of CV and the subsequent change in the 
direction were preceded by the emergence of strategic technologies that were different from 
the one that drove the first CV cycle: smartphone and cloud computing. These technologies 
gained their strategic importance within the firm especially between late 2006 and 2009. 
The first strategic technology smartphone is a type of mobile handsets with installed Operating 
                                                            
186 Maeil Business Newspaper (1997) ‘Korean major large firms competing against the Internet’, Maeil 
Business Newspaper, 8 April, (Naver News Library) 
187 Maeil Business Newspaper (1997) ‘Company Alpha establishes branches in the US’ 
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Systems (OSs) and connections to the Internet via mobile communication technologies, 
enabling them to act as internet connected ‘mobile computers’. In this thesis, smartphone 
technology refers to the range of multi-component and multi-technology integrated and 
embedded in the ‘smart’ handset. 
The word ‘smartphone’ was used as early as 1997 by Ericsson to highlight the distinctive 
product feature of GS88. Since the 1990s, smartphone was established among leading handset 
manufacturers such as Nokia, Motorola, and Ericsson with the idea it would “combine 
telephony, computing, and personalization features” into a portable device (Cecere et al., 2015: 
165). However, modern smartphone technology emerged in the mid-2000s through the 
successful commercialization of a series of innovative products (Cecere et al., 2015). 
The emergence of smartphones began with the release of ‘Blackberry’ by Research In Motion 
(RIM) at the end of 2006; it was then followed by Apple’s first release of the ‘iPhone’ in the US 
market in June 2007 (Merchant, 2017). 188  In June 2009, Samsung released its ‘Galaxy’ 
smartphone to compete against prior innovators. Changes of the global market share in the 
mobile handset industry indicate the rise of new entrants and the demise of some incumbent 
leaders during this period (see Figure 8.2). 
                                                            
188 Apple’s iPhone was first released on the Korean market in November 2009. 
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Figure 8.2 Global market share of mobile phone sales by vendors (1997–2015) 
Source: Elaborated based on the data obtained from Statista (http://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
271574/global-market-share-held-by-mobile-phone-manufacturers-since-2009/) and IDC (https:// 
www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS40980416).189 
Mobile handset technologies have co-evolved with mobile communication technologies (see 
Table 8.1). Even before the emergence of smartphones, the features provided by mobile 
phones enhanced “from simple voice-centric to various data-centric services such as text 
messaging, music downloading, mobile Internet browsing and video calling” (Park, 2016: 67). 
In this period, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) increased their influence over device 
manufacturers (e.g. on decisions about product specification) by taking advantage of their 
position as sole mobile network access providers (Whang, 2009). At the same time, some 
handset manufacturers deliberately collaborated with MNOs (i.e. inter-firm collaboration) in 
order to compete against the technology leaders in the mobile handset market (Park, 2016). 
  
                                                            
189 The author acknowledges that this graph was compiled and provided by Kang, a business analyst. 
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Table 8.1: The evolution of mobile communication and mobile handset technologies 
Generation 1G (late 1970s–) 2G (1992–) 3G (2000–) 4G (2010–) 
Technology AMPS, FDMA GSM, TDMA/FDMA, GPRS, EDGE 
UMTS, WCDMA, 
EVDO Rev. A, HSDPA LTE, LTE-A 
Embedded 
services Voice call 
Voice call, 
Text message, 
WAP-enabled or 
operator-specific 
Internet service 
(2.5G) 
Voice/video call, 
Multimedia 
message, 
Camera, mp3 music, 
Full-browsing 
Internet 
Voice/video call, 
Digital Video 
Broadcasting, 
HD TV content, 
Mobile TV 
Handset 
form factor Bar Bar, Flip 
Bar, Flip, Slider, 
Touchscreen 
Touchscreen, 
Phablet 
Phone type Basic phone Basic phone, Feature phone (2.5G) 
Feature phone, 
Smartphone Smartphone 
Source: Modified by the author based on Park (2016: 77), Alsharif and Nordin (2017: 620).190 
The emergence of smartphone technology at a relatively late stage in 3G had potential to 
provide new technology opportunities to IT service companies, which had previously not been 
key players in the mobile handset industry. 191  However, the identification of such 
opportunities was not obvious. 
At least in Korea, Company Alpha discovered new technology opportunities associated with 
smartphone technology earlier than many other firms in the ICT service industry. They, 
especially CTO#12, identified this opportunity in 2007 and launched a special project, the NMS, 
in mid-2008 to search for new-to-the-world mobile service ideas (see Section 6.2.3). 
Importantly, the rationale underlying the recognition of the value of the new technology 
opportunities was not solely based on smartphones; it was a new combination of smartphone 
and cloud computing technologies. A conceptual diagram taken from a 2008 technical report 
                                                            
190 The evolution of mobile communication technologies is well summarized in Park’s (2016) doctoral 
thesis at SPRU in Chapter 4. 
191 According to Park (2016), key actors before the emergence of smartphone technology are (1) handset 
manufacturers, baseband chip suppliers, and MNOs. 
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shows how people on the technology side of the firm perceived the combination of these 
strategic technologies (see Figure 8.3). 
 
Figure 8.3 A conceptual diagram of cloud computing 
Source: Adapted from ‘Cloud computing technology briefing’, by Company Alpha (2008) 
The second strategic technology cloud computing was defined by researchers in the RAD Lab 
at UC Berkeley in 2009 as: “both the applications delivered as services over the Internet and 
the hardware and systems software in the datacenters that provide those services” (Armbrust 
et al., 2009: 1). 192  In 2008, the key players leading the application of cloud computing 
technology were Amazon Web Service (AWS) which provided cloud-based computing and 
storage services (e.g. Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) and Simple Storage Service (S3)) 
and Apple through its personal data synchronizing cloud service (e.g. MobileMe). 
At Company Alpha, CTO#12 recognized that smartphone and cloud computing technologies 
would collectively bring them new opportunities because mobile handsets that had been 
                                                            
192 In their technical report, Armbrust et al. (2009: 1) clarified terms associated with cloud computing: 
“The services themselves [are] Software as a Service (SaaS). The datacenter hardware and software is … 
a Cloud. When a Cloud is made available in a pay-as-you-go manner to the general public, [it is] a Public 
Cloud; the service being sold is Utility Computing. … [And,] the term Private Cloud [is] internal 
datacenters of a business or other organization, not made available to the general public.” 
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confined within relatively limited computing resources were being transformed into more 
sophisticated hardware. As discussed in Section 6.2.3, smartphones combined with cloud 
computing infrastructure (e.g. computing machines and data storage via high-speed high-
bandwidth mobile communication technologies) were mobile computers (CTO#12, personal 
interview, 2014). In 2008, the head of the Technology Strategy Team described this specific 
combination as “Mobile as a front-end; cloud as a back-end”.193, 194 However, Company Alpha’s 
people outside the Corporate R&D Center did not yet understand its full potential 
opportunities (TS-SM-A, personal interview, 2014). 
Interactions on the value of strategic technologies led by CTO#12 (L2 manager) 
After the annual reshuffling for 2006 (R#2006), which was CEO#5’s resource structuring action, 
CTO#12, the newly assigned chief of technology, identified the value of strategic 
technologies—smartphones and cloud computing—to the firm as early as 2007 (see 6.2.3). 
CEO#12 then endeavored to gather scarce resources across the firm (e.g. financial and human 
resources). To do so, convincing CEO#5 was the top priority, and gaining support from the top 
management team and other heads of divisions was also crucial. Years later, CTO#12 in an 
interview with the researcher explained his motive behind such an endeavor: 
My key question was about the future of our company. Our identity was basically a 
‘System Integration (SI)’ business company, which actually didn’t really have a lucrative 
future. What should we have done, then? An alternative route I thought was the service 
business. SI might be a service business; however, what it does is providing manpower, 
a one-dimensional labor-intensive service. We needed to change to provide IT service 
through software, say, like mobile services through smartphones. (CTO#12, personal 
interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
                                                            
193 Head of the Technology Strategy Team (2008) ‘Email to researchers’ 
194 The position in the organization of the head of the Technology Strategy Team can be identified in the 
organizational chart OC#2006 (see Figure G.2 in Appendix G). 
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Having successfully gathered the resources, entrepreneurial efforts by CTO#12 transformed 
the technology side of the firm into the technology-driven locus of innovation. Figure 8.4 
illustrates the influence of the second factor—the identification of strategic technology by 
internal actors—on changing the direction of CV. In this case, CTO#12 launched the NMS 
project in mid-2008 to search for new-to-the-world mobile service ideas (see Section 6.2.3). At 
the end of 2010, the Mobile App Idea program was launched, which was the beginning of the 
second CV cycle. 
 
Figure 8.4 CTO’s (L2 manager) influence on CV programs 
Source: Developed by the author. 
Here, three managerial practices were important, by which CTO#12 increased the awareness 
of strategic technologies and the understanding of its potential value by internal actors 
including CEO#5. The first was the technology strategy development process through which 
hierarchical and linear interaction (L2 to L5 level) occurred within the Corporate R&D Center 
(see Figure 8.5). CTO#12, in 2006, renewed the corporate-level technology strategy 
development process (see Section 6.2.3). Under the process, the Corporate R&D Center 
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conducted technology trend research, producing an annual technology trend report. It was 
then followed by technology roadmapping—the development of the firm’s three-year IT 
roadmap. 
 
Figure 8.5 Interactions within the Corporate R&D Center (from L2 to L5 unit) for the 
corporate-level technology strategy development 
Source: Developed by the author. 
Through hierarchical and linear interaction from the L2 to the L5 unit (see Figure 8.5), the 
Corporate R&D Center developed the technology strategy. The annual technology trend report 
published in the autumn of 2007 highlighted smartphone and cloud computing as the firm’s 
strategic technologies for 2008. For people outside the firm, Company Alpha’s technology 
trend reports announced to the public was widely used as a report on technology foresight.195 
Internally, however, the results of technology trend research were fed into the technology 
roadmapping process. Members of the IT Roadmap Part (L5 unit) then discerned a wide variety 
of technologies that are strategic to the firm, and developed a three to five years’ technology 
strategy (i.e. technology roadmap) to secure those technologies. CTO#12 interacted with the 
                                                            
195  Externally, Company Alpha utilized the ‘technology trend’ report in order to promote their 
technology leadership in the Korean ICT industry. In 2010, for example, about 50 journalists and 
technology analysts from Korean media companies attended the press conference organized by 
Company Alpha to report the firm’s technology trend forecast (TS-SM-A, personal interview, 2014). 
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IT Roadmap Part through the report lines shown in Figure 8.5. CTO#12 explained this process: 
Through our technology trend research, we tried to identify technologies that were 
expected to have a significant impact on our business in the near future, say, three to 
five years. We then developed plans to secure those technologies and developed 
technology roadmaps, which was followed by [internal] R&D projects. (CTO#12, 
personal interview, 2014)196 
The second was the corporate-level technology strategy meeting—Technology Strategy 
Committee (TSC)—through which ‘strategic technologies’ and the ‘technology strategy’ 
developed around them were shared. The TSC helped CTO#12 interact closely with CEO#5. It 
also activated lateral interactions with L2 managers across the firm (see Figure 8.6). 
 
Figure 8.6 Interactions between CTO and CEO and between CTO and L2 managers in 
corporate-level strategy meetings 
Source: Developed by the author. 
Chapter 6 discussed that a series of TSC—first from 2003 to 2008 (chaired by CEO#5) and the 
New TSC from 2012 (chaired by CEO#6)—improved key individuals’ understanding of strategic 
technologies and the firm’s technology strategies (see Section 6.2.2 and 6.3.3). Although the 
TSC was originally initiated by CEO#5 for his own needs, the meeting turned out to be a place 
                                                            
196 This interview shows one of the fundamental issues in technology strategy, because, as Ford (1988) 
highlighted, technology strategy “consists of policies, plans and procedures for acquiring knowledge and 
ability, managing that knowledge and ability within the company and exploiting them for profit” (Ford, 
1988: 85; emphasis in the original). 
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where key individuals at different levels met together and updated their knowledge of 
technologies which had strategic importance to the firm. 
For example, the result of technology trend research in 2007 was shared in the TSC#45 
(December 2007). In addition, technological knowledge and the business potential of 
smartphone and cloud computing (the firm’s strategic technologies for 2008) were shared in 
the TSC—the TSC#61 (May 2008) discussed cloud computing technology, and the TSC#65 
(October 2008) focused on mobile communication technology.197, 198 
The third was the corporate-level business strategy meeting (Annual Strategy Committee), 
during which CEO#12 attempted to reconcile the firm’s business strategy and technology 
strategy. The meeting environment at the Annual Strategy Committee (ASC) was conducive to 
the CTO’s interaction with the CEO and also lateral interaction with the other L2 managers 
across the firm, as the members of the meeting included CEO#5, the top management team, 
and a number of heads of divisions (about 150 people in total). At the ‘2009 Annual Strategy 
Committee’, CTO#12 presented the impact of the combination of smartphone and cloud 
computing technologies. Emphasizing the business impact of the ‘mobile service’ and ‘cloud 
computing service’, which are based on the strategic technologies, CTO#12 asserted to the 
audience: 
In the next three years, we [people in the Corporate R&D Center] will find business 
opportunities for our future in these strategic areas in a proactive way.199 
This is an episode that illustrates how CTO#12, as a key actor who identified the significance 
of strategic technologies, tried to transform the technology side of the firm, the Corporate 
                                                            
197 The title of the TSC#61 session (May 2008) was “The Understanding of Cloud Computing Technology”. 
198 The title of the TSC#65 session (October 2008) was “The Understanding of Mobile Communication 
Technology”. 
199 Company Alpha (2013) ‘Meeting Minutes: Annual strategy session for 2009’ 
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R&D Center, into the firm’s locus of innovation. As we shall see in Section 8.3.4, CTO#12’s 
efforts and his interaction with CEO#5 turned the Corporate R&D Center into the locus of 
innovation, and the initiation period in the second CV cycle was started. 
8.2.3 Strategic freedom of middle-level managers 
The third factor influencing changes in the direction of CV is strategic freedom of middle-level 
managers, which enabled some managers within the CV unit to organize strategy development 
projects and to be involved in the projects. The impact of the strategy development projects 
was influential in changing the program-level strategies of the firm’s on-going CV programs. 
The unfolding CV activities associated with CV programs reveals that significant changes in the 
portfolio of CV programs were preceded by two strategy development projects. As shown in 
Figure 8.7, the Acceleration-α was launched in the summer of 2012 (KE#14) after finishing the 
Open Venturing Strategy (OVS) project; and the Global CVC-α began operation at the end of 
2014 (KE#29) as a result of the Corporate Venturing Strategy (CVS) project. 
 
Figure 8.7 Middle managers’ (L5 manager) influence on CV programs 
Source: Developed by the author. 
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The two projects—the OVS and the CVS projects—were not mandated either from the top or 
from senior managers in the hierarchy. Instead, the projects were proposed by middle-level 
managers in the official CV unit—the Emerging Business Team. Some middle managers (L5 
managers), after delegating their administrative and operational tasks to other members, 
initiated a strategy development project in which they reviewed the on-going CV program(s), 
and refined strategic objectives of the program(s). Unlike general interaction, which is linear 
through the organizational hierarchy, the interactions among actors in these projects were 
more bottom up (from L5 level), and the project members interacted with each of the different 
units (from L4 to L1 unit) more directly (see Figure 8.8). 
 
Figure 8.8 Interactions in the Corporate Venturing Strategic project 
Source: Developed by the author. 
The changes in CV programs influenced by the third factor will be discussed in a broader 
narrative of the evolution of CV at Company Alpha in Section 8.3. The remaining part in this 
section analyzes the details of each project. 
The Open Venturing Strategy (OVS) project led by middle managers (L5 managers) 
First, the OVS project was a six-month strategy development project initiated by a L5 manager. 
In the winter of 2011, middle-level managers and some professors at Korean business schools 
joined the project, and they reviewed the firm’s CV related programs that had been operated 
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since 2010. The main challenge they agreed was the increasing number of new business ideas 
explored through the programs, and the need to exploit opportunities being captured by 
enormous numbers of ideas (see Section 7.4.2). The project manager of the OVS project stated: 
“we came to realize that the implementation of ideas is much more important than the ideas 
themselves” (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2015). 
In 2012, the project concluded that more a systematic approach had to be applied to realize 
identified business opportunities, by which the CV unit can support internal and external CV 
teams and help them to develop business plans and the new IT services and products they 
proposed. The project manager presented the needs to his senior managers (L2 to L4 managers) 
and to CEO#6, and the Acceleration-α was launched in the mid-2012 (KE#14). In the evolution 
of CV at Company Alpha, the OVS project played a key role in the variation stage, and this will 
be discussed in Section 8.3.3. 
The Corporate Venturing Strategy (CVS) project led by middle managers (L5 managers) 
Second, the CVS project was a six-month strategy development project initiated by L5 
managers. In the summer of 2013, three middle-level managers joined and started the CVS 
project to review the outcomes of their CV programs and to develop strategic objectives for, if 
any, a new program. In 2003, after an ad-hoc mid-year reshuffling (R#2013-2), the location of 
the CV unit (the Emerging Business Team) was shifted to the Corporate R&D Center (see 
Section 6.3.4); the support for the innovation program from the top management team 
including CEO#6 was rapidly decreased. The second CV cycle would have been terminated, if 
the CV unit had not adapted their CV programs by changing the main strategic objective of the 
program. 
The project manager of the CVS project stated that the main reason for considering a new 
program-level strategy was because “the time for harvest [by previous programs] was too long” 
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(I-SM-B, personal interview, 2013). In 2003, the CV unit had been exploring new business 
opportunities by searching for ideas through programs for exploration (e.g. Corporate Idea-α). 
As selected ideas and required technologies were more clearly defined, they were also utilizing 
vital resources (e.g. technologies and human resources) to implement ideas through a program 
for exploitation (e.g. Acceleration-α) (see Section 7.4.2). However, due to a lack of viable new 
business outcomes, the members of the CV unit had difficulties in justifying their values to the 
firm (see Section 6.3.4). 
The project arrived at a conclusion that a new CV program should be an exploitative program 
in order to secure specific technologies already defined in the technology roadmap. They 
proposed a plan “to set up a venture fund and to start CVC activities based in Silicon Valley” (I-
SM-B, personal interview, 2014), which was approved by CEO#6 in 2013, and also by CEO#7 in 
late 2013. At the end of 2014, the firm officially launched the Global CVC-α (KE#29). In the 
evolution of CV at Company Alpha, the CVS project was crucial in the adaptation stage, which 
will be discussed in Section 8.3.4 in more detail. 
8.3  Changing ‘direction of CV’ and the evolution of CV 
Based on the analysis of a series of CV programs by using the direction of CV framework, this 
research reveals the evolution of corporate venturing at the case study firm (see Figure 8.9), 
which helps explain CV cyclicality at a firm level. From 1990 to 2015, the firm performed ten 
CV programs (see Table 6.3), and there is a repeating pattern occurring within the first (1997–
2002) and the second CV cycle (2011–2015), where each cycle is composed of evolutionary 
stages: initiation, reproduction, variation, and, in the second cycle only, adaptation. 
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Figure 8.9 Changing direction of CV and the evolution of CV at Company Alpha 
Source: Developed by the author. 
The identification of these evolutionary cycles and their stages helps us understand who in the 
firm innovates and why through the operation of a range of CV programs. In the following 
sections, four stages in the evolutionary cycle will be discussed. 
8.3.1 Initiation (the Mobile App Idea and the 2011 Corporate Idea-α programs) 
Technology-driven CV program for exploration 
The beginning of the initiation stage was started by two CV programs within the R&D side of 
the firm: the Research Challenge in the first CV cycle and the Mobile App Idea in the second 
(see Figure 8.9). Observing through the new framing of direction (the direction of CV), these 
programs at the initiation stage pertain to technology-driven CV programs for exploration. 
As discussed in Section 6.3.1, the Mobile App Idea program was a small-scale idea gathering 
program. Later, this acted as a prototype of CV programs, and evolved into the 2011 Corporate 
Idea-α, which is the first CV program in the second CV cycle. A similar pattern had occurred in 
the first CV cycle, where the Research Challenge in 1993 was evolved into the ICV-α1 in 1997 
(see Section 5.3.1). 
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All of these programs in the initiation stage were designed initially, purely for the purpose of 
gathering fresh IT service ideas, which were new to the firm. The initiation of new CV cycles 
was partly triggered by the identification of strategic technologies: Internet technology in the 
first cycle, and smartphone and cloud computing in the second (see Section 8.2.2). Once the 
strategic technologies were identified, the firm actively started new CV programs to explore 
new business opportunities by searching for new ideas (business, service, etc.). 
In the second CV cycle, members of the Technology Strategy Group, then the de facto CV unit, 
were the main actors (i.e. the locus of innovation). In 2010, the lack of ideas desperately felt 
by CTO#12 changed the way the firm did R&D and carried out its new business development 
(NBD) activities. 200  Mandated by CTO#12, a new corporate-level innovation strategy was 
developed by the Technology Strategy Group, which included a plan for an idea gathering 
program (see Section 6.3.1). In a technology strategy meeting in 2010, CTO#12 underlined the 
need for change in their approach to new business development led by the Corporate R&D 
Center: 
So far, we’ve attempted to squeeze ideas out of researchers; however, we now need to 
change the approach to carefully identify gems from the flood of ideas coming through 
the idea gathering channel. Here, the assessment of ideas will be our core function.201 
In the autumn of 2010, Company Alpha launched the Mobile App Idea (see Section 6.3.1); and 
this was followed by the 2011 Corporate Idea-α in the spring of 2011 (see Section 6.3.2). When 
designing these programs, the operation team (the Technology Strategy Group) did not have 
enough knowledge about the “idea competition (IC)” (Mortara et al., 2013) program; therefore, 
they had to benchmark best practices—i.e. “Innovation Management Practices (IMPs)” (Tidd 
                                                            
200 As quoted in Section 6.3.1, CTO#12 described the desperate feeling as “a genuine thirst for ideas” 
(CTO#12, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added). 
201 Company Alpha (2010) ‘Meeting Minutes: Open innovation strategy meeting’ 
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and Thuriaux-Alemán, 2016)—which included the idea management program developed by a 
subsidiary of the Alpha Group, because they gathered more than ten thousand ideas per 
month about new business and process innovation from their employees via an idea gathering 
program. 
Actually, the case study firm was one of the pioneers in the history of corporate venturing (CV) 
in the Korean high-tech industry, as they performed CV programs in their first CV cycle in the 
1990s. However, by the time the second CV cycle started, there was no accumulated 
knowledge of how to manage CV programs. Furthermore, when they were operating CV 
programs in the second CV cycle, no one in the de facto CV unit used the term corporate 
venturing (CV) when referring to the Mobile App Idea and the Corporate Idea-α programs (TS-
SM-A, personal interview, 2014; CVC-SM-A, personal interview, 2014). This evidence 
demonstrates that Company Alpha realized in hindsight, only in the second half of 2011, that 
a series of innovation programs they had been operating would be called corporate venturing 
(CV) by others. 
In the second CV cycle, the number of ideas gathered though the two CV programs was 
relatively small (see Figure 8.10). When the Mobile App Idea ran in 2010, the CV unit created 
a special webpage on the firm’s groupware system, through which 250 employees submitted 
364 new business ideas. In the 2011 Corporate Idea-α, they developed an independent idea 
portal system, and 1,170 employees submitted 1,357 ideas using the new system. 
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Figure 8.10 CV programs for exploration and increasing number of new business and 
service ideas (2010–2014) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
The assessment processes for the two programs were designed primarily to select new 
business ideas mainly by their novelty (TS-M, personal interview, 2014). The assessment 
process was improved during this period. At first, in the Mobile App Idea, all employees were 
invited to review the proposed ideas on the webpage. Any employees who visited the webpage 
rated the ideas using five-star ratings, and about one fifth of the total employees (1,950 people) 
participated in the idea assessment process. 
Later, in the 2011 Corporate Idea-α, the assessment process was refined into three stages: 
evaluation (1) by 60 junior-level employees, (2) by 40 business and technology experts, and (3) 
by 6 top level management. In the first stage, the assessment criteria were ideas’ clarity (40%), 
novelty (40%), and feasibility (20%), through which ideas were filtered mainly on the basis of 
ideas’ innovativeness. The profile of the first stage judges, who were composed of junior-level 
employees, supports this approach applied to the assessment. In the second and third stages, 
two criteria were added: potential market size (30%) and strategic relevance (10%); however, 
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the main assessment factor was still ideas’ novelty (30%). The list of some selected ideas 
indicates that the primary objective of the two technology-driven CV programs was to explore 
new business and service ideas (see Table 8.2). 
Table 8.2: The list of selected ideas (Mobile App Idea, 2011 Corporate Idea-α) 
Year CV program Rank Idea description Core technologies 
2010 Mobile App Idea 
1 Mobile car navigation application Digital image processing 
2 Personal accounting mobile application CRM (customer relationship management) data analytics 
3 Mobile toll payment application Mobile payment 
2011 Corporate Idea-α 
1 Crowdsourced learning platform UX (user experience) design 
2 Contact center service Cloud Computing 
3 Connected car service IoT (Internet of Things) 
Source: Elaborated by the author based on the firm’s archival data. 
8.3.2 Reproduction (the National Idea-α and the Global Idea-α programs) 
Market-driven CV program for exploration 
In the reproduction stage, the first and second CV cycles show a similar pattern. The main 
managerial actors for CV programs and the structural unit in which they reside were moved to 
the marketing side of the firm (i.e. the change of the locus of innovation). But still, the main 
strategic objective of CV programs was maintained to explore opportunities for new business 
at the level of ideas. In other words, the programs in the reproduction stage are market-driven 
CV programs for exploration (see Figure 8.9). 
In the second CV cycle, among a range of factors identified in Section 8.2, new CEO#6 (a L1 
manager) with his marketing and strategic planning background was most influential in 
changing the direction of CV. Based on a new corporate-level business strategy to stimulate 
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new business development activities (see Section 6.3.2), CEO#6 accumulated all resources 
related to the CV activities (i.e. on-going programs) to the market side by the annual reshuffling 
(R#2012) (see Section 6.3.3).202 By CEO’s resource structuring action, a new official CV unit (the 
Emerging Business Team) was formed in the Strategic Marketing Office. The General Manager 
of the Innovation Group (I-GM), who was then the director of CV unit, confirmed CEO#6’s 
intention: 
After the annual reshuffling [R#2012], I had a chance to see CEO [CEO#6] at a dinner. 
He said, “Now I gathered all those people doing new business development in one place; 
I hope you do well.” Hearing this, I thought that he wanted some synergies from this 
new combination. It seems that his background from marketing has affected the recent 
annual reshuffling. (I-GM, personal interview, 2014) 
Entering the reproduction stage, the new direction of CV became market-driven CV program 
for exploration, and as a wind change its direction, the way the firm operated new CV programs 
changed. CV programs became the strategic innovation activities closely aligned with the firm’s 
business strategy, and the firm put a lot more emphasis on the number of new business ideas. 
The CV unit therefore increased the scope and scale of CV programs by reproducing a series of 
CV programs. First, the scope of the CV program was extended to cover both internal and 
external idea competition (IC) programs. The CV unit decided to expand their source of ideas 
outside the firm, and designed new programs as an external IC format.203 When designing 
external IC programs, the scale of CV programs was also expanded to the national level (the 
National Idea-α program in 2012) then to the global level (the Global Idea-α program in 2013). 
As a result, the number of ideas gathered through the two programs was substantially 
increased (see Figure 8.10). For example, in 2012, a total of 1,500 people across Korea 
proposed 3,016 ideas (2,155 individual and 861 team ideas) to the National Idea-α. And in 2013, 
                                                            
202 The structural change after this annual reshuffling can be seen in the OC#2012 (see Appendix G). 
203 Idea Competition (e.g. Mortara et al., 2013) 
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a total of 3,420 people proposed 2,749 ideas (1,530 individual and 1,219 team ideas) to the 
Global Idea-α. The evolution of CV from the initiation to the reproduction stage also 
demonstrates that the firm leveraged their experience and knowledge of idea management 
they had gained in the initiation period, which provides empirical evidence to support the claim 
suggested by Tidd and Thuriaux-Alemán (2016): 
… [T]he difficulty of mobilizing the entire organization means that the companies that 
do this well have developed significant capabilities in the area of idea generation and 
assessment and have had to implement other IMPs [innovation management practices], 
which means that this may act as a marker of general good idea management processes 
and approaches. (Tidd and Thuriaux-Alemán, 2016: 1036; emphasis in the original) 
Leveraging their knowledge of the idea management process in the initiation stage, the CV unit 
improved the assessment process to ensure a tight coupling between corporate-level business 
strategy and venture team-level strategy (for the strategic layers of CV, see Table 7.3). In the 
National Idea-α, for example, the assessment process was composed of three stages, in which 
ideas were assessed by judges who are (1) 90 employees and 90 members of the Korean public 
(volunteers) in the first, (2) by 90 employees in the second, and (3) by 12 external advisory 
board members (professors, business experts, VC investors, and futurist) in the third stage. 
The evaluation criteria at the first stage were ideas’ clarity (30%), novelty (40%), and feasibility 
(30%). In the second and third stages, the criterion of potential market size (30%) was added. 
However, the third stage in particular was found to be not conducive to building a tight link 
between the firm’s business strategy and the business model of selected ideas. Judges in the 
third stage were all from outside the firm although they were experts in their own fields. I-SM-
A, who managed the National Idea-α program, recalled: 
For the objectivity of the idea assessment, we organized the advisory board with the 
members of experts from outside the company. But, I still remember the minutes of 
silence in the third assessment meeting. When reviewing the 12 finalist ideas, a VP from 
a venture capital asked, “By the way, what is your company’s business strategy? We 
need to know it to decide these ideas’ priority.” Suddenly, the meeting room became 
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so silent, which was quite an awkward moment. We had to say, “Please can you suggest 
some nice ideas from the list?” (I-SM-A, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
In the Global Idea-α, therefore, the CV unit changed the profile of judges: (1) 150 employees 
in the first, (2) all members of the CV unit in the second, and (3) top management (CSO, CFO), 
Head of the Emerging Business Team, Head of the Strategy Team, Director of the Innovation 
Group, and three external specialists in the third stage. 
At the reproduction stage, external to the firm, the tight coupling between corporate-level 
business strategy and venture team-level strategy (e.g. types of business) had a positive impact, 
as it motivated talented entrepreneurs with novel and ambitious ideas to propose their new 
ideas to the program. A CEO of external CV team (ECV-C), who was one of the finalists and later 
spun off his external CV team (Venture-δ) from Company Alpha, said: 
There were many idea competition programs when I was developing my business idea. 
However, I thought that this program [the National-α] was not just an idea competition; 
it looked like a program that the company is committed to search for its future business. 
(ECV-C, personal interview, 2014; emphasis added) 
Internally, however, there was a decoupling between corporate-level technology strategy and 
venture team-level strategy. First of all, ideas gathered through the CV programs gained 
strategic importance from the top management, and the ideas’ revenue projections were 
included in the corporate business planning. This in turn imposed heavy financial pressures on 
the CV unit. Therefore, the top priority in the ideas’ first assessment stage was changed to the 
size of their potential markets, rather than technologies that could enable those ideas. In 
addition, after the locus of innovation was moved from technology-driven to market-driven, as 
I-M acknowledged, people in the new official CV unit rarely considered ‘technologies’, as if 
they moved into a new ‘thought world’ using ‘different languages’: 
[After the annual reshuffling R#2012] … we [in the CV unit] experienced a disconnection 
from the R&D. Our language was totally changed; we didn’t even use the word 
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‘technology’ in our daily talks. … Our way of thinking was changed as well. … We talked 
much about the size of market for new business ideas proposed. … When evaluating 
ideas in the Global Idea-α, for example, proposals were immediately filtered out if its 
potential market size was less than, say, billion dollars. (I-M, personal interview, 2013; 
emphasis added)204 
8.3.3 Variation (the Acceleration-α program) 
Market-driven CV program for exploitation 
Both in the first and second CV cycles, new types of CV programs were beginning to emerge in 
the midst of the reproduction stage: the CVC-α in the first CV cycle and the Acceleration-α in 
the second (see Figure 8.9). Within the same locus of innovation (market-driven), the strategic 
objective of these programs was changed to exploitation, and these were market-driven CV 
programs for exploitation form the variation stage. 
In this thesis, exploitation is one of the primary strategic objectives of CV programs, which 
means to utilize identified business opportunities (e.g. new business ideas) by securing access 
to vital resources (technologies, business networks, etc.) (see Section 7.4.2). In the first CV 
cycle, the firm operated the CVC-α program mainly to establish business networks with 
ventures (see Section 5.3.3). In the second cycle, however, the Acceleration-α program was 
operated to secure vital resources, especially human resources and technologies, to 
implement ideas identified by many programs in the reproduction stage (see Section 6.3.3). 
Since 2012, the number of ideas gathered through the CV programs was rapidly increased. As 
Figure 8.11 shows, the number of new ideas was increased from 1,721 in 2011 to 6,154 in 2012. 
The increasing number of ideas exerted operational pressures on the CV unit, and its members 
faced a new challenge: a lack of resources (human resources and technologies) to implement 
                                                            
204 This is part of the interview with I-M which was quoted in full in Section 7.3.2. 
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ideas gathered through their CV programs. 
 
Figure 8.11 The emergence of new CV programs for exploitation (2011–2015) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
Accordingly, the CV unit decided the primary objective of a new CV program needs to be 
exploitation, and the Acceleration-α program was launched in mid-2012. As discussed in 
Section 8.2.3, the new program-level strategy (exploitation) was developed through a six-
month strategy development project—the Open Venturing Strategy (OVS) project. The OVS 
project was not mandated in a top-down manner; instead, it was initiated by a L5 manager (I-
SM-B), who realized the importance of idea implementation, rather than ideas themselves (I-
SM-B, personal interview, 2015). I-SM-B shared what he learned from the planning and 
operation of the CV programs in the initiation and reproduction stages: 
By 2012, we came to realize that the implementation of ideas is much more important 
than the ideas themselves. It’s because there are many pivoting moments in the ideas’ 
implementation stage; therefore, it is very important to involve the people who 
proposed ideas in the ideas’ implementation stage. We designed a new program, the 
Acceleration-α, to support ideas’ proposers in our ideation programs [internal and 
external IC programs], and help them refine their business models and develop what 
they proposed. (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2015) 
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Acceleration-α was designed for a systematic level of support for the exploitation of vital 
resources to implement ideas; its underlying principle was that the owner of an idea needs to 
be involved in the idea’s implementation process, which was in line with CTO#12’s rejection of 
the division of labor in the innovation process:205 
I don’t think the innovation process can be assigned to different people at different 
stages. Do you think those people who generate ideas and people who articulate and 
develop those ideas into business can be different? Although basic ideas can be handed 
over, but substantial losses are inevitable. I don’t believe that Adam Smith’s division of 
labor comes into effect in this case. (CTO#12, personal interview, 2014) 
In 2012, one of the finalists in the National Idea-α established an external CV team (Venture-
δ) at the Acceleration-α Center (working space), which provided IT infrastructures, business 
mentoring, and legal consultation (see Section 6.3.3). The business model of Venture-δ was 
then changed from a previous ‘business-to-client (B2C)’ model to a ‘business-to-business (B2B) 
model’, which resulted in the increase of its potential market size. The business mentoring 
provided by the Acceleration-α program was influential in bringing about this change (ECV-C, 
personal interview, 2014). From early 2013, Venture-δ made their first profit by providing a 
B2B service to its parent firm, Company Alpha (I-SM-B, personal interview, 2013). 
  
                                                            
205 In this thesis, the definitions of exploration and exploitation apply to ‘early commercialization’ stages, 
because opportunities are identified by the explorative activities then developed by the exploitative 
activities with the aim of commercialization of the ideas. If exploitation is defined in other ways (e.g. to 
exploit something to make the most of it) and refers to the post-commercialization stage (business in 
general), then actors exploring opportunities and actors exploiting developed opportunities can be 
different, as suggested by Teece’s (1986) profiting from the technological innovation model. 
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8.3.4 Adaptation (the Global CVC-α program) 
Technology-driven CV program for exploitation 
The first CV cycle of the case firm was terminated at the variation stage; whereas, in the second 
cycle, a process of adaptation enabled CV programs to survive in the evolution of CV. Rather 
than being the result of a process of natural selection, it was a proactive change of the program, 
as the survived CV program (the Global CVC-α) was the one which adapted by focusing on the 
exploitation of identified business opportunities by securing access to vital resources (e.g. 
emerging technologies) (see Figure 8.9). When changing the program-level strategy, middle-
level managers (L5 managers) in the CV unit played a vital role in convincing top management 
as a result of the outcome of the Corporate Venturing Strategy (CVS) project (see Section 8.2.3). 
From early 2013, at the latter stage of the variation, high level managers began to become 
concerned about the business outcome of CV programs. Originally, however, there was a huge 
gap between the time during which top management wished to implement ideas and the time 
realistically required for the implementation of ideas. The CSO, the head of strategy, already 
pointed out this gap in 2011: 
I like this plan [for the Corporate Idea-α program]. Senior management, including me, 
is less patient with business outcomes. No matter how you feel about pressure from 
the top [for business outcomes], I hope you can proceed with the plan we reviewed in 
this meeting.206 
A Business Strategy Senior Manager (BS-SM) said that such pressure was inevitable because of 
the growing shortermism, which was pervasive among top management (L1–L2 managers) (BS-
SM, personal interview, 2016). 
                                                            
206 Company Alpha (2011) ‘Meeting Minutes: New business development strategy planning’ 
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Under growing pressure from the top, the CV unit could not prove the viability of their outcome 
except for the promotional effect of the firm’s brand value (I-SM-A, personal interview, 2016). 
Even among the members of the CV unit—many of whom were recruited at the reproduction 
and variation stages—there was a lack of consensus about what the main goal of their 
programs should be. In the words of I-M: 
We talked much about what our direction was. From my viewpoint, it was as if we were 
operating the programs because we had been operating them. (I-M, personal interview, 
2013; emphasis added) 
In the middle of 2013, CEO#6, who was disappointed with the CV unit’s performance, moved 
the Emerging Business Team back to the Corporate R&D Center by an ad-hoc reshuffling 
(#R2013-2). The second CV cycle would have been discontinued, if the CV unit had not adapted 
their CV programs by changing its primary objective. However, having been transferred to the 
Corporate R&D Center, the CV unit started a strategy development project (the CVS project) 
to review their program-level strategy. Due to the longitudinal research design of this study, I-
SM-B had been interviewed in 2013 before the CVS project was launched: 
Our programs have been losing their importance [within the firm], so we need to think 
about a new strategy for the program. We found that the time for harvest [by previous 
programs] was too long, and we need to develop another approach. (I-SM-B, personal 
interview, 2013; emphasis added) 
The CV unit designed a new CV program focusing on the exploitation of already identified 
business opportunities. In the course of adaptation, interactions between I-SM-B (L5 manager) 
and top-level managers (L1–L2 manager) was crucial, which was enabled by the CVS project 
(see Figure 8.8). From early 2014, the Global CVC-α began its operation and the firm officially 
announced the program in late 2014. 
As the new CEO (CEO#7) emphasized the importance of technology capabilities, the 
technology roadmapping process managed by the Technology Strategy Team gained its 
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strategic importance across the firm. The Global CVC-α then became a means of strategic 
access to Silicon Valley, as it was mainly designed for securing technological resources defined 
in the technology roadmap by tapping into high-tech start-ups. CVC-SM-B explained their tasks: 
I’m meeting more than one hundred start-ups in a year. Most early stage start-ups have 
very competitive technologies with less business networks. Therefore, if their 
technological excellence is proved, we are trying to make a link between our business 
and those technologies from the start-up, as our business divisions already have 
established marketing and sales channels. (CVC-SM-B, personal interview, 2016) 
At the adaptation stage of the evolution of CV, Company Alpha running the Global CVC-α 
became a strategic corporate investor. As to the difference between VCs (mostly financial 
investors) and CVCs (mostly strategic investors), the Managing Director of ‘Company D’, which 
is a start-up accelerator in Korea, shared his observations: 
Most VC firms in Korea are financial investors. Maybe more than 80% of them are 
making financial investments, and their payback period [on initial capital investment] 
can be between five to ten years. Even angel investors in Korea are mostly financial 
investors. However, CVCs are, by their nature, making strategic investments, say, more 
than 50% of CVCs are strategic investors. CVCs as strategic investors have a shorter 
payback period than financial investors and it’s between three to five years. …The 
amount of capital investment of CVCs is relatively smaller than VCs, because they [CVCs] 
need to obtain the strategic items for which they invested and to make the next 
strategic investment. (Park, Managing Director of Company D, personal interview, 
2016). 
As a strategic investor, CVC-SM-B at the US office of Company Alpha explained: 
What they [start-ups] want is, rather than the amount of money invested, a strategic 
relationship for a joint business. They themselves believe that financial investment is a 
means of bridging this sort of strategic relationship. Recently, for example, we were 
able to establish a strategic partnership with A company who had deep learning based 
B and C technologies.207 They as a result could expand their business areas into the 
Korean market. This is the opportunity they want. (CVC-SM-B, personal interview, 2016) 
                                                            
207 The company’s name and the specific names of these technologies are disguised. 
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8.4  Conclusion 
At the outset, this chapter has discussed three main factors that influence changes in the 
direction of CV. These three factors are related to managerial actors at different levels in the 
organizational hierarchy: CEO (a L1 manager), CTO (a L2 manager), and middle-level manager 
(especially L5 managers). First, the CEO’s perception on the role of R&D and innovation 
affected how they conducted their resource structuring actions by annual, or ad-hoc, 
reshuffling. These shifted the locus of innovation between technology-driven and market-
driven ones. Next, the identification of strategic technologies was important in transforming 
the technology side of the firm (the Corporate R&D Center) into a locus of innovation. 
Here, CTO#12’s identification of the value of strategic technologies was crucial, as he 
interacted with other actors (CEO, L2 managers, and other managers within the Corporate R&D 
Center), and convinced them of the potential value of specific technologies to the firm. Finally, 
middle-level managers, who were delegated resource-related actions from the top, decided 
the main goals of resource bundling actions (i.e. specific programs). These strategic decisions 
with regard to CV programs were often made in strategy development projects, which were 
initiated by the strategic freedom of middle-level managers. Then the strategic objective of CV 
programs moved between exploration (to identify new business opportunities) and 
exploitation (to utilize identified business opportunities). 
These changes in the direction of CV can be understood from the resource orchestration 
perspective, and this helps explain how the firm combines resources in new ways by using CV 
activities. The results of the case study demonstrate that top-level management periodically 
reviewed and, if necessary, changed the organization’s internal consistency, trying to maintain 
a best strategy-structure linkage. The location of the managerial actors and the structural units 
in which they reside (i.e. the locus of innovation) was changed by the CEO’s resource 
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structuring actions (especially by annual reshufflings). And, within the locus of innovation, 
middle-level managers’ resource bundling actions were followed by setting the program-level 
strategy of CV activities. Collectively, this formed the direction of CV. 
Secondly, using the direction of CV framework developed through the research, this chapter 
has found an evolutionary pattern in the firm’s corporate venturing (CV) efforts (see Figure 
8.9). Based on the analysis of ten CV programs from 1990 to 2015 (see Table 6.3), this thesis 
refers to this pattern as the evolution of corporate venturing, which is composed of four stages: 
initiation, reproduction, variation, and, in the second cycle only, adaptation. The identification 
of CV’s evolution in the first and second CV cycles helps understand the firm’s behavior when 
they conduct CV programs in a more realistic way. It is because the firm’s innovation journey 
related to its CV activities can be explained by who in the organization innovates why, and how 
their activities were developed into different types of CVs. 
In particular, the findings about evolutionary CV cycles, represented by changes in the direction 
of CV, suggests that there are potential pathways along which the firm conducts a range of CV 
programs. Company Alpha was a pioneer in the history of corporate venturing (CV) in the 
Korean high-tech industry, as the firm has conducted a series of CV programs from the mid-
1990s to the current day. However, these pioneering efforts were not continuous. The firm 
started their CV program with its first CV cycle in the 1990s. Reaching its peak in the first cycle, 
however, all CV programs were discontinued, and a new cycle was only initiated after nearly a 
decade. 
However, when the second CV cycle started in the early 2010s, there was no accumulated 
knowledge, or organizational memory, of how to manage CV programs. Even the term 
corporate venturing (CV) was not used in the de facto CV unit when they carried out CV 
programs during the initiation stage of the second cycle. This finding suggests that Company 
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Alpha realized in hindsight, in the second half of 2011, that a series of innovation programs 
they had been operating was what others call corporate venturing (CV). 
The disconnection of knowledge and experiences between the two CV cycles raises questions 
about “organizational memory”. Unlike general perceptions that firms, as a collective group of 
people, maintain their memory in their organizational settings and history, this observation 
suggests that there was limited organizational memory maintained between the two CV cycles. 
After one evolutionary cycle was completely ceased, and after the actors who were involved 
in—and maybe exhausted by—operating CV programs either left the firm or forgot the details, 
a new cycle emerged ‘from the grave’ after nearly eight years. Although the new cycle was 
started by new actors who had limited access to prior organizational memory of the previous 
cycle, the way in which new CV programs were emerged and developed follows a similar 
pattern, which is captured by the changes in the direction of CV framework. 
Importantly, this finding could provide an empirical insight with which to explain the dynamics 
associated with the cyclicality in corporate venturing (e.g. Fast, 1978; Burgelman and 
Valikangas, 2005) (see Section 3.2.5). The identification of a repeating evolutionary pattern at 
Company Alpha suggests that CV is a periodically emerging phenomenon in the history of a 
firm, and ‘corporate venturing’ is a label that refers to a specific type of strategic innovation 
activities in the evolution cycle. Here, it should be noted that CV’s evolution is not in a 
Darwinian way (related to random variation), as “… there is an element of deliberate rather 
than random variation [because] innovation involves conscious experimentation” (Tidd and 
Bessant, 2014: 7). At Company Alpha, the first CV cycle was terminated before it arrived at the 
final stage of its evolution; whereas, a new cycle occurred, which was not terminated and 
reached the adaptation stage by deliberately changing its direction at the variation stage. This 
suggests that there would be another CV cycle that may be initiated again, especially when this 
firm identifies new strategic technologies, and Company Alpha will benefit in the future from 
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knowing about its own corporate history—the evolution of CV identified by this thesis—while 
considering the direction of CV and the management of strategic innovation activities.  
 [241] 
 
CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSION 
9.1  Research questions revisited 
This thesis focuses on corporate venturing (CV), which is an example of an innovation practice 
(see Section 1.2.1). This research was motivated by an empirical phenomenon in CV activities 
known as CV cyclicality (i.e. a cyclical nature of CV activities being repeated over time), which 
happens both globally and locally in Korea (see Section 1.2.2). Specifically, the thesis aims to 
develop a better understanding of CV cyclicality at the level of the firm in a way that helps 
managers manage CV activities—engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007) (see Section 1.3.1). 
Hence, the first research question was articulated as follows: 
How are corporate venturing activities developed, terminated, and then re-started at the level 
of the firm? 
To explore CV cyclicality at the level of the firm, this thesis adopts a case study approach. A 
high-tech ICT firm in Korea (Company Alpha) was chosen as the case study firm, because it is 
the exemplar of a large firm in Korean CV history which repeated CV activities over time. 
Through the observation of, and interaction with, CV practitioners across different levels 
within the case firm, the importance of ‘direction’ in managers’ framing of CV management 
emerged (see Section 1.3.2). At Company Alpha, during a period of major strategic decisions 
on CV activities, CV practitioners’ managerial challenges were converged into a theme: the 
importance of the direction of CV activities. From the strategy literature, strategy is seen as 
“about the direction of organizations” (Rumelt et al., 1994: 9), and managing innovation in a 
strategic manner requires a “clear sense of direction” (Tidd and Bessant, 2014: 21). However, 
it was also revealed that there was a degree of widespread ambiguity about how the concept 
‘direction’ itself was interpreted by different actors within the firm. Today, in the Korean 
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context, the importance of the term ‘direction’ is also highly emphasized after the country 
succeeded in ‘catching up’ with frontiers and moving on to ‘forging ahead’ (see Section 1.3.3). 
Therefore, this research aims to usefully conceptualize ‘direction’ itself in a way that would 
help managers make sense of the phenomenon of CV cyclicality. The second research question 
was then articulated as follows: 
How can different understandings of direction help managers and academics understand and 
explain Company Alpha’s corporate venturing activities and how they repeat over time? 
9.2  Research findings 
9.2.1 A new framing of direction: Direction of CV 
This thesis suggests that there is a new way of thinking about direction in a way that allows us 
to better understand and explain Company Alpha’s repeating CV cycles. Here, the direction of 
CV initially acted as an analytical framework to examine internal activities within the firm 
throughout its twenty-six-year CV history. Later, as empirical evidence was gathered, this 
framework was developed into a conceptual framework that helps explain the evolution of CV 
in the case study firm (e.g. the initiation, variation, termination (or adaptation), and re-
initiation of CV activities). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the review of the strategy literature suggests that there are two 
main ways in which the term ‘direction’ is used in strategy settings. These are distinguished by 
whether direction is focused on states or processes. In the first body of literature, the direction 
of strategy (Type I) is an indication of the content of the firm’s core strategy (e.g. Burgelman’s 
(2002a) strategy vector; see Section 3.2.2). It is a plan defined, adopted, and pursued by the 
firm that will allow it to achieve sustainable competitive advantage (SCA) at some point in the 
future (e.g. being a ‘defender’ or a ‘prospector’). In the second body of literature, the direction 
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of strategic change (Type II) reflects changes in the content of the firm’s core strategy (e.g. 
Zajac et al.’s (2000) ideas about the direction of strategic change; see Section 3.2.2). 
Using a vector analogy (see Figure 3.1), this thesis highlights that the content of strategy itself 
has a direction (Type I); and, when the content of strategy changes from time t (Strategyt) to 
time t+1 (Strategyt+1), the strategy change between Type I directions is represented by the 
difference of the two vectors, which generates another type of direction (Type II). Importantly, 
this reframing helps us clarify that ‘strategic change’ can refer to two things: first, changes that 
are strategic, and second, changes in core strategy (i.e. strategy-change) (see Section 3.2.3). 
Hence, it is possible to have a strategic change that is not strategic in the sense that strategy 
might change, but that change is ill-considered, random, etc. 
The review of the organizational change literature informs an alternative way of thinking about 
direction. Since the 1980s, the core questions about organizational change in this literature 
have shifted from ‘whether organizations can change themselves (or not)’ in the 1970s 
(Demers, 2007) to ‘how organizations can change (i.e. processes of change)’ (Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995). After this change, organizations, which had been regarded as loosely coupled 
systems, came to be increasingly viewed as tightly integrated systems. In addition, rather than 
only being interested in how organizations passively respond to external constraints, the 
literature is increasingly interested in how organizations proactively change and the 
importance of its internal consistency in that change. These changing viewpoints are 
associated with the debate between the contingency approach (Donaldson, 1996) and the 
configuration approach (Miller, 1996) (see Section 3.2.1), and this provides us with an insight 
into the conceptualization of ‘direction’ in the context of CV: a new concept of direction needs 
to capture organizational proactive change generated by reconfiguring their internal elements, 
even without stimuli external to the firm (see Table 3.1). 
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Applying Rajagopalan and Spreitzer’s (1997) three theoretical lenses on strategic change (see 
Section 3.3.1), Type I and Type II directions are found to be the way of thinking about direction 
through the rational lens. The rational lens assumes that (1) external conditions are 
deterministic and immutable; (2) there is an equilibrium which is an effective alignment 
between the firm and its external environmental conditions; and (3) organizations are 
equilibrium-seeking rational systems. However, Rajagopalan and Spreitzer’s (1997) learning 
and cognitive lenses on strategic change helps us think about direction in a new way by 
modifying previous assumptions: (1) environmental conditions are uncertain and dynamic, 
which can be changed influenced by managerial actors; (2) organizations’ proactive change 
can be better enabled by an internal consistency; and (3) what firms do for innovation is to 
deviate from or even disrupting a status quo equilibrium state (see Section 3.3.2). 
Therefore, this thesis suggests that the direction of corporate venturing (CV) can be usefully 
conceptualized as an internal consistency between the firm’s structure (with actors residing in 
the structure) and its strategy. A conceptual framework (the direction of CV) is then developed 
by combining both the main managerial actors who conduct CV activities (the starting point) 
and the primary strategic objective that the CV program pursues and is designed to achieve 
(the end point). This is a new way of framing direction in innovation settings, which considers 
the concept of direction from an internal firm perspective. 
To position the framework in the CV and the strategic management literature, this conceptual 
framework is developed by drawing on resource orchestration (RO) theory (Sirmon et al., 2007; 
Sirmon et al., 2011) (see Section 3.4.1). RO theory emphasizes the role of managerial actors in 
the process of resource combination. The theory suggests that managers’ resource-related 
actions can be divided into three main processes: (1) structuring (the formation of the firm’s 
resource portfolio); (2) bundling (the integration of resources to build the firm’s capabilities); 
and (3) leveraging (the application of the firm’s capabilities to create value). In particular, the 
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theoretical background to the framework’s dimensions are provided by the underexplored but 
prospective research agenda of RO theory: the depth (multiple levels of structures and actors) 
and breadth (multiple levels of strategies) of RO (Sirmon et al., 2011) (see Section 3.4.2). 
9.2.2 Changing direction of CV 
Using the idea of changing direction of CV, this thesis addresses the first research question, 
which is about the process of the repeat of CV activities. As shown in Figure 9.1, the series of 
CV programs in the first and the second CV cycles at Company Alpha (see Table 6.3) can be 
analyzed through the lens of the direction of CV. 
 
Figure 9.1 Changing direction of CV in the first and the second CV cycles at Company Alpha 
Source: Developed by the author 
Figure 9.1 illustrates how CV programs were developed, terminated (or adapted), and then re-
started at Company Alpha in its twenty-six years history of CV activities from 1990 to 2015 (For 
the firm’s timeline, see Appendix D). Importantly, the conceptual framework about the 
direction of CV allows us to see a pattern of change in both within the first (1997–2002) and 
the second cycle (2011–2015) of CV at Company Alpha. 
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Changing locus of Innovation (the X axis) 
On the conceptual framework, the X axis focuses attention on the main managerial actors who 
conduct CV activities (see Figure 9.1). This axis is referred to as locus of innovation, which is 
the starting point of the direction of CV. Inside the firm, there is a distinct group of individual 
actors within specific structural units who undertake a dominant role in managing a series of 
CV activities. The combination of these individual actors and the structural units in which they 
reside collectively form the locus of innovation (see Section 7.3). 
Considering the depth (multiple levels of structures and actors) or RO, a multi-layer framework 
(MLF) composed of five layers (see Figure F.1 in Appendix F) was developed (see Section 7.3.1). 
The MLF enabled identifying distinct groups of individual actors who resided in two L2 level 
units within the R&D side and the marketing side of the firm (see Section 7.3.2). These are the 
two potential loci of innovation at Company Alpha (see Figure F.2 in Appendix F); each locus of 
innovation had their own logic and also there was mutual competition between the two sides. 
Changes in the locus of innovation are identified from the analysis of the organizational charts 
at critical junctures (see Appendix G): main managerial actors (and the structural units they 
reside in) of CV activities swung between the technology and the marketing sides within the 
firm (see Section 7.3.3). This change can be theoretically interpreted from the RO perspective. 
The resource orchestration process was initiated by a CEO’s (L1 manager) resource structuring 
action through annual reshuffling. The change of the locus of innovation was often a result of 
top management’s resource structuring. Subsequent RO actions were then delegated to the 
lower level managers (L2–L5 manager). 
Changing strategic objective (the Y axis) 
On the conceptual framework, the Y axis represents two possible primary aims of CV programs 
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(see Figure 9.1). This axis is referred to as strategic objective, which is the end point of direction. 
From the RO perspective, middle managers, who are delegated to carry out resource-related 
actions, conduct resource orchestration actions by designing and operating a range of CV 
activities in the form of ‘programs’. Here, the breadth (multiple levels of strategies) of RO 
informs that middle-level managers’ resource orchestration actions themselves need to be 
guided by an overarching strategy (i.e. program-level strategy), which may not be the same as 
corporate- or business-level strategies (see Section 7.4.1). Therefore, multiple levels of 
strategy in the context of CV were articulated using ‘strategic layers of CV’ (see Table 7.3), 
which helped discern two primary strategic objectives of CV programs: exploration and 
exploitation (see Section 7.4.2). Exploration means to identify new business opportunities by 
searching for new ideas (business, service, etc.) from a variety of sources internal and external 
to the firm; whereas exploitation means to utilize identified business opportunities (e.g. new 
business ideas) by securing access to vital resources (technologies, business networks, etc.).  
Changes in the strategic objective of CV programs are identified from the analysis of ten CV 
programs conducted in the history of Company Alpha (see Table 6.3): a series of CV programs 
were developed, terminated, and then re-started with changes in the primary strategic 
objective of the CV programs between exploration of new business opportunities and 
exploitation of identified opportunities (see Section 7.4.3). 
9.2.3 Factors for the changing direction of CV 
The case study of Company Alpha’s CV programs in Chapter 5 and 6 were analyzed in Chapter 
8, focusing on factors that influenced changes in the direction of CV. The analysis suggests that 
there are three main factors, which are associated with managerial actors positioned at 
different levels within the organization, and their interplay with other actors and technological 
changes. Here, the multi-layer framework (MLF) (see Figure F.1 in Appendix F), which was 
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developed to articulate the depth of RO, is also found to be a useful framework to examine the 
role of actors across different levels of the organizational hierarchy. 
The first changing factor is how a chief executive sees the role of R&D and innovation. The CEO 
of the firm is a top-level managerial actor (the L1 manager) (see Section 8.2.1). As a conductor 
of resource orchestration, CEOs of the case study firm (e.g. CEO#5, CEO#6, and CEO#7) were 
the main actors involved in resource structuring actions. As discussed in Section 7.3.3, they 
fostered or shifted the locus of innovation by means of annual reshuffling, and sometimes by 
ad-hoc reshuffling, between the technology side (i.e. technology-driven) and the marketing 
side (i.e. market-driven) of the firm. These were deliberate structural and human resource 
changes implemented by those CEOs. During these changes, the location of the CV unit was 
also changed, because this unit resided in the locus of innovation. The empirical evidence 
suggests that the changes in the locus of innovation were affected by CEOs’ perception on the 
role of R&D and innovation, which were varied by CEOs and sometimes changed during a single 
CEO’s tenure. For example, those who believed (e.g. CEO#7), or came to believe (e.g. CEO#5) 
that the roles of R&D and innovation were more important in the innovation process 
accumulated resources for innovation on the technology side (e.g. the Corporate R&D Center). 
By contrast, CEO#6, who emphasized employees’ interactions with customers in markets and 
the role of the innovation process in scaling up the size of new business ideas, accumulated 
resources on the marketing side (e.g. the Strategic Marketing Office) (see Figure 7.5). 
The second factor is the identification of strategic technologies, which have substantial 
potential to generate new business and technological opportunities (see Section 8.2.2). It 
should be noted that technologies themselves were insufficient to act as a factor that could 
change the direction of CV. Instead, the value of strategic technologies to the firm had to be 
identified, or recognized, by internal actors. As found in Chapter 5 and 6, the case firm’s first 
CV cycle began after the identification of Internet technology. Similarly, the second cycle was 
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initiated after a top-level managerial actor (CTO#12, a L2 manager), who led the Corporate 
R&D Center, recognized the strategic importance of ‘smartphone’ and ‘cloud computing’ 
technologies. As a result, each cycle was initiated by exploratory CV programs from within the 
technology-driven locus of innovation (see Figure 9.1). More specifically, in the second CV cycle, 
CTO#12 recognized in 2007 that smartphone and cloud computing would collectively bring 
substantial new opportunities to the firm (see Section 6.2.3). By interacting with members of 
the Corporate R&D Center (L2 to L5 managers) (see Figure 8.5) and also with the CEO (the L1 
manager) and other C-level executives (L2 managers) (see Figure 8.6), CTO#12 gathered scarce 
resources from across the firm (e.g. financial and human resources), and successfully 
transformed the Corporate R&D Center into the locus of innovation (see Figure 8.4). 
The third factor is the strategic freedom of middle-level managers (L5 managers) who resided 
within the locus of innovation, especially the CV unit (see Section 8.2.3). These L5 managers, 
who were delegated resource-related actions from the top (CEO and CTO), designed detailed 
plans for CV programs and operated newly developed programs. The key issues then were 
setting the primary aim of CV programs. Sometimes, they organized strategy development 
projects (e.g. the Open Venturing Strategy project and the Corporate Venturing Strategy 
project) (see Figure 8.7) to decide their new program-level strategies. These projects were not 
mandated from the top; instead, L5 managers (e.g. I-SM-B) proposed the plan for a strategy 
development project. For example, the Open Venturing Strategy (OVS) project was started 
after I-SM-B realized the importance of idea implementation, rather than ideas themselves (I-
SM-B, personal interview, 2015). After the six-month OVS project, the Acceleration-α was 
launched in mid-2012 to address the need to implement enormous numbers of ideas 
(increased from 1,721 in 2011 to 6,154 in 2012) (see Figure 8.11). Similarly, the Corporate 
Venturing Strategy (CVS) project was started because the time to commercialize ideas 
gathered and nurtured by previous CV programs was too long (I-SM-B, personal interview, 
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2013). As a result, the Global CVC-α, which is a CVC program based in Silicon Valley, was started 
in order to secure specific technologies already defined in the technology roadmap (i.e. to 
exploit identified opportunities). 
9.2.4 Changing direction and the evolution of corporate venturing 
From an understanding of direction developed in this thesis, the conceptual framework about 
the direction of CV allows us to better understand and explain Company Alpha’s repeating CV 
cycles. This addresses the second research question, which is about using an idea of ‘direction’ 
to help explain the phenomenon of ‘CV cyclicality’ at the level of the firm. 
Based on the analysis of ten CV programs from 1990 to 2015 (see Table 6.3), changes in the 
direction of CV can be mapped onto the framework (see Figure 9.2). Here, we can observe a 
pattern of change within the two CV cycles, which is composed of four stages: initiation, 
reproduction, variation, and, in the second cycle only, adaptation. 
Figure 9.2 Changing direction of CV and the evolution of CV at Company Alpha 
Source: Developed by the author. 
Company Alpha’s repeated CV activities in its twenty-six years (1990–2015) history can be 
explained as repeating evolutionary CV cycles aimed at new resource combination. Specifically, 
this thesis makes its main argument about the CV cyclicality at Company Alpha: rather than 
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being terminated separately, a series of CV programs evolved over time for the purpose of 
combining resources in a new way; results of deliberate and experimental efforts then formed 
an evolutionary cycle of CV. The thesis also argues that what was terminated during the firm’s 
repeated CV activities was, instead, a distinct evolutionary cycle of CV, which later re-initiated 
with the next CV cycle. It should be noted that the term ‘evolution’ is not being used in a 
Darwinian way, which is related to random variation. Part of the firm’s evolutionary CV cycles 
is found to be the result of proactive and deliberate experiment (Tidd and Bessant, 2014). 
The findings about evolutionary CV cycles suggests that there are potential pathways along 
which the firm conducts a range of CV programs. As discussed in Section 8.3, in the initiation 
stage, small-scale idea gathering programs were started on the R&D side of the firm, which 
later acted as prototypes and evolved into CV programs to identify new business opportunities 
by searching for new ideas new to the firm. The research suggests that the initiation of both 
CV cycles was highly influenced by the identification of strategic technologies by internal actors 
(see Section 8.2.2). In the reproduction stage, the locus of innovation was shifted to the 
marketing side of the firm. As CV activities became more closely aligned with the firm’s 
business strategy, the scope and scale of CV programs were expanded to search for the firm’s 
core business items in the future. At the variation stage, however, the primary strategic 
objective of CV programs was changed to utilize identified business opportunities (e.g. new 
business ideas) by securing access to vital resources (technologies, business networks, etc.). In 
the first CV cycle, CV programs were terminated at the variation stage; whereas, in the second 
cycle, a process of adaptation enabled CV programs to survive. 
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9.3  Contributions towards knowledge 
9.3.1 Contribution to the CV literature 
Firstly, this thesis contributes towards the CV literature by providing a detailed and empirical 
evidence-based explanation of CV cyclicality at a large Korean high-tech firm. The argument 
about the firm’s repeated CV activities (see Section 9.2.4) goes beyond a relatively simple 
dichotomy between termination (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1998) and evolution (Fast, 1977) in 
the CV literature. This insight helps us understand CV cyclicality (e.g. Fast, 1978; Burgelman 
and Valikangas, 2005) at the level of the firm in a new way: repeated evolutionary CV cycles 
aimed at new resource combination. From this evolutionary pattern, it can be suggested that 
a firm’s CV (and CVC) activities are not so much a unitary concept, but rather a range of 
different programs with varying strategic objectives undertaken by different actors within the 
firm. Hence, the thesis can also contribute as a program-level study of CV activities within a 
single firm over time, which helps bridge a divide between the CV and the CVC literature. 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the CV literature by providing an empirical insight that can 
help managers (e.g. CV practitioners) manage their CV activities. Assuming that CV activities 
can be a periodically emerging innovation practice in the history of a firm, practitioners of the 
firm may well benefit from knowing their own history of CV. At Company Alpha, one CV cycle 
was completely discontinued at its peak, but a new CV cycle was re-initiated after nearly a 
decade. Seen through the direction of CV framework (see Figure 9.2), CV programs in the 
second CV cycle were developed and operated in a similar way to the previous CV cycle 
although the latter cycle was initiated and operated by totally new managerial actors. 
Nevertheless, almost no organizational memory about their previous CV efforts remained in 
the firm. For example, it is found that they did not initially intend to start a CV program in the 
second CV cycle. Instead, actors in the CV unit only realized in hindsight, in the middle of the 
 [253] 
 
cycle, that a series of innovation programs they had been operating would be called corporate 
venturing by others (see Section 8.4). If, as is expected, there will be another CV cycle, which 
will be re-initiated if and when the firm identifies new strategic technologies, Company Alpha’s 
managers will benefit from knowing its own history and the repeated evolutionary CV cycles 
identified by this thesis. 
Thirdly, this thesis contributes towards the CV literature by compiling and documenting a 
detailed explanation of the 26-year timeline of the case firm. In the CV literature, as 
Makarevich (2017) recently pointed out, “the internal organizational environment in which 
ventures emerge and operate … is the area where we lack understanding the most” 
(Makarevich, 2017: 189). This thesis provides the result of empirical observations and 
documentation of CV activities and the corporate context (including business history), and this 
helps develop a deeper understanding of corporate venturing conducted by large established 
firms (particularly by a large Korean firm). 
For external observers, researchers often do not have good access to data about large firms. 
Furthermore, publicly available data, such as newspaper articles, is either limited in its 
explanatory level, or sometimes, mere representations of what they want people outside the 
firm to know about them. An External Communication Senior Manager at Company Alpha 
confirmed that if and how to announce a press release is a highly strategic decision (EC-SM, 
personal interview, 2014). These could be some of the reasons why many large firms are 
treated as a ‘black box’ in many cases. 
The 26-year timeline (see Appendix D) was compiled through the researcher’s interviews and 
the in-depth analysis of multiple types of business archives (e.g. meeting minutes, 
organizational charts, etc.). In order to develop a whole timeline, retired employees and 
external collaborators were additionally interviewed. Internal actors were found to be fully 
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emerged with their everyday operation of programs, while not retaining their previous 
organizational memories. In addition, business archives were found to be inadequately 
managed due to practitioners’ demanding operational tasks. Therefore, identifying and 
collecting the data, and weaving those data into the timeline, which is one of the important 
empirical outcomes in this thesis, would be a significant empirical contribution to the CV 
literature. 
9.3.2 Contribution to the strategy and innovation management literature 
This thesis contributes to the strategy literature by clarifying concepts of direction in strategic 
settings (Type I and Type II direction) and by suggesting a new way of framing direction (the 
direction of CV). Direction is a key attribute of change (Demers, 2007), and it is a dimension 
that helps us discern changes and decide future strategic movements. These Type I and Type 
II directions focus on where a firm is aiming to go, which is central from a ‘rationalist’ school 
perspective where changes are seen through the rational lens on strategic change 
(Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997). However, considering the shift in the organizational change 
literature, where organizations are seen as tightly integrated systems that can change 
themselves proactively, the concept of direction in innovation settings needs to be updated to 
take this theoretical shift into account. 
In this regard, the thesis also contributes to the strategy and innovation management 
literature by suggesting a new framing of direction from an internal firm perspective. This new 
framing updates the direction from a ‘rationalist’ school focus on where a firm is aiming to go, 
to one which considers both who in the organization (managerial actors residing in the 
structure) innovates and why (program-level strategies). The direction of CV framework helps 
us understand organizational and strategic change in a new way that organizations can 
generate changes proactively by reconfiguring their internal elements, even without stimuli 
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external to the firm. The thesis demonstrates that this new framing is theoretically useful as it 
helps explain CV cyclicality at the level of the firm, which is an important but under explored 
phenomenon in the CV literature (Burgelman and Valikangas, 2005). Specifically, the new 
framing of direction (the direction of CV) helps us understand and explain the process of the 
repeat of CV activities from the perspective of new resource combination. 
9.3.3 Contribution to the resource orchestration literature 
This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to resource orchestration (RO) theory (Sirmon et 
al., 2007; Sirmon et al., 2011) by improving its understanding and updating theoretical building 
blocks. RO theory is at a nascent developmental stage; however, it has a great deal of potential 
to explain the role of managers’ resource-related actions (resource structuring, bundling, and 
leveraging) and the process of resource combination (see Section 3.4.1). Specifically, Sirmon 
et al. (2011) have suggested that this theory’s prospective future research agenda involves the 
depth (multiple levels of structures and actors) and breadth (multiple levels of strategies) of 
RO. However, these agenda have not yet been effectively explored and developed both 
theoretically and empirically. 
By analyzing the multiple levels of strategy and structure within the firm, the empirical analysis 
improves our understanding of the breadth (multiple levels of the firm’s strategy) and the 
depth (multiple levels of structures and actors within the firm) of RO. More specifically, in the 
context of the firm performing corporate venturing, multiple levels of strategy (i.e. the breadth 
of RO) are more clearly articulated using ‘strategic layers of CV’ (see Table 7.3). In addition, 
multiple hierarchies in structure and actor (i.e. the depth of RO) are more clearly understood 
by applying a ‘multi-layer framework (MLF)’ for structural and actor analysis (see Figure 7.3). 
This thesis contributes to RO theory by providing a detailed empirical explanation of the depth 
of RO. As noted in Section 7.3.3, Sirmon et al. (2011), by drawing on Floyd and Lane (2000), 
 [256] 
 
hypothesized that the interaction across different managerial levels in organizations occurs 
when “top management is more likely to delegate authority to middle managers to direct the 
necessary structuring, bundling, and leveraging actions.” (Sirmon et al., 2011: 1405). Unlike 
the top management’s resource orchestration action (e.g. Chadwick et al., 2015), however, our 
theoretical understanding of the role of middle level managers is still limited. The research’s 
findings highlight that RO actions in the large firm are often initiated by top management’s 
resource structuring action by means of organizational reshuffling (see Section 7.3.3). Through 
reshuffling, top management (e.g. CEO) changes the location of main managerial actors 
conducting CV activities (i.e. changing locus of innovation), and subsequent RO actions are 
delegated to these lower level managers. 
Next, this thesis contributes to RO theory by providing an empirical case of the breadth of RO. 
This thesis demonstrates that, after the ‘delegation of authority from top management’ 
(Sirmon et al., 2011: 1405), middle managers’ RO actions themselves need to be guided by 
another level of strategy which may not be the same as corporate- or business-level strategies. 
The thesis suggests that the strategy for the CV program can be helpfully guided by two 
primary strategic objectives: exploration (i.e. to identify new business opportunities) and 
exploitation (i.e. to utilize identified business opportunities) (see Section 7.4.3). 
9.3.4 Methodological contribution 
This thesis makes a methodological contribution to the study of large firms, especially in non-
English speaking countries, by providing a detailed explanation of the research design and the 
processes of data collection analysis. These strengthen the ‘replication logic’ (Yin, 2013) of 
further research, and they can also be used as a source of reference for other researchers who 
have to address similar issues. 
This thesis has developed a ‘multi-layer framework (MLF)’ for structural and actor analysis (see 
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Appendix F) which helps analyze the organizational charts of large Korean firms. The case firm’s 
organizational charts at critical junctures (2000–2013) were obtained for the analysis of 
dynamic strategic and organizational changes within the firm over periods of time. The results 
of the analysis through the application of this framework are displayed in a systematic way 
(see Appendix G). The five levels in the MLF can be utilized in the analysis of other large firms’ 
structures and multiple levels of actors. 
Next, this thesis provides a practical example of how to ensure the anonymity of the case study 
firm and interviewees for the purpose of confidentiality, which is a central element of ethical 
social research (Wiles et al., 2008). There were some issues, which arose, such as the distinctive 
characteristics of the case firm and the preferences of some of the interviewees who wished 
to be identifiable. However, every effort was made to handle these issues. The primary method 
was the use of systemized codes for interviewees. Other methods include the disguising of 
identifiable titles of data sources (e.g. business archive, newspaper article, etc.); names of 
organizational units; and other characteristics of interviewees (e.g. business title, gender, etc.). 
Lastly, the case firm and most primary data used for the analysis in this thesis are collected 
from Korea, hence there is acknowledged subjectivity in the research settings. Translation is 
seen as ‘negotiation’ (Eco, 2003) between a translator, original speakers and authors in the 
context of different language systems. This subjective nature of translation was addressed by 
explicitly dividing the language used for the thought and the analysis processes (the Korean 
language—the language of interviewees and business archives) and the language for written 
words (the English language), which were used in ex post translation processes. 
9.4  Limitations and the direction for future research 
The research design of this study—a qualitative case study of a single large established firm—
demonstrates its benefits by usefully addressing the research questions and developing the 
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findings of the research, such as a repeating pattern in the case firm’s CV cycles which has not 
been previously observed. However, this study includes several limitations as follow. 
The first limitation is about generalization of the findings (i.e. to achieve external validity). This 
thesis does not claim that the empirical data collected from the empirical settings (that is, from 
the case firm) is generalizable beyond this specific case. As underlined by Yin (2013), external 
validity in this sense is achieved by statistical generalization in which “an inference is made 
about a population (on universe) on the basis of empirical data collected from a sample of that 
universe” (Yin, 2013: 40; emphasis added). In the case study approach, however, it is less 
relevant to achieve external validity through statistical generalization (Ibid.). Instead, this 
thesis (a case-oriented in-depth study of a single exemplar case firm) aims to achieve external 
validity through analytical generalization in which some theoretical findings or concepts, 
either applied to or emerged from the research, can go beyond the specific empirical settings 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2013). 
Specifically, this thesis does not generalize findings about the evolution of CV cycles beyond 
the specific firm that was empirically examined through the study. Similarly, Robert Burgelman 
also noted in his classic single firm case study on the process of corporate venturing: “Concerns 
of external validity were traded off against opportunities to gain insight into as yet 
incompletely documented phenomena” (Burgelman, 1983b: 224). However, the conceptual 
framework about direction draws on a theory about resource orchestration which is enhanced 
by the research’s findings. This study therefore improves the generalizability (analytical 
generalization) of its findings as it helps RO theory’s analytical usage go beyond the specific 
case in the thesis. 
Importantly, there are other analytically generalizable findings from the thesis, such as shifts 
in the CV program-level strategy between exploration and exploitation and tensions between 
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technology-driven and market-driven locus of innovation. These shape the future research 
agenda suggested by the findings from this thesis. For example, some people might think that 
a division of R&D and marketing units is flexible and vague in the case of small firms and 
ventures, making a sharp distinction between their two loci of innovation (technology- and 
marketing-driven) less clear. However, several professionals in small firms confirmed in 
discussions, which took place during the period of research, that similar patterns exist in their 
organizations (e.g. tension between engineers and marketers within the same team). This 
suggests that the internal dynamics of small firms and ventures can be examined and 
interpreted by applying locus of innovation while modifying this concept at an individual level. 
The second limitation concerns the retrospective nature of the data collection method applied 
in the thesis. To analyze CV activities repeated over time in the case firm’s twenty-six years 
history since the early 1990s, some data collection (especially those about the 1990s) firstly 
relied on selected interviewees’ retrospective memories. There are several interviewees who 
performed different key roles with different job titles in their career at Company Alpha. For 
example, as noted in Section 6.3.4, an Innovation Senior Manager (I-SM-A) during the period 
of the interviews was himself a Technology Strategy Manager (TS-SM-A) before the annual 
reshuffling for 2012. Therefore, this interviewee was interviewed about his tasks and opinions, 
as a person with a then present job title. In addition, the same interviewee was also 
interviewed about his tasks and opinions in previous days, as a person with a different job title 
in the past. With this type of limitation, however, every effort was made to increase the data’s 
reliability. This includes “corroboratory strategies” (Yin, 2013: 121) such as triangulation by 
comparing the interview data with the archival data (i.e. data triangulation) and to ask the 
same questions about past events to multiple interviewees. 
The third limitation concerns the positioning of the thesis as an academic work in the CV 
literature. This study addresses and explains the phenomenon of interest, CV cyclicality at the 
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level of a firm. The thesis argues that the firm’s repeating of CV activities—defined as CV 
cycles—can be understood and explained by using a new framing of ‘direction’. However, 
understandings of CV cyclicality at a national or global level—represented as CV waves—are 
traded off against gaining an insight into developing an understanding of the CV cyclicality of 
a uniquely important firm in Korean CV history. This limitation suggests that more studies on 
other large firms’ CV activities—either in Korea or other countries—will help develop a deeper 
understanding of the cyclical nature of CV activities at different levels of analysis.  
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Appendix A: List of interviewees 
No Organization Name Code Interview Date Organizational Unit Title 
Follow-
up 
Needed 
1 
Company α 
CTO#12 07 Oct 2014 18:30 (2H) CTO 
Executive  
Vice President 
N 
2 EBT-VP 10 Oct 2014 14:30 (1H) Emerging Business Team Vice President N 
3 TS-GM-A  
I-GM 
 
30 Sep 2014 18:30 (2H) 
Technology Strategy Group 
Innovation Group (CV unit) 
 
General Manager Y 
4 TS-GM-B 10 Oct 2014 12:00 (1H) Technology Strategy Group  General Manager N 
5 TS-SM-A 
I-SM-A 
30 Nov 2014 17:00 (2H) 
Technology Strategy Group  
Innovation Group (CV unit) 
 
Senior Manager N 
6 TS-SM-B 
I-SM-B 
21 July 2013 09:30 (1H) 
20 July 2014 18:30 (1H) 
13 Aug 2014 05:30 (1H) 
Technology Strategy Group  
Innovation Group (CV unit) 
Senior Manager Y 
7 TS-M 
I-M 
28 Oct 2013 13:00 (1H)  
13 Aug 2014 05:30 (1H) 
Technology Strategy Group  
Innovation Group (CV unit) 
Manager Y 
8 CVC-SM 
-A (ex) 
14 Oct 2014 18:00 (2H) Innovation Group (CV unit) Senior Manager N 
9 CVC-SM 
-B 
 CVC unit Senior Manager N 
10 IC-SM 09 Oct 2014 17:30 (2H) Incubation Center Senior Manager N 
11 ICV-M-S 24 Sep 2014 21:00 (3H) Internal CV team Venture Manager N 
12 ICV-M-K 08 Oct 2014 19:00 (2H) Internal CV team Venture Manager N 
13 ICV-M-J 11 Oct 2014 09:30 (2H) Internal CV team Venture Manager Y 
14 BD-GM 01 Oct 2014 19:00 (2H) Mobile Business Division General Manager N 
15 BS-SM 
10 Oct 2014 15:30 (1H) 
01 Apr 2016 20:30 (2H) 
 
Corporate Strategy Team Senior Manager Y 
16 EC-SM 07 Oct 2014 21:30 (1H) Communication Team 
(External Communication) 
Senior Manager N 
17 Spin-out firm ECV-C 01 Oct 2014 10:00 (2H) External CV team CEO (Start-up) N 
18 IgniteSpark Choi, HJ 08 Oct 2014 12:00 (2H) N/A CEO (Accelerator) N 
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19 Korea Univ. Hong, SJ 10 Oct 2014 18:30 (2H) Business School Professor of 
Management 
N 
20 Company D208 Park, SH 11 Oct 2014 13:00 (2H) Company D Managing Director Y 
21 LG CNS Seo, HY 02 Oct 2014 11:30 (2H) Business Development Team Senior Manager N 
22 SK Telecom Lee, KY 06 Oct 2014 11:30 (1.5H) Corporate Venturing Team General Manager N 
23 SK Planet Kim, SH 16 Oct 2014 14:00 (2H) Corporate Venturing Team Senior Manager N 
24 KLC (ex) Eum, MJ 07 Oct 2014 12:30 (1.5H) Business Development Team Senior Manager N 
25 Cisco (ex) Roh, BJ 04 Oct 2014 08:30 (2H) Business Development Team Senior Manager N 
26 Angel Investor Roh, JS 13 Oct 2014 19:00 (2H) N/A CEO N 
27 Bain&Compamy Lee, SH 10 Oct 2014 17:15 (1H) Business Strategy Consulting Principle N 
28 Ewha Univ. Song, SY 07 Oct 2014 15:30 (2H) Business School Professor of 
Marketing 
N 
* Organizational units indicate the department where the interviewees worked, or are working. 
** All names of the interviewees from Company Alpha are disguised. 
  
                                                            
208 Unlike “Company Alpha”, this is not a disguised name for the purpose of anonymization. 
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Appendix B: Interview guide (one-to-one in-depth interview) 
Date (duration): DD-MM-YYYY (H hrs M mins) Interview ID: DDMMYYYY_Initial_Count 
Interviewee’s Name:  Position and Title: 
Interview Place: Contact E-mail: 
Notes:  
 
Type of Question Interview Questions (selected) 
General questions 
• Please tell me about your organization, groups/teams/divisions, and the work 
that you do 
• How is your organization structured internally? This could include reference to: 
- Organizational charts 
- The role of groups/teams/divisions 
- Key individuals and the title of their position (or title of their rank) 
• Can you describe the characteristics of the reporting line from you the CEO of 
your company? 
• Who do you collaborate with in the other groups/teams/divisions? 
CV and CVC 
program 
(program-level) 
• Please tell me about the A program. This could include reference to: 
- Ideation processes and categories 
- Evaluation processes and criteria 
- Exit strategies (e.g. spin-offs, new CV teams)  
- Incentive schemes and/or investment processes 
• How, and when, was the A program initiated? 
• What do you think was the main driving force behind the A program’s initiation? 
• When you operated the A program, what was the main goal, aim, of the 
program? 
• How many ideas were gathered by the A program? What were those ideas 
about? How were these then developed, and by whom? Can you comment on the 
current status of those developed ideas? 
• Why did your team (the CV unit) start the B program after the A program? What 
do you think were the reasons for this change? 
• (If the A program was terminated) In your opinion, what do you think was the 
reason the A program discontinuation? 
• What do you think are the differences between the A and the B programs? 
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• What challenges have you encountered operating CV programs? 
CV unit-level 
• Please explain the new business development process of your company 
• How has the new business development process changed, or developed, since 
you were involved in the process? 
• Did you observe, or experience, any difference in your team/programs after the 
relocation of the team (the CV unit) after the reshuffling (in 20xx)? 
• How does your team work with the CEO, top management team members, and 
the CV teams? 
• How does your team collaborate with other groups/teams/divisions and other 
people outside the company? 
CV team-level 
• Please tell me about the work that you do. What is the business model of your 
team (a CV team)? 
• What idea(s) did you propose to the A program, and why? 
• Subsequent to getting approval from the CV unit, how were your ideas 
developed? 
• How does your team (a CV team) work with the CV unit, and with the top 
management team? 
• What challenges have you encountered running your team? 
Strategy 
development 
project 
• What did you do during the X project? 
• Who proposed the X project, and how was it initiated? 
• What was the main goal, or aim, of the X project? 
• How did you work with the CEO and other top management team members in 
relation to X project? What was the main outcome of the X project? 
• (To top management team members) Why did you mandate XX to the project 
members working on the X project? 
Organizational 
reshuffling 
• Please tell me about the organizational reshuffling in the year of 20xx. 
• Why do you think the CEO moved the location of your team (the CV unit) from 
R&D to marketing (or from marketing to R&D) in 20xx? 
• Can you explain any internal changes after the relocation of your team? What 
impact do you think the relocation had on your team and program? Did you feel 
any kind of changes in the relationship between your team and R&D (or 
marketing)? 
Etc. 
• What do you mean by changes in the ‘direction’ of your programs? 
• Please explain R&D processes of your company. 
• What do you think about the role of Y technology to your company? 
• What do you think is the most important thing for the successful management 
of CV? 
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Appendix C: List of provisional codes 
No Category Code Rationale* 
1.1 
Corporate Venturing (CV) 
#CV-Definition  
1.2 #CV-Objective  
1.3 #CV-Termination  
1.4 #CV-Type  
1.5 #CV-Process  
2.1 
Strategy 
#Strategy-Top Level  
2.2 #Strategy-CV Team Level  
2.3 #Strategy-Venture Team Level  
3.1 Innovation #Innovation-Termination Phenomena 
4.1 Direction #Direction Core concept 
5.1 
Locus of Innovation 
#Locus of Innovation Analytical framework 
5.2 #Locus of Innovation-Technology Driven Analytical framework 
5.3 #Locus of Innovation-Market Driven Analytical framework 
6.1 
Strategic Objective 
#Strategic Objective Analytical framework 
6.2 #Strategic Objective-Searching Opportunities Analytical framework 
6.3 #Strategic Objective-Building Capabilities Analytical framework 
7.1 
Changes 
#Change-Direction Research question 
7.2 #Change-Locus of Innovation Research question 
7.3 #Change-Strategic Objective Research question 
7.4 #Change-Factor Research question 
8.1 
Queries 
#Queries-Surprizes Miles and Huberman (1994) 
8.2 #Queries-Puzzles Miles and Huberman (1994) 
9.1 
Etc. 
#CV program Unit of analysis 
9.2 #Cyclicality Phenomena 
9.3 #Research Question  
* This column indicates why these provisional codes were developed during the first cycle coding 
stage.  
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Appendix D: The 26-year timeline associated with CV programs (1990–2015) 
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Appendix E: Changing direction of CV and the evolution of CV 
 
 
Figure E.1 Changing direction of CV in the first and the second CV cycles at Company Alpha 
(see Figure 7.2) 
Source: Developed by the author 
 
 
 
Figure E.2 Changing direction of CV and the evolution of CV at Company Alpha  
(see Figure 8.9) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
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Appendix F: A multi-layer framework (MLF) and two potential loci of innovation 
 
 
Figure F.1 A multi-layer framework (MLF) for structural and actor analysis (applied to 
OC#2012) (see Figure 7.3) 
Source: Developed by the author. 
 
 
Figure F.2 Two potential loci of innovation at Company Alpha (Technology-driven vs. 
Market-driven) (see Figure 7.4) 
Source: Developed by the author.  
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Appendix G: Organizational charts of Company Alpha at five critical junctures 
Chapter 5 and 6 presented five organizational charts of the case firm at its critical junctures. 
For a more convenient comparison, those charts are included here. These charts are 
elaborated based on Company Alpha’s business archives (e.g. annual reshuffling plans). 
Structural units colored in blue represent newly formed divisions following the announcement 
of a new corporate-level strategy. In addition, italicized names indicate a change of a person 
in the position between two consecutive organizational charts. 
 
Organizational chart of Company Alpha (March 2000) (OC#2000) 
 
Figure G.1 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, March 2000 (see Figure 5.4) 
* CFO: Chief Financial Officer; CHRO: Chief Human Resources Officer; CIO: Chief Information Officer; 
COO: Chief Operating Officer; CTO: Chief Technology Officer 
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Organizational chart of Company Alpha (March 2006) (OC#2006) 
 
Figure G.2 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, March 2006 (see Figure 6.2) 
 
Organizational chart of Company Alpha (January 2010) (OC#2010) 
 
Figure G.3 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, January 2010 (see Figure 6.3)  
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Organizational chart of Company Alpha (January 2012) (OC#2012) 
 
Figure G.4 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, January 2012 (see Figure 6.4) 
Organizational chart of Company Alpha (January 2013) (OC#2013) 
 
Figure G.5 Organizational chart of Company Alpha, July 2013 (see Figure 6.5) 
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